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Abstract 
 
 
Why explain the communicative behaviours of animals by invoking the 
information/meaning ‘transmitted’ by signals? Why not explain communication in 
purely causal/functional terms? This thesis addresses active controversy regarding the 
nature and role of concepts of information, content and meaning in the scientific 
explanation of animal communication. I defend the methodology of explaining animal 
communication by invoking the ‘meaning’ of signals, and responds to worries raised 
by sceptics of this methodology in the scientific and philosophical literature. This 
involves: showing what facts about communication a non-informational methodology 
leaves unexplained; constructing a well-defined theory of content (or ‘natural 
meaning’) for most animal signals; and getting clearer on what cognitive capacities, if 
any, attributing natural meaning to signals implies for senders and receivers. Second, it 
weighs into comparative debates on human-nonhuman continuity, arguing that there 
are, in fact, different notions of meaning applicable to human communication that 
have different consequences for how continuous key aspects of human 
communication are with other species. 
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Preface 
 
 
Concepts of information and meaning appear frequently in biological explanations. In 
the realm of developmental biology, genes are often said to be the ‘blueprint’ of the 
organism, which are ‘transcribed’, ‘translated’, ‘edited’, and ‘proof read’. In the realm 
of evolutionary biology, major transitions are credited to improvements in both the 
amount and accuracy of information capable of being ‘transmitted’ down the 
generations. Some have even identified the role of genes in evolution with an 
‘informational’ domain, existing independently of the domain of matter and energy1. 
This explanatory practice has gained philosophical attention. Why characterise 
the role of only some entities in development or evolution as informational? In the 
developmental realm, sceptics have argued that characterising development as an 
ongoing process of instruction clouds our understanding of the causal mechanisms 
responsible. The charge of genetic determinism has been levelled at those who 
attribute information to genes, but not to other developmental factors like nutrition or 
sunlight. In the evolutionary realm, it has even been argued that a focus on inter-
generational information transmission promotes an implicit dualist ontology. 
When it comes to animal communication2, attributing information to signals 
is also commonplace. A vervet vocalisation is said to carry information about the 
presence of a leopard (Seyfarth et al. 1980). Lizard ‘pushups’, produced for potential 
predators, are said to provide information about escape ability (Leal 1999). Similarly, 
the waggle-dance of a honeybee orientated at 40 degrees from the vertical of the hive 
is said to carry information about food at some distance along a line 400 from the 
sun’s azimuth (von Frisch 1967). In these cases, and many more, animal 
communication is described not merely in causal and/or functional terms. Senders are 
sources of information about the world (including their own internal states); signals 
are imbued with this information; and receivers derive this information from signals.  
 
- Information vs influence - 
 
                                                          
1 See Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny (2016) for an overview. 
2 ‘Animal communication’ will mean nonhuman animal communication unless otherwise specified. 
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A similar, slightly more recent, philosophical debate about information has taken place 
here too. Some attack the practice of attributing information (or ‘content’) to animal 
signals (Rendall, Owren & Ryan 2009; Owren, Rendall & Ryan 2010), while others 
defend it (Seyfarth et al 2010; Carazo & Font 2010). Sceptics argue that we should 
conceive of animal communication in terms of influence as opposed to information. 
Their motivations are both mechanistic and evolutionary (Stegmann 2013). On 
mechanisms, sceptics argue that declaring a receiver to have ‘derived information’ 
from a signal inflates the cognitive sophistication of response behaviours if all that 
happens is that a phylogenetically or ontogenetically-fixed response is triggered by the 
signal. Animal communication is not proximately akin to human communication. As a 
result, we should not impose concepts drawn from the study of semantics (‘content’) 
and pragmatics (‘meaning’) onto explanations of animal communication. When it 
comes to evolution, sceptics argue that an informational methodology gets the game 
theory backwards. Attributing content to signals ignores the degree to which we 
should expect communication to be sender driven and exploitative. Signals, they insist, 
are phenotypes of senders not receivers. Again, the alleged result of an informational 
methodology is that we fail to pay enough attention to how animal communication 
differs from human communication. Instead of focusing on the exquisite ways 
evolution tinkers with the physical form of signals to influence receivers in ways 
favourable to senders, we instead focus on the vaguely-defined ‘content’ that signals 
‘carry’. What is this content and how does a signal carry it? Why focus on it instead of 
the intrinsic physical properties of signals that have actual causal influence? 
Proponents of an informational methodology respond that much of this is 
either confused or question begging. First, we needn’t posit that receivers derive 
information from signals in the way children derive sandwiches from lunchboxes. 
Signals could ‘carry information’ in virtue of something as simple as correlating with 
particular states of the world (Scarantino 2013). Imagine a worker with a ‘stop’ sign 
standing a few hundred metres down the street from some road works. When the 
worker displays the sign to oncoming traffic, this correlates with a truck blocking the 
road at the location of the works. Similarly, a vervet alarm could carry information 
about a predator being here now simply by correlating with the presence of a 
predator. There is no need to posit that the acoustic pattern emitted by the sender 
vervet is some kind of container carrying a distinct commodity known as ‘information 
content’. Second, they argue that the ones getting the game theory wrong are the 
information sceptics (Seyfarth et al 2010). Receivers must be gaining fitness benefits 
from being influenced by signals, or else receivers would evolve or learn to ignore 
signals, given enough time. Proponents argue that we cannot hope to understand why 
receivers respond to signals, given the response plasticity granted them by natural 
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selection and/or learning, without positing that receivers derive fitness benefits from 
signals. ‘Information’ tells us something about the nature of this benefit. 
Thus did the information sceptics rattle their sabres and information 
proponents dig in their heels. But now that the dust has settled a little, where are we 
left and what is there still to do? This thesis is broadly pro-informational. I offer some 
important clarifications to an informational approach in the wake of Stegmann’s 
(2013) anthology on the information vs influence debate. On the evolutionary front, I 
maintain that receivers possess enough flexibility to make information explanatory. 
Even if receivers are at some disadvantage, information is needed to account for why 
receivers respond in species-typical fashion. As mentioned, sceptics object to 
information for reasons that are not only evolutionary. They argue that an 
informational methodology inflates the cognitive sophistication of communicative 
behaviours. Taking this criticism on board, I argue that information proponents must 
be more precise about how receivers ‘derive information’ from signals. Proponents 
argue that because receivers possess response flexibility, they must gain fitness 
benefits if they are ‘listening’ (e.g. Seyfarth et al. 2010). What they gain is said to be 
information, derived from signals (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003, Searcy & Nowicki 
2005). I argue that there are two different ways in which organisms can be said to 
‘derive’ information from signals, corresponding to different degrees of cognitive 
sophistication, and also to two different kinds of response flexibility: diachronic vs 
synchronic. By not being clear about this distinction, proponents of information have 
opened themselves up to inflating the cognitive sophistication of receivers in 
cognitively-simpler species. On the one hand, information can be derived by receivers 
from signals in a minimal sense. This is when the cognitive link between a mental 
representation of the stimulus (in this case the signal), and behaviour, is relatively 
fixed. In such cases, a signal’s information explains why receivers are wired-up to 
respond as they do, from a historical and population level perspective only. On the 
other hand, information can be derived by receivers in a cognitively-richer sense. This 
is when the cognitive link between a mental representation of the signal-stimulus, and 
behaviour, is more sophisticated: i.e. where the organism itself has more control over 
its response to the signal. Here, the information derived from signals can feature in 
more-or-less proximate explanations of why individual receivers respond as they do, 
in real time. It is only in the second case that some degree of cognitive sophistication 
is implied (although it falls short of human communication). I look at a prominent 
pro-information paper where the distinction just outlined is not clear (Seyfarth et al. 
2010), and where, as a result, an informational methodology can easily be seen as 
inflating the cognitive sophistication of many receivers. This will be the primary focus 
of Chapter 3. 
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A preliminary issue, though, concerns making the notion of signal-content 
precise. In addition to the worries presented above, sceptics have also complained that 
the sense in which signals ‘carry information’ is not spelled out in enough detail by 
proponents (Rendall, Owren & Ryan 2009; Owren, Rendall & Ryan 2010). Instead, 
proponents (especially practicing biologists) make vague gestures towards Shannon’s 
(1948) notion of information, formulated for quite different ends in the field of 
communications engineering. To this end, Chapter 1 surveys a range of well-
articulated accounts of content originating in the philosophy of mind literature, plus 
some philosophical theories of content that have already been advanced for animal 
signals. Drawing on the concerns of biologists, I argue that the kind of content 
attributed to animal signals should makes sense of why receivers respond to signals. 
This is a requirement that constrains my choice of theory for grounding signal 
content, of which there are many. To this end, I defend an analysis of content 
wedding correlation with teleology (Shea 2007). The content of a signal is not simply 
what the latter correlates with, as argued by, for instance, Skyrms (2010), Scarantino 
(2013; 2015), and Birch (2014). This is because any signal will correlate with a) too 
many things, which b) won’t necessarily rationalise the receiver’s response. Content 
must be whittled down by considering the selected response of the receiver: more 
specifically the world-state that historically obtained when the response elicited by the 
signal was beneficial to the receiver (Millikan 2004). Conversely, though, the content 
of a signal is not simply the world-state that historically obtained when the elicited 
response was beneficial to the receiver, as argued by Artiga (2014) and Stegmann 
(2005a; 2009). It must, in addition, be the world-state the signal correlates with. This is 
because, without correlation, explaining historical success becomes circular (Godfrey-
Smith 1996, Shea 2007). 
A third unresolved issue is whether communication, or signalhood, can be 
uniquely defined from an informational perspective (Scott-Phillips 2008; Carazo & 
Font 2010; Scarantino 2013). Like in the philosophical literature on organismal 
development and evolution, the question is this: why do we label some causes in 
nature as ‘informational’, but not others? When it comes to the current debate, why 
do we call the intermediary causal factors in some co-adapted interactions (i.e. 
communication) but not others (i.e. grooming) ‘signals’? The answer, as I will show, 
can’t be that signals, uniquely, correlate with functionally-relevant world states 
(Scarantino 2013)3. This is too liberal. Nor can the answer appeal to the ‘arbitrariness’ 
of signals vs non-signals. This is too restrictive. Debate has occurred over whether the 
notion of arbitrariness might be lent upon to defend the attribution of information to 
genes as opposed to other developmental factors (Godfrey-Smith 2000, Stegmann 
                                                          
3 This is so even when content is grounded by teleology as well as correlation, as it will in this thesis. 
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2005b). However, while arbitrariness may justify the singling out of some causal 
factors as informational but not others when it comes to organismal development, I 
argue that it cannot do so when it comes to between-organism communication. This 
is because many animal signals are not arbitrary. Arbitrariness, at least when it comes 
to between-organism interactions, does not make some phenotypes but not others 
‘informational’ in nature. This argument will involve offering a counterfactual notion 
of arbitrariness, as the notion is not well-defined in the current literature, along with 
showing why some paradigm animal signals do not appear to be all that arbitrary 
under this notion. The overarching moral here is that while an informational 
methodology is justified and useful for explaining aspects of animal communication, 
such communication cannot be uniquely defined in informational terms. This will be 
the topic of Chapter 2.  
 
- Natural and non-natural meaning - 
 
In an influential paper published in 1957, Grice distinguished between what he called 
‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ meaning. The former he understood as an entailment 
relation between states of affairs. Fire naturally means smoke because the presence of 
fire entails smoke. Dretske (1981) sought to naturalise mental content using this kind 
of relation. Others have followed this line of thinking but have weakened the required 
relation: natural meaning obtains whenever there is contingency/correlation between 
states of affairs. Thus, smoke naturally means fire because it raises the probability of 
fire, as opposed to making fire certain4. Inspired in part by Dretske (1981), Skyrms 
(2010, p. 1) proclaimed boldly that “all meaning is natural meaning”. 
Chapters 1-3 operate using a notion of natural meaning, albeit one backed by 
teleology as well as correlation (Shea 2007). Chapter 4 changes focus and engages with 
Gricean non-natural meaning. This is because, despite bold assertions by Skyrms 
(2010), not all meaning is natural meaning. At least, not all meaning attributed to 
animal signals in the literature is natural meaning. By ‘non-natural meaning’, Grice 
meant something very different from entailment and/or correlational relations. 
Exactly what he meant will be fleshed out in Chapter 4, but basically for some 
behaviour performed by a sender to carry non-natural meaning it needs to be 1) 
intentional and 2) overtly so. The first criteria states that the behaviour must be 
motivated by a goal which is robustly pursued by an organism sensitive to means-ends 
contingencies in real time. The second requirement holds that this intention 
motivating the sender’s behaviour, i.e. the sender’s “informative intention” (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986), is embedded within a more sophisticated intention: that the receiver 
                                                          
4 There are, after all, smoke machines. 
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recognise the sender’s informative intention. This latter intention is sometimes called 
the “communicative intention” (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
There is a currently-influential line of post-Gricean research on the topic of 
language evolution and operation (Sperber & Wilson 1986; 2002, Gomez 1994, 
Tomasello 1999; 2008, Bloom 2000, Hurford 2007, Csibra 2010, Scott-Phillips 2015, 
Moore 2016; 2017). It posits that both a) acting with the above intentions, and b) 
recognising when others are doing so, are necessary for human communication. 
Human communication requires the expression and recognition of intentions, because 
what is explicitly uttered (or gestured) is always/often an imprecise guide to what 
speakers aim to achieve by uttering. This is to say that semantic content 
underdetermines speaker meaning, where non-natural meaning is envisaged as speaker 
meaning. Jones curses while overtly looking at his watch for Smith. Does Jones want 
Smith to believe they’re late for the lecture, or that he paid too much for his watch? 
Without the ability to recognise what speakers want to achieve by uttering (or 
gesturing), human communication wouldn’t succeed because hearers would never ‘get 
the message’. The message (or the speaker’s meaning) is the speaker’s intention: in this 
case, that the hearer believe they’re late for the lecture. Thus, human communication 
is not simply the coding and decoding of semantic content (and sometimes also 
natural meaning). Of course, coding and decoding often occurs. Language is obviously 
a massively important component in human communication. Plus, we sometimes 
employ natural information in our communicative actions, such as when I point to the 
dark rings around my eyes in telling you I’m exhausted. But these ‘explicit’ sources of 
information are used in the service of a more fundamental process. This is the process 
of expressing and recognising speaker meaning. Explicit evidence of speaker meaning 
is provided, which the hearer must then combine with other information about the 
context, in order to infer the speaker’s intended outcome in uttering/gesturing (i.e. 
that you believe I’m exhausted). In short, human communication is an exercise in folk 
psychology or ‘mindreading’. Explicit evidence, produced by senders, is used by 
hearers to infer a representation which is a placeholder for the speaker’s intention in 
communicating. This stands in opposition to communication involving natural 
meaning only. The latter can take place with zero awareness, on the part of senders or 
receivers, of one another’s motivations. 
According to the post-Gricean line, then, the ability to express and recognise 
intentions explains how humans express and recognise (non-natural) speaker meaning. 
However, a challenge to the post-Gricean view comes from developmental 
psychology, and is presented by Moore (2017). Expressing and recognising both 
informative and communicative intent is standardly thought to require, not just the 
ability to make inferences about others’ mental states, but also the ability to make 
inferences about others’ mental states towards one’s own mental states: to think things 
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like S intends me to believe that S wants me to do P or believe P (Sperber 2000, Tomasello 
2008, Scott-Phillips 2015). However, the present developmental literature on higher-
order mindreading provides reasons to think that this is too demanding. The degree of 
meta-representation required to express and recognise non-natural meaning is 
plausibly beyond the capabilities of young children, who are nevertheless in the 
process of learning how to express and recognise speaker meaning. Moreover, it 
doesn’t seem like adults engage in such inference in quotidian episodes of 
communication. In response to this, some Post-Griceans suggest that the required 
meta-representation goes on implicitly and sub-personally (Sperber & Wilson 2002; 
Scott-Phillips 2015). Others have attempted to reduce the intentional demands of 
expressing and recognising Gricean non-natural meaning (Moore 2016; 2017). In 
Chapter 5, I argue that the intentional (and thus meta-representational) demands of 
communicating with non-natural meaning can be reduced only so far before the 
relevant intentions become explanatorily redundant within the post-Gricean picture. 
As a result, I argue that all proponents of Gricean non-natural meaning must take 
seriously the idea that humans can implicitly/sub-personally meta-represent 
intentions. In Chapter 6, I offer a crude cognitive model of how this might occur. The 
model is massively-modular in nature, because the relevant post-Griceans favour a 
massively-modular view of the mind. However, before this, in Chapter 5, I present a 
graded picture of speaker meaning. I argue there are kinds of speaker meaning that are 
a) non-Gricean, while at the same time b) more sophisticated than natural meaning. 
They are more sophisticated than natural meaning because they require intentional 
behaviour on the part of speakers, and intention recognition (i.e. mindreading) on the 
part of hearers. However, the intentions motivating speakers and recognised by 
hearers are less recursive than Gricean non-natural meaning. Here I draw on the work 
of Csibra (2010) and Moore (2017), while parting ways with the latter to some degree. 
While Chapters 4 and 5 focus largely on human communication, one of the 
primary objectives is nevertheless comparative. We must know what humans are 
doing when communicating before we can judge whether other animals are carrying 
out the same cognitive tasks, or simpler ones. If humans are doing something simpler 
than post-Griceans think, this has comparative ramifications. If, as suggested by 
Moore (2016, 2017), the expression and recognition of non-natural meaning is simpler 
than post-Griceans think, then perhaps other primates are doing it. Alternatively, if 
human communication is non-Gricean but still more advanced than the sending and 
receiving of natural meaning, as I will suggest, then some other primates might, 
alongside humans, be engaged in a form of communication that many other species, 
being limited to natural meaning, are not.  
Finally, Chapter 6 interrogates the foundation of all models of 
communication featuring the expression and/or recognition of intentions, whether 
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fully Gricean or not. It does this because of the murky relationship between 
intentional psychology and cognitive explanation (Bermudez 2005). On some views of 
this relationship, and on decompositional views of cognitive explanation, citing 
intentional states when explaining behaviour (i.e. belief-desire pairs) is not doing 
‘genuine’ cognitive science. Instead, intentional psychology merely provides a way to 
rationalise and predict the behaviours of others, in an abstract sense. There need be 
no systematic resemblance between, on the one hand, states attributed by intentional 
explanation, and on the other, descriptions of mental processes at lower levels of 
analysis (Dennett 1987). In response, and instead of concluding so much the worse 
for intentional psychology, I conclude so much the worse for views of cognitive 
explanation that always demand decomposition. Even if intentional psychology is as 
abstract as Dennett maintains, it nevertheless provides a powerful basis for 
understanding, intervening on, and coordinating with, the thoughts and behaviours of 
others. This holds in the case of communication, too. As a result, it is not 
explanatorily empty to posit that human (and perhaps some nonhuman) 
communication involves the expression and recognition of intentions.  
While Chapter 6 is less explicitly concerned with communication, it is 
continuous with the overall project in interrogating the explanatory role of varieties of 
meaning more sophisticated than merely natural meaning: more specifically, the 
explanatory role of intentions, the expression and recognition of which constitutes the 
expression and recognition of speaker meaning (whether fully Gricean or not). 
Because it is worth asking whether nonhuman primate communication goes beyond 
merely the sending and receiving of natural meaning, it had better be the case that this 
kind of meaning is not explanatorily empty.  
Although this thesis is relatively eclectic in nature, it has some unifying 
themes. Natural meaning is a modest property of signals. It need not worry sceptics of 
information in the information vs influence debate. Attributing natural meaning to 
animal signals, by itself, implies little in the way of cognitive sophistication, and little in 
the way of continuity with human communication. Indeed, the natural meaning of 
animal signals should usually be seen as part of a broadly ultimate or “structuring” 
(Dretske 1994) explanation of communicative behaviour. This stands in contrast to 
speaker meaning, expressed and recognised in species capable of mindreading. Here, 
recognising speaker meaning (whether fully Gricean or not) requires cognitive 
sophistication. It involves inferring what speakers intend to achieve by signalling, even 
if such intentions are not quite as sophisticated as Grice and/or his followers 
envisage. We can (and I argue we probably should) deflate the kind of meaning 
humans paradigmatically traffic in, making it simpler than Gricean non-natural 
meaning. Nevertheless, expressing and recognising speaker meaning depends on 
cognitive abilities not required by the sending and receiving of natural meaning, alone. 
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- A note on terms - 
 
Throughout, I use the following terms interchangeably to refer to that property of 
signals thought problematic by information sceptics and defended by information 
proponents: information; content; natural meaning. Chapter 1 argues that the property 
referred to by these terms is grounded by signal-world correlations along with 
biological proper function. This property is contrasted in Chapter 4 by ‘speaker 
meaning’. The latter is restricted to communication where speakers are motivated by 
intentions towards hearers, and where hearers must infer the intentions of speakers in 
order to understand what is meant. These intentions might be Gricean in nature, or 
alternatively they might be less recursive. In contrast to natural meaning, speaker 
meaning features paradigmatically in psychological explanation. Although I distinguish 
a biological notion of natural meaning from psychological notions of speaker meaning 
in the thesis, in the conclusion I suggest a way in which the two might be combined, 
at least when it comes to human (and plausibly some great ape) communication. 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 1. Why attribute natural meaning to signals? Why not explain animal communication in 
causal/functional terms alone? Given we do want to attribute natural meaning to signals, what is the 
nature of this property? What biological facts ground this kind of meaning? There are several theories 
of content that could be used, each grounding natural meaning in different kinds of biological facts. 
Which one is most suitable? What explanatory considerations should constrain a good theory of 
natural meaning for signals? 
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Chapter 1 
A Biological Notion of Natural Meaning for Signals 
 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to argue for a well-defined theory of content 
for animal signals. A secondary objective is to justify a desideratum that might 
constrain a good theory of content for animal signals. This secondary goal is 
important, because theories of content should be constrained by explanatory concerns 
(Shea 2007). It is one thing to apply some theory of content or another to structures 
in the world customarily or intuitively regarded as information-bearing. It is another 
thing for this content to do explanatory work. Drawing from concerns in the biology 
literature, I argue that a suitable theory of content for animal signals should make 
sense of why receivers respond to signals (and hence, also why senders produce 
them). 
This desideratum for a theory of content is justified in Section 1. There I also 
justify explaining animal communication in informational terms and not merely in 
causal and/or functional terms, given plausible evolutionary assumptions expanded 
upon in Chapter 3. Sections 2 and 3 then consider a range of theories of content, each 
drawn from the philosophical literature, to find one that satisfies my desideratum. To 
bring some order into what has become a rather burgeoning scene, I represent the 
available theories of content according to three criteria: (1) whether a theory of 
content is input-orientated or output-orientated; (2) whether it invokes the notion of 
selected function; and finally (3) whether correlation plays a content-determining role. 
I argue that my desideratum is best met by a theory of content that is: (1) output-
orientated, and (2) inclusive of a notion of selected function (specifically, the selected 
function of the receiver’s response to a signal). Further, I argue (3) that correlation 
must play a content-determining role within the theory. 
 
1. The Explanatory Role of Content 
 
When a male courts a female, do his signals honestly convey his quality relative to 
other males? Or does he exaggerate his quality in order to win over females that 
would otherwise choose some other male? When one animal signals aggressively in a 
contest over a resource, does the signaller honestly covey its likelihood of attack? Or 
does the signaller exaggerate that likelihood in order to intimidate competitors that 
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would otherwise defeat him? The question of reliability versus deceit arises even in 
interactions that, on the face of things, seem to be predominantly cooperative. When 
an offspring begs for food from its parents, does it honestly convey its level of need? 
Or does the offspring exaggerate its need to order to get more food than the parents 
would otherwise provide? (Searcy & Nowikci 2005, p. 1).  
 
Searcy & Nowicki begin their well-known book by highlighting one of the central 
questions occupying the biological study of animal communication. This is the 
question of signal reliability, or ‘honesty’. Given the predominant view that selection 
operates on individuals or their genes, and given, also, that often the fitness interests 
of senders and receivers diverge to varying degrees (sometimes conflicting entirely), 
one would expect senders to often signal unreliably or ‘dishonestly’. Imagine a male of 
relatively low genetic quality courting a female. One would expect him to mimic the 
mating signal of a high-quality male, thus influencing the female to mate with him, 
where this is sub-optimal for her or her genes. After all, selection operates on sender 
signalling strategies, if it operates on anything in communication. Surely, though, 
selection also operates on receiver response strategies. As a result, the female will 
ignore most dishonest signals, creating selection pressure for costly, and thus, honest, 
signalling (Maynard-Smith 2003, Searcy & Nowicki 2005). Sceptics of information in 
the biology of animal communication argue that this assumption is too quick. While 
acknowledging receiver flexibility, they argue we should expect senders to nevertheless 
have the upper hand (Owren, Randall & Ryan 2010). Senders should produce traits 
tapping into pre-existing sensory biases in receivers, such that receivers are 
manipulated. In response, information proponents argue that the selection pressures 
operating solely on senders cannot fully explain why receivers respond. Manipulation 
can only go so far in explaining why, and just as importantly, how, receivers respond. 
Moreover, as the sceptics themselves admit, a situation in which receivers are being 
strongly manipulated is unlikely to persist. Chapter 3 will go into these issues in more 
detail. For now, let us assume, plausibly, that receivers have some adaptive ‘choice’ in 
responding to signals. If this is indeed the case, then the following is suggested. 
Signals must be reliable, at least to a significant degree. If they weren’t, then receivers 
would respond in species-typical fashion less often than they do, and, concomitantly, 
senders would produce less often than they do. But communication is rife in the 
animal kingdom. 
From this, at least two questions are raised. First: what ensures that signals 
are, at least often enough, reliable? Second: what, exactly, do receivers gain from 
responding to reliable signals? Here, I am interested in the second question as 
opposed to the first5. I am interested in how we should characterise what receivers 
                                                          
5 On the first question, Maynard-Smith & Harper (2003) and Search & Nowicki (2005) present a wide 
range of mechanisms ensuring signal honesty, or at least enough honesty to keep receivers ‘listening’. 
They share informational assumptions about evolutionary parity just discussed.   
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gain from responding to reliable (enough) signals. More specifically, what property do 
reliable signals possess that unreliable signals would not (if the latter were produced), 
such that we can point to that property in explaining why receivers respond? An 
intuitive answer to this question is that reliable signals carry ‘information’, where this 
information is ‘about’, or has content referring to, relevant states of the world (including 
what senders might do next). That receivers derive this information/content from 
signals explains why receivers currently respond: i.e. why they have not evolved to 
ignore signals. Thus, Searcy and Nowicki (2005, p. 208) write “the only value of a 
signal to a receiver is as a source of information, and without this value the receivers 
will not respond to the signal and the signalers will not produce it”. This same idea 
motivates Seyfarth et al. (2010, p. 3), in a paper called the central importance of information 
in studies of animal communication, to assert “the concept of information plays a central 
role in studies of animal communication”. According to Seyfarth et al., we cannot 
make sense of why receivers respond to signals, given the response plasticity granted 
to receivers by natural selection (and also learning, it must be noted), unless signals 
carry information. 
Similarly, Wheeler et al. (2011, p. 189) state “the only mechanism from which 
receivers can benefit by responding [to signals] entails signals which vary consistently 
with some feature of the environment” According to Wheeler et al., signals “varying 
consistently” with particular features of the environment is how signals carry 
information. The particular feature of the environment signals covary with is what 
signals carry information about. In a similar vein again, Maynard-Smith & Harper 
(2003, p. 3) assert “if a signal alters the behaviour of others it must, on average, pay 
the receiver of the signal to behave in a way favourable to the signaller; otherwise 
receivers would cease to respond”. This is because signals (unlike acts of coercion) 
influence receivers in a way that “depends on the evolved properties of the brain and 
sense organs of the receiver” (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003, p. 3). An act of 
coercion like a push does not rely on the evolved properties of the brain and sense 
organs of the receiver. The ‘recipient’ has no choice but to ‘comply’. Alternatively, 
when a Peacock’s brilliant display causes a receiver to become sexually receptive, this 
does rely on the evolved properties of the brain and sense organs of the receiver. The 
receiver has a genuine ‘choice’ in whether to comply6, since the brain and sense organs 
of the receivers undergo selection. Given receivers have some adaptive ‘choice’ in 
whether to respond to signals, and given receivers are responding to signals, then “It 
follows that signals must carry information… that is of interest to the receiver” 
(Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003, p. 3). 
                                                          
6 This choice might not be one the receiver makes, herself. Instead, it is one which natural selection 
makes on her behalf. 
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In short, the following idea is widespread among information proponents. The 
idea is that signals carry information, where this information makes sense of the 
existence of communication. More specifically, there is diachronic plasticity in the 
receiver’s response to stimuli. As a result, receivers must be making a return on being 
causally influenced by signals. If they weren’t, then they wouldn’t be responding. But 
receivers are responding. Thus, it is suggested, they must be gaining some adaptive 
benefit. This adaptive benefit is the information derived from signals. I want to use 
this thinking as a constraint on a good theory of content for animal signals. Thus, I 
posit that a theory of content should make sense of why receivers respond to signals 
(and hence why senders produce them). As we will see in Sections 2 and 3, some 
theories of content are more equal than others on this score. I should note that, in 
what follows, my desideratum refers explicitly to making sense solely of why receivers 
respond to signals. However, I take it that making sense of this goes a long way 
towards making sense of why senders produce signals, too. I refer explicitly to content 
having to make sense solely of receiver responses, for reasons of brevity. In doing 
this, though, I do not want to be understood as neglecting intimate evolutionary 
connections between receiver responses and sender strategies (Godfrey-Smith 2013).  
Before we begin shopping for content, however, a potential objection ought to be 
considered (Scott-Phillips 2008). The objection goes as follows: talk of information 
carried by signals is superfluous. It is perfectly possible, and equally enlightening, to 
describe communication in terms of fitness benefits. Indeed, all ‘information’ stands 
in for is the fact that receivers, as well as senders, historically gained a fitness benefit 
by responding to signals. This idea can be captured perfectly well without saying that 
signals ‘transmit information’, and without saying that receivers in some sense ‘derive’ 
this ‘information’. For example, instead of positing that peahens derive information 
from brilliant peacock tails, we should say (simply) that peahens derive a fitness 
benefit from responding in species-typical fashion to brilliant peacock tails. While this 
approach might seem more parsimonious in dispensing with information, it leaves 
something important out of the picture. What it leaves out is the reason receivers gain 
fitness benefits from responding to signals (Carazo & Font 2010, Lean 2014).  
Imagine that, because of selection, two receivers respond differently to a kind of 
signal: one runs away and the other prepares for a fight. Imagine the information 
carried by the signal is that the sender is preparing to attack. So here we have one 
information content (that the sender is preparing to attack) and two different 
responses to this content (running away and preparing for a fight). Now, we can ask 
why it pays each receiver to respond in their respective way to the signal. A prima facie 
plausible answer will be because the signal carried the information that the sender is 
preparing to attack. Without invoking this information, we can’t make sense of why 
our two receivers benefitted from responding to the signal differently. Thus, 
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information is not just a stand-in for the fact that receivers, as well as senders, 
commonly benefit from communication. Rather, information helps explain why 
receivers benefit from responding as they do.  
Thus, an appropriate theory of content for animal signals must make sense of why 
receivers currently respond to signals, given that the fitness interests of senders and 
receivers often diverge. Moreover, content must be the kind of property that makes 
sense of the evolved responses of our two receivers above.  
 
2. Shopping for Content 
 
Drawing from the concerns of biologists studying the evolution of animal 
communication, I’ve proposed that an informational gloss on communication ought 
to make sense of why receivers respond to signals. On this picture, ‘content’ should be 
thought of as a property possessed by a reliable signal, where this property explains 
why a receiver influenced by the signal typically gained a fitness benefit in the past by 
responding. Sections 2 and 3 go into more detail about this kind of property: they 
advance a theory of content for animal signals delivering on my proposed desideratum 
of content attribution. Three different kinds of content originating in philosophy of 
mind will be considered: causal-informational semantics; causal-informational (i.e. 
input-orientated) teleosemantics; and output-orientated teleosemantics. Although each 
originated with the project of ‘naturalising’ the content of mental representation, they 
are prima facie applicable (indeed, perhaps more applicable) to animal signals. I aim to 
show that a particular variant of output-orientated teleosemantics (‘infotel-semantics’) 
goes farthest in assigning the right kind of content to animal signals across a range of 
cases, including deception. Other theories output contents failing to satisfy the 
desideratum advanced in Section 1. I start by considering causal-informational 
semantics. 
 
2.1 CAUSAL-INFORMATIONAL SEMANTICS 
 
A variety of closely related theories of content are all motivated by the same essential 
idea: that the content of a sign is no more than the natural meaning (Grice 1957) it 
carries. By ‘natural meaning’ (and in contrast to ‘non-natural meaning’), Grice meant 
an entailment relation between states of affairs. For instance, the presence of rain 
naturally means that your clothes hanging out to dry will get wet. The presence of 
smoke naturally means there is a fire. A child’s fever naturally means that the child is 
sick. Different labels for essentially the same kind of theory include ‘informational 
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semantics’, ‘indicator semantics’, and ‘causal theories of content7’. Informational and 
indicator theories can be grouped together, while causal theories can be considered a 
subset of informational/indicator theories. Informational theories are boarder than 
causal theories. Causal theories require that a sign be caused by what it represents, 
while informational theories do not. This is an upshot for non-causal informational 
theories. Informational theories, unlike causal theories, leave room for the possibility 
of misinformation: either in the form of ‘deception’ or in the form of mistakes. In 
what follows I will examine non-causal informational theories of content.  
The (synonymous) notions of ‘correlation’ and ‘probability-raising’ are central 
to the kind informational theories of content I will address. By saying that S carries 
information about X, we are saying that S correlates with X. And by saying that S 
correlates with X, we are saying that S raises the probability of X. There are different 
ways of unpacking the notion of information as ‘correlation’ (see Stegmann 2014 for a 
detailed overview). Not all of them will be compatible with the way information is 
evoked in explanations of animal communication. First off, however, it is vital to note 
that probability-raising (and hence correlation) is to be cleanly differentiated from the 
notion of ‘coincidence’.  
Coincidence is not co-extensive with correlation. Even if it’s the case S and X 
coincide to some degree, S doesn’t necessary correlate with X unless S raises the 
probability of X. For instance, assume that S never occurs without X. That is, 
Pr(S/~X) = 0. Assume also that 30 percent of instances in which X obtains S also 
obtains. That is, Pr(S/X) = 0.3. In this case, S raises the probability of X, or correlates 
with X, to the order of 30%. But now assume that S does sometimes occur in the 
absence of X (30% of the time to be exact): Pr(S/~X) = 0.3. In this case, although S 
and X coincide, S does not increase the probability of X. This is because S occurs just as 
much in the absence of X as it does in the presence of X: Pr(S/X) = Pr(S/~X) = 0.3. 
Thus, S doesn’t carry information about X. 
Thus, carrying correlational information involves changing probabilities as 
opposed to mere coincidence. This already rules out various candidates as the content 
of some signal. For example, despite leopard calls coinciding very reliably with oxygen 
being in the atmosphere at normal levels, leopard calls do not raise the probability of 
normal oxygen levels. This is because the leopard call does not make a normal level of 
oxygen in the atmosphere (NLOIA) more likely than it would be, independent of the 
signal: Pr(NLOIA/signal) is no higher than Pr(NLOIA).  
So, in order for a sign S to carry information about some world-state X, the 
former must raise the probability of the latter. However, there is a question regarding 
the degree of correlation required for S to carry (correlational) information about X. 
                                                          
7 Fodorian causal theories of content, not Kripke-Putnam causal theories. 
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One might think that the required correlation must be maximally strong (e.g. Dretske 
1981). For signal S to carry information about X, on this view, the probability of X 
given S must be 1. There is a problem with this, though. The objective probability that 
any event in the biological world obtains given the occurrence of some other event 
will rarely be 1. Thus, such a maximally strong understanding of correlation will not be 
useful when it comes to thinking about the content of animal signals. 
Scarantino (2015), Skryms (2010) and Shea (2007) have each endorsed an 
account of correlational information that is less demanding than Dretske’s8. This 
weaker notion is a good candidate for grounding the content of animal signals. On 
this weaker understanding, a signal S carrying information about X need not entail X. 
Rather, S carries information about X obtaining iff the probability of X given S to be 
greater than the probability of X in the absence of S. For example, even if S raises the 
probability of X from (say) .4 to .459, the display carries information about X 
obtaining (though in this case a small amount). It is also a feature of this 
understanding of correlational information that it does not require S to make it more 
than 50 per cent likely that X obtains. The presence of S just needs to raise the 
probability of X. Even if the conditional probability of the state X given S is less than 
0.5 the signal will still carry information about X obtaining. It will do so if the 
unconditional probability of X absent S is lower than the conditional probability of X 
given S.  
Generally speaking, correlational accounts of content carry with them the 
least amount of theoretical baggage. This is because, unlike subsequent theories to be 
considered, correlational accounts do not depend on philosophically contentious 
notions of biological function. This austerity has its price, however. The price is the 
notorious problem(s) of content indeterminacy.   
 
- Problem: indeterminacy - 
 
Purely correlational accounts of content face indeterminacy problems. A leopard 
alarm call transmits content about the presence of a leopard because there is a 
correlation between leopard alarms and actual leopards. On the one hand, there is the 
probability of a leopard being present independent of an alarm call. On the other 
hand, there is the probability of a leopard being present given a leopard alarm call is 
given. The latter probability is higher than the former. However, correlation is cheap. 
Thus, we ought to worry that the content of the ‘leopard’ alarm call (individuated in 
                                                          
8 It must be noted that Shea (2007) employs his notion of correlational information within a 
teleosemantic view of content. 
9 Although it is likely to carry significantly more information. 
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virtue of its physical structure) will be legion if content is assigned via a correlational 
theory. 
For example, a leopard alarm call correlates with the sender being in a 
particular state of belief, just as well (if not better) than it correlates with the presence 
of an actual leopard10. So why isn’t the content of the ‘leopard call’ the following: 
sender believes there is a leopard here now? Similarly, leopard alarm calls correlate with 
leopard-caused light patterns in the environment just as much as they correlate with 
actual leopards. Whenever there is an actual leopard in the environment there are 
always leopard-caused light patterns in the environment. This is the ‘depth problem’ 
facing informational semantics. The depth problem is one form of indeterminacy 
facing a purely correlational theory of content. It exists due to the basic fact that any 
signal that raises the probability of the presence of some middle-sized distal object in 
the environment like a leopard will also raise the probability of the proximal states 
used to detect and represent a leopard. 
Even more worrying is the difficulty of ruling out wildly disjunctive contents. 
We might respond to the depth problem following Dretske. Dretske (1981) 
anticipated the depth problem and proposed a first-pass solution. The solution 
involves a sender that conditions production of a sign S (i.e. a leopard alarm call) 
carrying content C (i.e. leopard here now) on multiple proximal cues: P1 (i.e. leopard-
caused light patterns) and P2 (leopard-caused sound waves). As a result of signal 
production being conditional upon the receipt of more than one proximal cue, a 
receiver cannot tell from S whether either P1 or P2 obtains. However, the receiver can 
tell from S whether C obtains. S carries much more information about C than either 
P1 or P2 alone. As a result (Dretske argued), C is the content of S as opposed to 
either of P1 or P2. 
There is a problem, however. It is true that one cannot reliably infer one of 
either P1 or P2 from S, but unfortunately one can infer the disjunction P1 OR P2. 
Take the disjunctive set of proximal cues that variously elicit sign production, and S 
will carry just as much information about this disjunction as it will about C. Take the 
disjunctive world-state leopard-caused light patterns OR leopard-caused sound waves OR beliefs 
about a leopard being here now. A leopard alarm call will carry just as much information 
about this disjunction (appropriate filled out) than it will about actual leopards. 
Indeed, the alarm call might carry more information about this disjunction than actual 
leopards, because of false alarms. Why is this problematic? Because of my 
desideratum. The disjunctive state presented in this paragraph is true if any single one 
of its disjuncts is true. For instance, it will be true if the sender believes a leopard is 
                                                          
10 No doubt, leopard alarms are sometimes given mistakenly. Thus, the signals will raise the probability 
that the sender believes there is a leopard here now more than it will raise the probability that there is a 
leopard here now. 
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present (the last disjunct). But the fact that the sender beliefs a leopard is present does 
not, by itself, rationalise the receiver’s response to the alarm call. Only the presence of 
a leopard does this.  
Dretske’s (1986) second-pass solution to the depth problem was to invoke 
learning. If the set of proximal cues is open-ended over ontogenetic time, with the 
sender being able to condition its production of S on novel cues that indicate C, then 
S will carry more information about C as opposed to any particular set of proximal 
disjunctions at time T. However, a rather obvious problem with this second-pass 
solution to the depth problem is that it excludes ‘hard-wired’ communication systems. 
Many between-organism communications systems are developmentally canalised, with 
sender and receiver strategies remaining relatively fixed over ontogenetic time. But we 
don’t want to deny content to these systems just because of this. Biological practice 
attributes content to canalised firefly mating signals just as readily as to vervet alarm 
calling11, and both plastic and hard-wired signals pose the same explanatory challenge: 
why do receivers respond? So, some other solution to the depth problem is needed 
for the present project.  
There is a second form of indeterminacy facing purely correlational accounts 
of content. This is the ‘breadth problem’. Leopard alarms given by vervets are no 
doubt occasionally produced in error: for instance, in the presence of rustling bushes 
when a leopard is not, in fact, present. Thus, ‘leopard signals’ correlate more reliably 
with the disjunction leopard OR rusting bush than they do with just leopards. Needless to 
say, this is not a good outcome for a theory of signal content. The signal would mean 
leopard present OR no leopard present/a bush is rustling12.  
The breadth-problem is particularly pressing when sender and receiver 
interests begin to diverge, or conflict entirely. In such cases, we might expect signals 
to be given ‘deceptively’ at least some of the time. Like Searcy & Nowicki (2005) and 
Skyrms (2010), I use a functional definition of deception: ‘deceptive’ signals are those 
that raise the probability of a state of the world that does not, in fact, happen to 
obtain; such that the sender benefits at the expense of the receiver. Usually, deception 
can exist so long as the proportion of dishonest signals is not too high. Take the 
notorious example of firefly mating signals. Females of one species, Photinus, produce 
flashes of light to attract males seeking to mate. However, females of a closely related 
genus, Photuris, mimic the flash of Photinus females. They lure males of the latter genus 
in and eat them. Thus, the ‘mating call’ raises the probability that there is a female of 
the genus Photinus looking for a mate or that there is a female of the genus Photuris 
                                                          
11 Which is developmentally canalised to a significant degree, at least when it comes to the sender’s side 
of the interaction (Seyfarth & Cheney 2010). 
12 Even worse, if a vervet call raises the probability that a leopard is present, it equally raises the 
probability that a leopard is present or a typewriter is present (or anything else). The probability of p is 
never higher than the probability of p or q, for any q at all. 
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looking for a meal. Of course, disjunctive contents are not to be ruled out a priori. If 
the receiver engaged in some checking or probing behaviour before coming in to land, 
then it would right to say that the disjunctive content explained the response. 
However, without this, the latter content explains why the receiver responds as it 
typically does, as opposed to content about Photuris imposters. Moreover, only if 
content is non-disjunctive and relates solely to Photinus females willing to mate can the 
signal be used dishonestly or deceptively when given by Photuris females looking for a 
meal. 
One conceivable response is this. It is to simply stipulate that the content of 
signals must be: a) non-disjunctive; and moreover b) that (non-disjunctive) world-
state, the probability of which has been raised most by the signal. In our working 
example, this state will be Photinus looking for a mate and not Photuris imposter looking for a 
meal. This response might be acceptable under highly idealised conditions, such as for 
modelling purposes. Outside of such contexts, though, the response seems rather ad-
hoc. I conclude, then, that correlational information faces a major problem as a 
candidate for animal signals: the problem of non-arbitrarily identifying a privileged 
world-state from among the many world-states a signal correlates with. This problem 
occurs on both the ‘horizontal’ dimension (depth) and the ‘vertical’ dimension 
(breadth).  
These sources of indeterminacy are problematic because of our desideratum 
for control attribution. Content should make sense of why receivers respond to 
signals. Take the horizontal dimension. The fact that, say, a leopard alarm correlates 
with a leopard being present or the fact that the sender believes there is a leopard 
present, doesn’t rationalise tree-climbing in response to the signal. This is because the 
content leopard here now OR beliefs about a leopard here now is true when there is just a 
belief about a leopard but no leopard. But in those instances where there was leopard 
belief in the absence of a leopard, climbing a tree in response to the signal did not 
contribute to this response being maintained. Similarly, the fact that a firefly mating 
call correlates with a female looking to mate or the sender wanting to eat the receiver 
doesn’t rationalise the male’s typical response. This is because the content female looking 
to mate OR sender wanting a meal is true when there is merely a sender wanting a meal. 
But when the sender wanted to eat the male as opposed to mate with him, the male 
approaching the sender was not a response that was reinforced by selection. It should 
also be noted that indeterminacy problems have also worried some biologists. Carazo 
& Font (2010, pp. 661-662), mirroring Rendall et al. (2009), state that a significant 
problem faces informational definitions of animal communication based simply on 
‘uncertainty reduction’. The problem “lies in specifying, of all the information 
potentially available to the receptor in a communicative interaction, the subset that 
should be considered relevant to the communicative context”. 
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2.2 INPUT-ORIENTATED (CAUSAL-INFORMATIONAL) TELEOSEMANTICS 
 
In response to these problems with causal-informational theories of content, a 
popular solution has been to go ‘teleosemantic’ and appeal to the notion of selected 
function. One variant of teleosemantics, to be addressed now, is more of an 
augmentation or modification of causal-informational semantics than an essentially 
novel kind of theory. It retains the notion fundamental to causal-informational 
semantics that content depends on correlation, and simply adds teleology to the mix 
to whittle down the promiscuity of correlation on both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions. On this ‘input-orientated’ teleosemantics, the content of a representation 
is what the representation correlates with when the representation producer is 
functioning correctly. For example, while a vervet alarm might correlate with a leopard 
or with beliefs (in the sender) about a leopard, it is the selected function of the signal 
to correlate only with a leopard being present (Dretske 1986, Neander 2013).  
 ‘Output-orientated’ teleosemanticsts, to be considered in Section 2.3, have 
objected to the idea that the selected function of a representation can be to correlate. 
They argue that the selected effect of a trait must be forward-looking, or something 
that occurs causally-downstream of the trait’s activation and in response to the trait’s 
activation. But correlation is an upstream relation: it concerns the relationship 
between a trait and what caused the trait’s activation. Because of this, it can’t be the 
selected function of a trait to correlate with some world-state. This is because selected 
functions of traits are effects that traits have control over, and a trait has no control 
over what activated it: only over what it activates. In order to defend the idea that 
upstream correlation can be the selected function of a representation, Neander (2013, 
2017) has arguing convincingly for the existence of ‘response functions’: systems that 
have a response function were selected to bring about some effect in response to 
particular upstream conditions. It is surely an important historical fact about pain 
receptors, for example, that they fired in response to biologically damaging stimuli, as 
opposed to biologically beneficial stimuli. Similarly, when it comes to animal 
communication. It is surely an important historical fact about communicative 
interactions that senders produced signals in response to appropriate world-states. In 
this light, it is more accurate to ascribe response functions to the systems that produce 
representations, as opposed to those representations themselves. When it is said that a 
leopard alarm call indicates the presence of a leopard and not the presence of a 
leopard or some other irrelevant world-state, because that is what the representation is 
supposed to do, what this really means is that the sender is supposed to token leopard 
alarm calls in the presence of a leopard. With this in mind, we will examine how input-
orientated teleosemantics can solve indeterminacy problems.  
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First, the depth problem. Recall the general form of the problem facing a 
purely correlational theory of content. A vervet call pre-theoretically labelled as a 
‘snake alarm’ raises the probability that a snake is here now. Thus, the content of the 
call is snake here now. However, the vocalisation also raises the probability of many 
world-states more proximal to the sender than the presence of actual snakes. It raises 
the probably that snake-caused patterns of light are present, and it raises the 
probability that beliefs about snakes being present are here now. Thus, the content of 
the vocalisation is unfortunately snake OR snake-induced retinal firings OR beliefs about 
snakes. Neander (2013, 2017) responds that there is a principled way to restrict content 
to the distal world-state. Adapting her argument to vervet signalling, we appeal to 
counterfactual asymmetries. The sender was selected to produce the snake alarm in 
response to snakes. It was selected to do this via producing the alarm in response to 
snake-caused light patterns. However, the sender was not selected to produce the 
alarm in response to snake-caused light patterns via producing it in response to snakes. 
As a result, we restrict content to the more distal world-state of snake. 
What about the breadth problem? The problem, to recall, is that pre-
theoretically labelled ‘snake alarms’ are sometimes mistakenly given in response to 
distal objects that aren’t snakes, such as snake-like sticks. Thus, ‘snake alarms’ carry 
the content snake OR snake-like stick. Additionally, vervets have been reported to 
occasionally give an alarm call in the presence of an individual attempting to migrate 
between groups, to stop the migration (Dennett 1998). If cases of deception like this 
occasionally occur, tokens of the signal-type would mean snake OR snake-like stick OR 
attempted migration. However, if we focus on the selected function of the sender, the 
problem just raised for mistaken signals, but not deceptive signals, can be bypassed. 
The idea is as follows: it is the selected function of senders, qua response systems, to 
token ‘snake alarms’ in the presence of snakes as opposed to snake-like sticks. Thus, 
the content of a ‘snake alarm’ is snake and not snake-like stick. However, causal-
informational teleosemantics doesn’t do as well on the breadth problem when it 
comes to deception. 
 
- Problem 1: non-cooperative communication - 
 
Consider alarm calls produced deceptively. Presumably, it is an adaptation of a sender 
(even if over ontogenetic time) to produce an alarm sometimes in the presence of an 
undesired migration attempt. If this is right, then there is a problem for causal-
informational teleosemantics. On the latter, so-called ‘snake alarms’ will carry content 
about both snakes and intragroup migrations. This is a problem given the desideratum 
for content-attribution suggested in Section 1. Content must explain why receivers 
respond to signals. But the disjunctive content snake OR intragroup migration doesn’t 
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explain why receivers typically respond to snake alarms as they do. This is because the 
disjunctive content is true when there is just a migration occurring but no snake. But 
in such cases the typical response was not rewarded. In contrast, the content snake 
explains why receivers typically respond to snake alarms as they do.  
Another problem is that, given a causal-informational teleosemantics, it 
cannot be said that so-called ‘snake alarms’ are ever tokened deceptively. This is 
because the so-called ‘snake alarm’ isn’t just a snake alarm, under the theory. It’s also a 
migration alarm. This is because the tendency to produce putative ‘snake alarms’ in 
response to snakes or migration attempts is an adaptation of the sender. Thus, the 
signal can’t be tokened deceptively when a migration is taking place.  
 
- Problem 2: adaptation and indication - 
 
The fundamental idea behind input-orientated teleosemantics is that the content of a 
signal-type S is determined by focusing on what producers of S have the selected 
function of indicating. I want to focus on some important commentary on this idea 
given by Godfrey-Smith. Godfrey-Smith (1992) has argued that indication is a 
problematic answer to the question what is the selected function of senders, qua producers of S? 
He argues that S can represent X even if the statistical relationship between S and X is 
quite weak. X just needs to be a world-state that is important in the selection of S as a 
cause of the response S typically elicits in a receiver13.  
Consider detection tasks where the costs of false negatives far outweigh the 
costs of false positives. Take an acoustic vocalisation representing the presence of a 
predator. Was this acoustic pattern recruited by the receiver as a signal of a predator 
because a) whenever it was produced, a predator was lurking, or alternatively because b) 
whenever there was a predator lurking, the signal was produced? These two possibilities are 
quite different. If the former is what explains why the signal was recruited by the 
receiver as an elicitor of response R, then an explanation of why the signal was 
recruited may well involve the idea that it indicates a predator. However, if the latter is 
what accounts for the sign’s recruitment, then an explanation of why the sign was 
recruited need not involve the sign correlating with a predator. For this, latter, task can 
be carried out more effectively by the sender producing signals when there is no 
lurking predator around. That is, it can be carried out more effectively by the sender 
producing many false positives. By creating many false positives, a sender can actually 
better ensure that there is a sign whenever there is a predator nearby.  
A proponent of indication as the selected function of a sender might respond 
that, despite the positive statistical relation between S and X being weak in this case, it 
                                                          
13 Readers in favour of Millikan’s output-based theory of content may begin to be feeling more at home 
here. 
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exists nonetheless. They could point out that S still raises the probability of X, just by 
a small amount. Perhaps 80% of S tokens (the predator alarm) are given in the 
absence of X (the appropriate predator), such that the chance of X, given S, is a low 
20%. Still, if the prior probability of W obtaining is even lower at 5%, the fact that 
20% of S tokens are given in the presence of X means that S raises the probability of 
X: by 15% to be exact. So S still correlates with X, where this correlation explains why 
S was recruited by receivers as a stand-in for X. However, we can modify the case 
such that it becomes problematic to say that the function of a sender (or a signal) is to 
convey information about X. 
Suppose that, as above, S raises the probability of some relevant world-state 
X (i.e. that a predator is present) by 15%: e.g. from 0.05 to 0.2. However, assume now 
that S also raises the probability of another world-state X* (say, that an individual of a 
benign species which looks rather like X individuals is present). Assume, further, that 
S raises the probability of X* (a benign look-alike) by more than it raises the 
probability of X. That is, individuals of the look-alike species cause tokens of S more 
often than individuals of the predator species do. Now, suppose that the cost of 
initiating predator-avoidance behaviour in the presence of a look-alike is quite minor. 
Suppose also that S is the best indicator of X (actual predators) available: no more 
fine-grained sensory discrimination on the part of the sender is possible. In this case, S 
will be recruited as an indicator of X despite carrying more information about X*. The 
problem with this is that it now seems strange to say that S was recruited because it 
correlates with X. What seems more appropriate to say is that S was recruited because 
it elicits behaviour in a receiver that is beneficial given the statistical relation between S 
and X but also given a host of other factors: such as the relevant payoffs and the relevant 
constraints. 
It arguably gets worse for the notion that senders (or signals) are selected for 
correlating with their contents. The above case is one in which S is the closest thing 
possible to a genuine ‘indicator’ of W. Despite S carrying more information about X* 
than X, the ideal is still that S would, if it could, carry information about X more 
reliably than X*. It’s just the case that, for whatever reason, constraints got in the way 
of this ideal. If, contrary to fact, the sender was able to discriminate between Xs and 
X*s, then a signal would eventuate that correlates more strongly with W than with X*.  
However, this might not be true. That is, receivers might sometimes not even 
want a signal to correlate more strongly with X than with some non-X even if this 
were possible. This would be the case if the cost of error is huge. If, whenever a 
sender fails to notice the presence of an actual predator, there is a large chance that 
the receiver will be killed and if the cost of climbing a tree in response to a benign 
look-alike is quite negligible, then it could well be more adaptive (from the point of 
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view of the receiver) for S to correlate more reliably with X*s than with Xs14. In this 
case the selected function of the sender (or signal) would seem to be to correlate with 
X*, not X! 
The ultimate point is that it isn’t reliable correlation that is being selected for 
in this kind of case. The statistical relation between signal and world is only part of a 
complex evolutionary explanation of a sender’s production strategies. Equally relevant 
are constraints, and, crucially, costs and benefits. As already noted, a proponent of 
input-orientated teleosemantics could concede that the signal does not correlate most 
reliably with the relevant world-state X but maintain that the correlation with X is 
nevertheless relevant: ‘sure (they might reply) S carries more information about a 
world-state that isn’t its content, but it still raises the probability of its content, even if 
less than other states!’.  
I do not intend to settle this issue once and for all here. However, it does 
seem strange to me that S can have the function of indicating X no matter how strong 
or weak the positive statistical relation between the two. One consequence of this 
theory will be that more information transmission isn’t necessary better. This is slightly strange. 
If the function of the opposable human thumb is to enable the grasping of objects, it 
would seem that any variation in the thumb that enabled an individual to better grasp 
objects would be favoured, given relevant developmental trade-offs. However, given 
relevant trade-offs, a signal that correlates more strongly with its content is not always 
more favourable than a less informative signal. Although perhaps not definitive, this 
consequence of input-orientated teleosemantics at least calls into question the idea 
that it is the function of senders to correlate signals with world-states. 
This seems like a good place to stop and take stock. By augmenting purely 
correlational theories of content with the idea that it is the selected function of 
senders to correlate, various problems can plausibly be solved. First, Neadner’s (2013) 
functional asymmetry considerations plausibly solve the depth problem. Second, 
looking at what state the sender is designed to raise the probability of by signalling 
might solve the breadth problem. We saw that while input-orientated teleosemantics 
might be able to handle signals sent accidently in the presence of the ‘wrong’ world-
state, it has trouble assigning appropriate contents when signals are sent deceptively by 
the sender: i.e. when the non-‘veridical’ tokening of a signal is an adaptation for the 
sender but detrimental to the receiver. A more fundamental objection to input-
orientated teleosemantics was then considered. This objection questioned whether it 
gets the functional considerations of communication right to say that senders were 
selected for correlating signals with upstream world-states. 
 
                                                          
14 At the very least, it would be more adaptive for S to correlate more reliably with the disjunctive world-
state W or W* than with W alone. 
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2.3 OUTPUT-ORIENTATED TELEOSEMANTICS: ‘BIOSEMANTICS’ 
 
Now we will explore output-orientated teleosemantic theories of content, specifically 
as they apply to animal communication. All have in common the idea that 
indeterminacy problems can be solved by focusing on the selected function of the 
receiver. Whereas input-orientated teleosemantics stresses the function of the sender 
(which, in the theory, is to correlate signals with world-states), biosemantics stresses 
the function of the receiver. What determines content for biosemantics is “what the 
sign needs to correspond to if the consumer is to perform its tasks in its normal way” 
(Millikan 2004, p. 80). The content of a signal is to be identified with the world-state 
that rationalises (in a fitness sense) the behaviour elicited in the receiver.  
The first step in determining content is to discover what the receiver was 
selected for doing in response to some type of signal. The second step is to determine 
the ‘normal condition for the proper performance’ of the receiver’s response. Take 
the ‘mating call’ of the Photinus female firefly, also sent deceptively by female Photuris 
fireflies. The receiver is a male Photinus. The function of the male’s response to the 
signal is to bring the male closer towards the female. Now, this response only makes 
evolutionary sense (from the perspective of a male Photinus) when the sender is a 
Photinus female. When the male caller is a predatory Photuris female, the behaviour of a 
male is not rewarded by selection. Approaching makes no evolutionary sense. Thus, 
the normal condition for the proper performance of the male’s response is that the 
sender is a Photinus female looking to mate, and the signal is genuinely a mating call, as 
opposed to something less determinate.  
The virtues of this kind of theory of content are apparent when contrasted 
with causal-informational semantics. First, the depth problem. Even though leopard 
alarms correlate with, say, leopard-induced retinal firings as well as leopards being 
present, the content of leopard alarms refers to leopards being present and not 
leopard-induced retinal firings. This is because the former, but not the latter world-
state, makes evolutionary sense of the receiver’s response to the signal (i.e. tree-
climbing). Next, one variant of the breadth problem. Imagine, plausibly, that vervets 
sometimes produce ‘leopard’ alarm calls mistakenly, perhaps in response to a rustling 
bush. As a result, the ‘leopard’ alarm will correlate more reliably with leopard present OR 
no leopard present/rustling bush than with leopard present. However, the behaviour elicited 
in a receiver by the signal is tree-climbing. And tree-climbing behaviour only makes 
evolutionary sense in the presence of a leopard, as opposed to rustling bushes in the 
absence of a leopard. Thus, content is restricted to leopard here now.  
Biosemantics also does better than input-oriented teleosemantics in handling 
deception. Even though predatory Photuris females sometimes give the Photinus mating 
signal, such that the signal correlates with Photinus female looking to mate OR Photuris 
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female looking for a meal, this fact is irrelevant in fixing the content of the call. Input-
oriented teleosemantics struggled because, not only does the deceptive signal correlate 
with a disjunctive world-state, it does this, also, as a matter of proper function. Photuris 
females have been adapted to produce the Photinus mating signal15. However, 
biosemantics is not troubled because only the presence of a Photinus female looking to 
mate makes evolutionary sense of the receiver’s response to the signal (i.e. 
approaching the sender). Similarly, biosemantics can accommodate vervet alarm calls 
given during an attempted migration. In this case, the success condition of the 
predator-avoidance behaviour of receivers is that there is a snake here now, and not 
that a migration is occurring. Thus the content is snake as opposed to snake here now 
OR attempted migration. Causal-information teleosemantics ran into trouble because, 
again, not only do alarm calls given deceptively correlate with the disjunctive world-
state, alarm calls do this as a matter of proper function.  
 
- Problem 1: evolutionary success conditions are indeterminate - 
 
Biosemantics is thus able to solve the indeterminacy problems facing a purely 
correlational theory. It is even able to improve upon input-orientated teleosemantics 
when interests of senders and receivers conflict. However, biosemantics faces 
problems of its own (See Neander (2012) for an overview). One issue, which I will not 
address here, originates with Fodor and is motivated by a blanket scepticism about the 
ability of natural selection to select for particular traits and not other co-extensive 
traits. It has been responded to in detail elsewhere and so I will not address it here16.  
The first indeterminacy problem for biosemantics to be addressed here again 
originates with Fodor (1990) but is less extreme. It is the problem of arbitrarily-
described evolutionary success conditions. Natural selection cares about reproductive 
success, but not the particular description we use to explain this success. When it 
comes to communication, whether a signal gets the receiver to produce its typical 
response in the appropriate circumstance is visible to selection, but the description we 
choose for the world-state that rationalises this response is largely arbitrary. Does the 
‘leopard alarm’ mean leopard? Predator? How about survival and reproduction hindrance? 
While some of these aren’t intuitive candidates for the content of this signal-kind, 
each is perfectly plausible given the theoretical machinery of biosemantics: the 
presence of any one of these world-states rationalises the response of the receiver to 
leopard alarms. 
                                                          
15 Of course, I am assuming that the Photuris signal is the same kind of signal as the Photinus signal. I will 
give reasons for this assumptions soon. 
16 Neander (2005), Rosenberg (2013), and Sterelny (1990) have each responded to Fodor’s anti-Darwinian 
scepticism about naturalising content. 
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The second is that of omnipresent evolutionary success conditions. Many 
things in addition to the presence of a leopard were required on past occasions when 
leopard alarms functioned properly: oxygen in the atmosphere; gravity operating 
normally (and so on). Because biosemantics identifies content with the evolutionary 
success condition of the behaviour elicited by the signal, content will be leopard here now 
in the presence of sufficient oxygen in the atmosphere and gravity operating normally (and so on). 
The content for the ‘leopard alarm’ will be a potentially limitless list of success 
conditions and so completely unwieldy. 
The third is the problem of overly-specific evolutionary success conditions. 
All sorts of things could have prevented vervets from gaining a fitness benefit from 
the leopard alarm: e.g. limb injury preventing a vervet from climbing a tree 
successfully in response to the signal. Again, because content is identified with the 
evolutionary success conditions of the response elicited by the signal, the content of 
the ‘leopard alarm’ will be leopard here now and the receiver isn’t badly injured. Likewise, 
imagine a crucial branch breaking while a vervet is climbing a tree in response to the 
signal. In such a case tree-climbing behaviour would not have earned its keep. Thus, 
the content of the ‘leopard alarm’ must be leopard here now and the receiver is able to climb 
and the receiver will not choose a weak branch for a perch. The list of specific success 
conditions is potentially endless, meaning that, again, the content of the ‘leopard 
alarm’ will be extraordinarily detailed. 
Shea (2007) offers a solution the first problem: that of arbitrarily-described 
evolutionary success conditions. His solution is designed to allow biosemantics to rule 
out all of the candidate contents listed above (leopard; predator; survival and reproductive 
hindrance) apart from leopard. His proposal is as follows:  
 
The evolutionary success condition relevant to a particular representation should be 
specific to the behaviour prompted by that representation, as compared with 
behaviour prompted by other representations that mediate between the same 
producer and consumer system (Shea 2007, p. 408). 
 
While there might be a very general success condition relevant to the responses 
elicited by all signal-types, there is a more specific success condition relevant to the 
response elicited by each particular signal-type. This latter, more specific, success 
condition is the content of the signal. While survival and reproduction hindrance is a world-
state that explains why all the predator-avoidance behaviours of vervets (in response 
to alarm calls) are advantageous, it is not a world-state rationalising tree-climbing (in 
response to leopard alarms) as opposed to bush-hiding (in response to eagle alarms). 
Similarly for predator: this is not a world-state rationalising tree-climbing as opposed to 
bush-hiding. Out of the normal candidates, only leopard does this. Of course, Shea’s 
proposal depends on there being more than one type of signal. What about single 
signal systems, like firefly mating flashes? Because this communication system is just 
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signal/no-signal, each signal would naturally mean any of the following: female Photinus 
looking to mate; reproduction-enhancer looking to mate; something that won’t kill you looking to 
mate, etc.  
In response to this I am inclined to bite the bullet. When we are considering 
non-linguistic signalling systems like firefly flashes or vervet alarms, the expectation 
that a theory of content deliver contents that are as fine-grained as linguistic 
utterances is, I think, unrealistic. In addition, the candidate contents of the Photinus 
mating signal all genuinely explain why receivers respond. Thus, while it doesn’t 
deliver contents as fine-grained as linguistic signals, biosemantics is still a genuine 
improvement over causal-informational semantics where many candidate contents do 
not make sense of why receivers respond. It is one thing for a signal’s content to be 
indeterminate between female Photinus looking to mate or something that won’t kill you looking 
to mate. It is another thing for content to be indeterminate between female Photinus 
looking to mate or female Photuris looking for a meal. The latter content goes awry of our 
desideratum for content attribution; the former does not. 
What about the second and third problems: omnipresent and overly-specific 
evolutionary success conditions? Both seem to be genuinely problematic for 
biosemantics. As I will argue in Section 3, though, a variant of biosemantics known as 
‘infotel semantics’ (Shea 2007) has the resources to neutralise both indeterminacy 
problems without biting any bullets. Before addressing this, though, I address another 
problem biosemantics faces in the context of animal signals. This is the problem of 
non-cooperative communication again. I explain the problem as it applies to 
biosemantics before arguing that a recently-proposed solution for biosemantics fails 
(Artiga 2014). I then argue that tweaking biosemantic theory along the lines suggested 
by Stegmann (2005a, 2009) handles the challenge from non-cooperative 
communication17. 
 
- Problem 2: non-cooperative communication (again) - 
 
As it did for input-orientated teleosemantics, deception again poses a problem for 
teleological theories of content. Only this time the problem confronts biosemantics. 
Deception is problematic for biosemantics because biosemantics, at least as 
traditionally conceived, is a cooperative theory of representation: the proper function 
of the sender (or receiver) is part of a normal explanation for why the receiver (or 
sender’s) evolved act was adaptive. This is a fundamental component of the 
theoretical machinery of biosemantics (Millikan 2004). 
                                                          
17 And because infotel-semantics is itself a variant of biosemantics, Stegmann’s modification to 
biosemantics can be carried through to infotel-semantics, as will become clear soon. 
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To see why biosemantic theory breaks down under conditions of non-
cooperation, take the example of the hungry Photuris female firefly preying on a 
hopeful Photinus male looking for a mate. On Millikan’s theory, the content of a signal 
is determined by (a) what the sender is designed to map via its signal production 
strategies, where (b) this mapping enters into a normal explanation of why the 
receiver’s stereotypical response is adaptive. But in the case of the predatory mimic, 
(a) will not gel with (b) appropriately. More specifically, the world-state that the sender 
evolved to map via producing the signal is not the world-state that explains why the 
receiver’s response evolved. For the predatory mimic maps the fact that there is a 
hungry predator looking for a meal. But the fact that the signal was produced by a 
hungry predator looking to eat the receiver definitively does not explain why the 
stereotypical response of the male receiver (namely flying closer to the sender) 
evolved! The male’s response evolved when the sender was a female non-mimic 
willing to mate, not when the sender was a predatory mimic of a closely related species 
looking to eat him. So there is a problem for Millikan’s biosemantic theory of content. 
Non-cooperative communication throws a spanner into the theoretical works, such 
that the machinery breaks down. 
In response to this problem, Artiga (2014) comes to the aid of Millikan’s 
biosemantics. He argues that biosemantics can successfully assign content when 
interests conflict, because the mimic’s signal belongs to the same biological kind as the 
honest signal. Recall that aggressively mimicry is prima facie problematic for 
biosemantics because the latter requires the proper function of the sender’s act to be a 
normal condition for the proper performance of the receiver’s act. But in cases of 
aggressive mimicry, the proper function of the sender’s act (i.e. to secure a meal) is not 
a normal condition for the proper performance of the receiver’s act (i.e. being 
attracted by the signal). According to Artiga, however, we can class the two signals as 
being of the same kind, thus removing the conflict between proper function of the 
mimic sender’s act, on the one hand, and the historical success conditions of the 
receiver’s response, on the other.  
The idea is there is a relationship of counterfactual dependency between 
mimic signal and honest signal, such that the form of the mimic signal tracks (over 
phylogenetic time, and no doubt with some lag) variation in the honest signal. The 
mimic signal and the honest signal “belong to the same kind in virtue of the fact that 
they tend to have many properties in common due to an underlying robust causal 
mechanism” (Artiga 2014, p. 370). There is a ‘homeostatic clustering’ mechanism at 
work, which ensures that the mimic signal is shaped by the cooperative relationship 
between the honest sender and receiver just as much as the honest signal is. Thus, 
tokens of the mimic signal belong to the same kind as tokens of the honest signal. I 
think this proposal fails. The mimic signal cannot belong to the same kind as the 
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honest signal due to counterfactual dependencies. This is because the counterfactual 
dependencies only go one way. Change in the honest signal tends to cause change in 
the mimic signal, true. However, this doesn’t hold in reverse. Change in the mimic 
signal does not cause change in the honest signal. Moreover, the honest signal is under 
selection to diverge from the mimic signal.  
Helpfully, Stegmann (2005a, 2009) has modified biosemantics to 
accommodate non-cooperative communication. His proposal departs from Millikan’s 
essentially cooperative biosemantics in being exclusively receiver-focused. Both 
representational status and content are grounded independently of the sender. Indeed, 
a sender need not even exist for something to be a representation with content. Some 
biological entity is a representation, for Stegmann, if it is used by a consumer to 
respond adaptively to the world. And the content of the representation is the particular 
state of the world that explains why the consumer’s response to the biological entity is 
(normally) adaptive. On Stegmann’s proposal, assigning content to the mimic’s 
behaviour in our example would go as follows. The mimic’s flashing behaviour is a 
representation because it is used by Photinus males looking to mate with a Photinus 
female. The content of the representation is the particular state of the world 
explaining why Photinus males respond to the flashing display by becoming sexually 
receptive and flying closer. Clearly, this state is that there is a Photinus female signalling 
who is looking to mate with a male of her own species. So far so good. However, one 
might worry about how we can group the mimic’s deceptive flash alongside a non-
mimic’s flash. This needs to be possible so that the receiver’s response to the mimic’s 
flashing display inherits the historical success conditions of receiver’s responses to the 
honest display. All theories of content inherit this problem. However, one possibility 
is to group flashes in terms of their selected function and causal properties relevant to 
the fulfilment of this selected function: all traits with the selected function of 
attracting a male Photinus looking to mate, and that have properties P1,…, Pn causally 
relevant to attracting a Photinus male looking to mate, inherit the historical success 
conditions of a male Photinus’ typical response (Stegmann 2009). If this proposal 
works, then a wholly consumer-based teleosemantic theory of signal content can 
successfully assign content to both cooperative signals such as vervet alarm calls and 
also non-cooperative signals like aggressive mimicry among fireflies. 
Before moving on, Artiga (2014) has argued against Stegmann’s proposal in 
clearing the way for his own proposal, which I argued above fails. These objections 
need to be neutralised before running with Stegmann’s biosemantics. Artiga’s concern 
is that focusing exclusively on the receiver solves one problem at the expensive of 
opening up at least 3 others. Firstly, Stegmann’s view is allegedly problematic “not 
only because it changes the framework for thinking about signals, but also because it 
compels us to reconsider the use of abstract models of signaling in analyzing the 
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phenomenon of representation18” (Artiga 2014, p. 365). This objection fails because it 
groups together two issues which are conceptually separate: classifying certain traits as 
signals, on the one hand, and assigning specific contents to signals, on the other. 
Stegmann’s theory of content has it that cues, for example, will carry content. But this 
doesn’t make a cue a signal. Stegmann himself (2009, p. 872) writes: 
 
Signals are not distinguished from cues by the kind of information they carry (i.e., 
semantic vs natural information). Rather, as current biological science suggests, 
signals are evolved for the purpose of representing and carrying information, whereas 
cues are not19. 
 
Artiga’s second, closely related, charge is that representation will be promiscuous on 
Stegmann’s account. According to the latter, an item is a representation if it “is 
consumed by a mechanism whose normal condition to perform its function is that 
items of this type correspond to something other than themselves according to a 
mapping” (Artiga 2014, p. 365). As a result, smoke will qualify as representations. This 
is because smoke is often used by an organism to stand in for the presence of fire, 
according to a mapping rule. Indeed all the sensory information we use in our day-to-
day lives will be representational, for the same reason. In response, though, we need 
not take Stegmann’s theory of content to determine what is and what is not a 
representation, let alone a signal. The representational status question is a thorny one 
(Ramsey 2007, Burge 2010). However, it is not the same question as what contents 
should be ascribed to a representation (let alone a signal), after a structure in question 
has been classified as a representation (or a signal). I propose using Stegmann’s 
account of content to assign natural meaning to a trait that is independently 
considered a signal (as opposed to, say, a cue). Then, the content of a signal is the 
success condition of the elicited response. But this need not entail that a signal (or 
representation) is anything and everything eliciting an evolved (or learnt) response 
from an organism. My proposal is that we use Stegmann’s theory of content for 
animal signals, but only after we have identified some trait as a signal. If something 
doesn’t count as a signal, then we don’t apply Stegmann’s theory of content to it.   
Artiga’s (2014, p. 366) third charge against Stegmann is that “any representation 
(token) has always as many contents as potential consumers”. For instance, a leopard 
call in vervetese will be about the presence of leopards for vervets, but it will also be 
about the presence of vervets for leopards. This is because the success condition of the 
                                                          
18 Such as the Lewis-Skyrms model. 
19 If one is not happy with the definition that signals (but not cues) evolved for the purpose of 
representing or carrying information, then one can modify the definition and retain the necessary 
distinction between cues and signals. Signals, but not cues, evolved for the purpose of influencing 
another organism. Of course, this definition will be far too liberal to differentiate signals from many other 
non-signals that aren’t cues, such as acts of coercion. But, as Chapter 3 will show, no currently-available 
definition (whether it employs information, or merely influence) is unproblematic. 
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leopard’s response (hunting the sender) is something like the fact that a tasty vervet 
produced the call. Put simply, there is no principled way of discounting eavesdroppers 
as receivers of the signal and, as a result, signals will have as many contents as 
consumers. But this runs afoul of our desideratum, which is that content should help 
make sense of why the receiver, picked out by contextual-pragmatic considerations, 
responds, and hence why signalling has not collapsed. The fact that a leopard 
responds to the signal, and responds because (for the leopard) the biosemantic 
content of the signal is something like vervet here now, doesn’t help us understand why 
vervets respond.  
But why should this be an objection that derails Stegmann’s proposal? In one 
sense, leopards are receivers if they recognise and respond to vervet calls, and their 
response will be explained by the fact that, when leopards benefitted from responding 
to vervet calls, vervet calls mapped to the presence of vervets: in other words, the 
content of the signal, for leopards, will help us understand why leopards respond to 
the signal (in this case, the content vervet here now won’t help us understand why 
senders produce the signal, though). Alternatively, one might simply treat the vervet 
call as a cue, from the point of view of a leopard. As already argued, it need not be the 
case that everything eliciting an evolved/learnt response from an organism counts as 
signal, even though our theory of content tells us to look simply to the success 
condition of the evolved/learnt response. On this proposal, a vervet call is a signal 
from the perspective of another vervet but a cue from the perspective of a leopard. It 
is a signal for vervets because of co-adaptation. It isn’t a signal for leopards, because 
of a lack of co-adaptation20. 
 
- Stocktake - 
 
A traditional (sender-receiver) biosemantic theory of content for animal signals faces a 
significant problem when the interests of senders and receivers conflict. An integral 
part of the biosemantic machinery is that the proper performance of the sender’s 
function is a normal condition for the proper performance of the receiver’s function. 
But when interests conflict, this won’t be the case. In response, I defended 
Stegmann’s proposal to focus exclusively on the receiver when it comes to assigning 
content. However, a biosemantic theory of content still faces indeterminacy problems, 
as outlined earlier: the problems of omnipresent and overly-specific evolutionary 
success conditions.  
Furthermore, biosemantics faces yet another issue that needs to be addressed. 
This issue is serious given my desideratum for content attribution presented in Section 
                                                          
20 Chapter 3 will address the thorny issue of defining communication. 
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1. The issue is that biosemantics arguably cannot adequately explain the success of 
responding to an accurate representation. This charge has been used to argue that 
biosemantics requires representations to correlate with their contents21. Only by 
correlating with their contents can accurate representations explain successful 
responses. I begin the next section by explaining the objection and relating it to 
between-organism signals, specifically. I will argue that the solution to this problem of 
circularity, as well as to the two outstanding indeterminacy problems for biosemantics, 
can be solved only by moving to a different theory of content: ‘infotel-semantics’. 
Infotel-semantics draws heavily from output-orientated teleosemantics (i.e. 
biosemantics) but it (re)incorporates the idea that signals must correlate with their 
contents. By adding correlation into the biosemantic mix, infotel-semantics is able to 
overcome both the problem of circularity and the remaining problems of 
indeterminacy facing biosemantics.  
 
3. Biosemantics & Explanatory Circularity: Resurrecting Correlation? 
 
3.1 THE CIRCULARITY OBJECTION 
 
The only value of a signal to a receiver is as a source of information, and without this 
value the receivers will not respond to the signal and the signallers will not product it. 
(Searcy & Nowicki 2005, p. 207). 
 
As argued in Section 1, the main methodological justification for attributing content to 
signals is to makes sense of why receivers respond to signals (and hence also why 
senders produce them). In this section, I address an allegation that has been levelled 
against biosemantics. The allegation is potentially problematic in light of what was 
argued in Section 1. The allegation is that if content is assigned via a biosemantic 
theory, then a particular kind of explanation of behaviour will be circular.  
First, we must get clear on the kind of explanation the objection has in mind. 
The relevant kind of explanation is one that makes sense of 1) behavioural success by 
2) invoking the receipt of (accurate) information from a reliable signal. For instance, 
take a situation in which we explain why Joe succeeded in not being hit in the head 
with a ball because his friend yelled ‘Ball!’, causing Joe to duck suddenly. On the one 
hand we have an explanandum: the success of Joe in avoiding the ball (by ducking). 
On the other hand we have an explanans: the fact that Joe’s friend yelled ‘Ball!’. More 
precisely, the explanans is the fact that Joe’s friend transmitted the accurate 
                                                          
21 It is vital to note that an output-orientated teleosemantic theory (i.e. a biosemantic theory) which 
includes correlation bis different from an input-orientated teleosemantics. As will become clear, the 
former, despite possessing a role for correlational information, still ultimately assigns content based on 
the selected response of the receiver. By way of contrast, an input-orientated teleosemantics (i.e. Dretske 
1986/Neander 2013) assigns content based on the selected function of the signal/producer.  
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information that there was, in fact, a ball headed towards Joe which caused Joe to 
duck. In short, the relevant kind of explanation is one in which acting on an accurate 
representation explains success. When a receiver is influenced by a signal in some way 
(say, by ducking), success typically obtains when: (1) the signal has content X (i.e. 
‘Ball!’) and (2) X happens to obtain (i.e. when there is, in fact, a ball). The charge 
levelled against biosemantics is that we are unable to give explanations of the above 
kind. Why? Because biosemantics is a kind of success semantics (Godfrey-Smith 
1996). Arguably, all forms of success semantics suffer from the problem of circularity: 
  
For correspondence22 to have a real role in the production and explanation of 
success, it must be conceptually distinct from the fact of success. Success-linked 
theories threaten this independence. (Godfrey-Smith 1996, p. 192). 
 
The alleged problem is that success-linked theories of content make a definitional 
connection between representing accurately (or ‘corresponding’), on the one hand, 
and success, on the other. Teleosemantics is allegedly no exception: 
 
Teleosemantics too makes a definitional connection between representing truly and 
succeeding, and the fact that the definitional connection relates only to past episodes 
of behaviour does not make the explanation of the success of current behaviour any 
more substantial. (Shea 2007, p. 192). 
 
For example, on a biosemantic account of content a leopard alarm carries information 
about leopards in virtue of a normal explanation of the past success of the receiver’s 
response. Such an explanation will appeal to a ‘mapping rule’ which relates actual 
leopards to the time and place in which the signal is given. The nature of this mapping 
rule is determined by what made it the case that, when receivers historically responded 
in the typical way to leopard alarm calls23, such a response was adaptive/successful. In 
this case, what made it the cases that the response was adaptive/successful was that 
there was a leopard present. As such, the content of a leopard alarm call is something 
like leopard here now. The alleged problem for biosemantics concerns the fact that the 
content of the leopard alarm call is determined by conditions of historical success. If 
content is defined in terms of what state of the world made the response to the signal 
adaptive for receivers in the past, content can’t then be cited in an explanation of 
success, without the explanation being circular and hence empty. An adequate 
explanation of why a vervet successfully avoids being killed by a leopard in climbing a 
tree cannot cite the fact that the receiver derived the content leopard here now from an 
alarm call and that the content was correct. 
How exactly is this objection to biosemantics potentially problematic for the 
present project? Well, if, as argued in Section 1, the explanatory role of attributing 
                                                          
22 Godfrey-Smith uses the term ‘correspondence’ where I use the term ‘accuracy’. 
23 I.e. by climbing a tree or remaining in a tree if already in one. 
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content to animal signals is to make sense of why receivers attend to signals; and if, on 
a biosemantic theory of content, success in responding to a signal can’t be explained 
by invoking accuracy, then biosemantics will not be a good theory of content for 
animal signals. I will argue in the next sub-section that this objection doesn’t affect the 
current project. However, I will show that a closely related objection does. 
 
3.2 ASSESSING THE OBJECTION 
 
It is important to note that the goal of explaining success by invoking a response 
caused by an accurate signal is subtly different from the desideratum argued for in 
Section 1. Section 1 argued that content must explain why receivers respond to 
signals. But this is different from explaining success. To illustrate this, assume that the 
present environment for a group of vervets has changed, very recently, from the one 
in which receivers learnt the significance of a leopard alarm call. For instance, if tree 
branches are now unable to support the weight of a vervet monkey for some reason, 
the fact that a leopard alarm call was produced accurately (i.e. in the presence of an 
actual leopard) will not explain successful behaviour. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
signal carries content about leopard-presence can still explain why a receiver happens 
to respond to the signal by climbing a tree. The requirement to explain success 
(Godfrey-Smith and Shea’s desideratum) is a requirement to explain present success. 
However, the requirement to explain why receivers respond to signals (my 
desideratum) is a requirement to explain past success. Past success, and hence why 
receivers are wired-up, in the present, to respond to signals in the way they do, is 
something I’ve claimed a good theory of signal content must illuminate. On the other 
hand, present success24 is something Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Shea (2007) claim a 
good theory of content must illuminate. These two desiderata are subtly different. But 
the difference matters. The difference means that the circularity objection isn’t a 
problem for biosemantics, given my project. If the explanatory role of attributing 
content to animal signals is not, in fact, to explain present success, then it will not 
matter if present success cannot be explained in non-circular fashion. 
However, might it be the case that the circularity objection applies equally to 
explaining past success as it does to explaining present success? If this is the case, then 
a biosemantic theory of signal content might still be problematic. It will be 
problematic if the historical success of typical responses to signals, over phylogenetic 
or ontogenetic time, cannot be explained by citing the receipt of accurate signals in 
those historical environments. Take the mating signal of female Photinus fireflies. What 
is the content of the signal, according to biosemantics? To answer this question, we 
                                                          
24 More precisely: present success in virtue of deriving accurate content from a signal. 
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first look to the species-typical response of the target receiver. The target receiver is a 
male looking to mate with a female. The species-typical response of the male is to 
become sexually receptive to the signalling female. Next, we ask what world-state 
obtained when this species-typical response to the mating signal proved adaptive to 
male ancestors of our present male. The answer is that the sender of the signal was a 
female Photinus firefly looking to mate. The content of the signal, according to 
biosemantics, is thus something like here is a Photinus female looking to mate. Now the 
important question is this: can the receipt of accurate biosemantic content explain why 
the male ancestors of our present male experienced a fitness boost by responding with 
increased sexual receptivity? More precisely, can we do so a non-circular fashion?  
One should be sceptical. This is because, according to biosemantics, content 
doesn’t exist independently of the selected function of the receiver’s response. Only 
by consulting a normal explanation for the success of the receiver’s response can we 
assign content. In other words, only after selection has operated does content come 
into existence. As Lean (2014) has noted (in a paper on the methodology of applying 
content to certain within-organism causes as opposed to external signals), this gets 
things the wrong way around. What explains the content carried by a signal is not the 
adaptive response of the receiver. Instead, what explains the adaptive response of the 
receiver is the content carried by the signal. Content is the explanans, not the 
explanandum. If this is right (and I think it is), then a slightly different form of the 
circularity objection is problematic for biosemantics from the perspective of my 
project. In the next sub-section, I show how adding a clause relating to correlational 
information gets around the problem of circularity. If a signal correlates with its 
content, then this correlation can explain historical success. However, the selected 
function of the receiver is still highly relevant, in order to circumvent indeterminacy 
problems that would otherwise plague a purely correlational account of content. The 
best theory of content needs its snout in both the trough of correlational information 
and the trough of (the) selected function (of the receiver). 
 
3.3 ACCOMMODATING THE OBJECTION: UNITING CORRELATIONAL INFORMATION 
AND BIOSEMANTICS 
 
Enter ‘infotel-semantics’ (Shea 2007). Infotel-semantics is like biosemantics in a) 
stressing the selected function of the consumer and b) identifying content with the 
normal condition for the proper performance of this function. However, it brings 
correlational information back to the forefront of a theory of content. According to 
infotel-semantics, a signal of type S has content C if: 
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Ss are intermediates in a system consisting of a sender and a receiver cooperating by 
means of a range of mediating signals (all specified non-intentionally), in which every 
signal in the range also satisfies (a) to (c); 
 
a) Ss carry the correlational information that condition C obtains 
b) An evolutionary explanation of the current existence of the signalling 
system adverts to Ss having carried information about C 
c) C is the evolutionary success condition, specific to Ss, of the behaviour 
of the receiver prompted by Ss. (Shea 2007, p. 419)25 
 
Condition (a) stipulates that tokens of S must raise the probability of C in order to 
represent C. Condition (b) stipulates that S must have carried correlational 
information about C whenever the signal proved its worth over phylogenetic or 
ontogenetic time, where c) C is the world-state that ‘rationalised’ (in terms of fitness) 
the response elicited by S in the receiver.  
What explains why receivers attend to signals is clause (b). The fact that signals 
historically correlated with the success condition of the receiver’s response explains 
why the receiver’s response has been maintained by selection. Moreover, because the 
selected function of the receiver is also appealed to in clause c, infotel-semantics can 
get around the problem of non-cooperation communication facing causal-
informational teleosemantics. Recall that the problem for causal-informational 
teleosemantics was to assign the right contents when sender interests are opposed to 
receiver interests. Because content is assigned by looking at what world-state the 
sender was selected to produce the signal in response to, cases of deception are 
problematic. For instance, in the case of Photuris fireflies hunting Photinus males 
looking to mate, it was surely an adaptation of Photuris senders to produce the same 
signal as Photinus females in response to wanting a meal. Thus, on causal-informational 
teleosemantics the signal should mean Photinus female looking to mate OR Photuris wanting 
a meal. Infotel-semantics gets around this problem in the very same way biosemantics 
does, by appealing to the evolutionary success condition of the behaviour elicited in 
the receiver by the signal. In both the non-cooperative case of Photuris senders, and in 
the cooperative (or more cooperative) case of Photinus senders, the evolutionary 
success condition of the behaviour elicited in male Photinus receivers is that the sender 
is a Photinus female looking to mate. Thus, Infotel-semantics possesses the best of 
both worlds: the explanatory prowess of receiver-independent, correlational accounts 
of biological information, but without some of the problems that come along with 
them. Before moving out, however, it needs to be shown how infotel-semantics 
avoids the problem of non-cooperative communication facing biosemantics.  
                                                          
25 See Carazo & Font (2010) for a strikingly similar account of the information content of signals, without 
the cooperation requirement. 
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Infotel-semantics, as articled by Shea (2007), essentially attaches to traditional, 
sender-receiver, biosemantics the idea that a signal must correlate with its content. 
That infotel-semantics builds on theoretical machinery of biosemantics is evident in 
the beginning of the above quote from Shea. Signals are intermediates in a system 
consisting of a sender and a receiver cooperating by means of a range of mediating 
signals. But, as I demonstrated in Section 2.3 (problem 2), this creates an issue when 
the interests of senders and receivers conflict. When interests conflict, senders and 
receivers do not cooperate by means of a range of mediating signals. What the sender 
wants is opposed to what the receiver wants. In response to this, my suggestion is that 
infotel-semantics be modified in the same way Stegmann modified traditional 
biosemantics. This would constitute only a minor change to infotel-semantics. None 
of the conditions (a) to (c) presented above need to be modified. Only the initial 
assumption that senders and receivers are cooperating needs to be jettisoned. But this 
does not change the fundamental recipe for assigning content: S must still correlate 
with its content; where this correlation must make sense of why receivers respond; 
and the content of the signal must be the evolutionary success condition of the 
receiver’s response to S. 
Take our Photuris imposter hunting Photinus males. S is the deceptive flash 
produced by Photuris hunters26. It carries the content Photinus female looking to mate 
because, (a), the flash raises the probability that it is produced by a Photinus female 
looking to mate. Of course, it raises the probability that it is produced by an imposter 
looking for meal too. However, (b) only the former correlation explains why receivers 
respond in species-typical fashion. Moreover, (c) only the former world-state (that the 
sender is a Photinus female looking to mate) constitutes the evolutionary success 
condition of male Photinus responses.  
A couple of additional points about infotel-semantics are needed. As seen in 
condition (a), infotel-semantics takes it as constitutive of content that a signal S carries 
information about its content C. If there is no correlation between S and C in the 
present, then S doesn’t represent C. One might worry about this. Does it entail that 
infotel-semantics has unfortunate verificationist consequences? It does not, because 
the correlation between S and C is a correlation between types not tokens. Tokens of S 
can occur in the absence of C. A sender can sometimes produce a leopard alarm call 
when in fact there is no leopard present. It just has to be that the leopard call as a type 
raises the probability that a leopard is present. 
Nor does the content of the signal have to be the world-state the signal 
correlates most reliably with. A signal can correlate more reliable with a world-state(s) 
                                                          
26 As mentioned previously, it might be individuated as the same signal as the honest one in virtue of 
having the same selected function: to attract Photinus males; and because it carries out this same function 
in virtue of the same physical properties P1,…, Pn. 
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that is not its content than with its content. This is because of clause (b) in infotel-
semantics: namely, that an evolutionary explanation of the current existence of the 
signalling system must appeal to Ss having carried information about C for C to be the 
content. For a signal to have content C, it is not enough that the signal carried 
information about C. Over and above this, the fact that the signal carried information 
about C must explain the current existence of the signalling system: it must 
evolutionarily rationalise the response of the receiver. A leopard alarm will raise the 
probability that there is leopard present OR that the sender thinks there is a leopard 
present, more than it will raise the probability of the first disjunct alone. However, an 
explanation of the current existence of the vervet alarm communication system will 
not appeal to Ss having carried information about the sender being aroused. It will 
appeal only to Ss having carried information about the presence of a leopard. 
This last point effectively circumvents one of Millikan’s problems with 
correlational information; that it masquerades as a proto-semantic relation that exists 
independently of signal-use. Infotel-semantics, however, doesn’t frame correlational 
information as determining content independently of use. It is open to the fact that a 
signal-type will correlate many world-states. When it comes to determining content, 
infotel-semantics picks out that world-state explaining the historical success of the 
behaviour elicited in receivers. Thus, while biosemantics maintains that content 
determination requires focusing on how signs are used, it goes too far, according to 
infotel-semantics, in holding that input conditions play no substantive content-
determining role. Infotel-semantics gives a role to both input and output-based 
determinants of content. On the input side: those world-states that a signal carries 
correlational information about. On the output side: out of all those world-states, only 
those relevant to an explanation of the historical success of the receiver’s response to 
the signal. 
So far, I have outlined infotel-semantics as a plausible solution to the problem 
of circularity and explained how it can be made to handle non-cooperative 
communication. Now I offer some novel considerations regarding how infotel-
semantics solves the two indeterminacy problems facing biosemantics remaining open 
from Section 2.3. First, the problem of omnipresent evolutionary success conditions. 
Recall the problem. There must have been oxygen in the atmosphere whenever the 
typical response to leopard alarms earned its keep. Gravity must also have been 
operating as normal. According to biosemantics, then, the content of the leopard 
alarm must be leopard and oxygen in the atmosphere at sufficient levels and gravity operating 
normally. However, infotel-semantics, because of its requirement that signals raise the 
probability of their contents, rules out omnipresent conditions. Nothing can raise the 
probability of conditions that are always present. Because the presence of oxygen in 
the atmosphere is omnipresent for all practical purposes, there is no greater chance of 
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there being oxygen in the atmosphere given some other event (such as signal 
production). Thus, oxygen being in the atmosphere (as well any other omnipresent 
world-state) is eliminated as a candidate content.  
Second, the problem of overly-specific evolutionary success conditions. 
Recall that the issue relates to the myriad ways in which the evolved response of the 
receiver could have failed. The receiver could have been unable to climb a tree 
successfully due to injury, or the receiver may have fallen out of the tree while 
climbing to safety due to grabbing a weak branch. There are numerous other world-
states one can think up such that each must have been absent whenever the response 
to the signal earned its keep. Thus, there are numerous states that must be included in 
the content of the signal, according to biosemantics. In response, correlation can once 
again come to the rescue. A leopard alarm call doesn’t raise the probability that 
receivers are well enough to climb a tree. The frequency of vervets well enough to 
climb a tree after a leopard alarm is tokened won’t be greater than before a leopard 
alarm is tokened. Thus, such an overly-specific candidate content is ruled out. 
Likewise when it comes to grabbing weak branches. The frequency of vervets falling 
out of trees due to this problem after a leopard alarm is tokened won’t be smaller than 
before the signal.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined different theories of content and assessed their suitability 
for animal signals. Drawing on the explanatory concerns of biologists, I claimed that 
the suitability of a theory of content for animal signals comes down to whether this 
content makes sense of why receivers respond to signals. I then examined: (1) causal-
informational semantics, (2) input-orientated teleosemantics, (3) output-orientated 
teleosemantics (‘biosemantics’), and finally (4) infotel-semantics, arguing that infotel-
semantic content goes the farthest in meeting the desideratum. Moving forward, an 
infotel-semantic account of signal content will be in the background in Chapters 2 and 
3, where I weigh into some conceptual debates over animal communication conceived 
informationally. As some in this literature have noted (Owren, Rendall & Ryan 2010), 
information proponents need a clearly-defined notion of signal content before 
engaging in some of these debates. I hope this chapter has contributed to laying that 
groundwork.  
With a clearly-defined notion of “natural meaning” (Grice 1957) now 
established, the next chapter argues that signals cannot be accurately defined as traits 
that, uniquely, carry natural meaning. The resulting definition is too liberal, capturing 
most (if not all) co-adapted interactions between two organisms, as opposed to those 
interactions that are conceived as communicative. I argue that this is problematic for 
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all currently-available definitions, as an informational definition was intended as an 
improvement over definitions eschewing information, which are themselves too 
liberal. Chapter 3 then weighs more heavily into the ‘information vs influence’ debate. 
There I argue that, while it makes sense to attribute natural meaning to signals, we 
must make two concomitant distinctions: between ‘proximate’ vs ‘ultimate’ 
explanatory roles of this meaning; and concomitantly, between two different ways this 
meaning is ‘derived’ by receivers from signals. The first way is cognitively modest, and 
is probably the most widespread way receivers derive information from signals. Here, 
the natural meaning of signals plays merely an ultimately explanatory role. The second 
way receivers derive natural meaning from signals is cognitively richer, and plausibly 
less widespread. Here, the information contained in a signal plays a more-or-less 
proximate explanatory role. These distinctions are advanced in the hope of alleviating 
the mechanistic concern of information sceptics, discussed in the preface. The 
concern, if you recall, is that explaining receiver responses in terms of derived 
information often inflates the cognitive sophistication of receivers.  
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 2. Can we uniquely define animal communication in terms of the exchange of natural 
meaning, or does such an exchange occur between all co-adapted interactions? Perhaps signals, 
uniquely, are arbitrary? What is arbitrariness and what is the relationship between arbitrariness and  
signalhood? Do any criteria cleanly separate communicative co-adapted interactions from non-
communicative ones? 
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Chapter 2 
Problems for Defining Signalhood in Terms of Natural 
Meaning 
 
 
Biologists classify some, but by no means all, between-organism interactions as 
‘communication’ (or ‘signalling’). Yet, it is contentious exactly what features an 
interaction must possess to count as communication, as opposed to, say, a case of one 
organism coercing another, or alternatively one organism inadvertently producing a cue 
that can be utilised by another (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003; Scott-Phillips 2008; 
Carazo & Font 2010; Scarantino 2013). In short, what makes only some behaviours or 
morphological traits ‘signals’? In this Chapter I argue that no currently-available 
definition, particularly a recently-proposed informational definition, is extensionally 
adequate. This chapter is an exercise in the philosophy of nature just as much as the 
philosophy of science. Its focus is on nature itself, and how nature is to be carved at 
its ‘joints’, just as much as it is about scientific explanation.  
 
1. Communication as co-adapted influence? 
 
Before the rise of individualist and gene-centric views of evolution in the 1960s and 
70s, the idea that natural selection adapts senders to faithfully ‘inform’27 receivers was 
commonplace. However, after the demise of ‘naïve’ group selection, this idea became 
somewhat controversial (Dawkins & Krebs 1978). The worry was that natural 
selection, operating at the level of the individual organism, will very often adapt 
senders to manipulate or influence receivers, not ‘inform’ them. This is because the 
fitness interests of senders and receivers commonly diverge to varying degrees. For 
example, a relatively unfit male frog will not be selected for indicating his sub-par 
genetic quality to a female looking to mate. Rather, he will be selected for doing 
whatever he can, causally speaking, to influence the female to mate with him, 
regardless of the interests of the female. 
                                                          
27 ‘Informing’ is meant in a loose sense here: as causing a response in a receiver that is adaptive for the 
receiver, given the state of the world. 
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Moreover, taken as a defining feature of signalhood, ‘information 
transmission’ is too liberal. This is because various other behaviours and 
morphological features of organisms, aside from signals proper, transmit information. 
Consider a stag (I1) coming up against another stag (I2) in a contest over a contested 
resource. After assessing the size of I2, I1 decides not to engage with I2. Here I2’s size 
is a source of information that I1 utilises in deciding how to act (or, in this case, how 
not to). But it isn’t a signal. Rather, it is a cue (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003). Thus, 
a definition of a signal that defines a signal as any trait that transmits information to 
another organism fails. It is too liberal: it can’t exclude cues. 
 In response to these problems with a definition of communication couched 
in terms of ‘information transmission’, some took a different approach entirely. They 
avoided reference to information transmission and instead formulated a definition 
based solely on sender influence. On this definition, signals are traits adapted for 
causally influencing a receiver (Maynard Smith & Harper 1995). This influence-based 
definition was able to differentiate signals from cues. The larger size of stag I2 has a 
causal effect on the smaller stag I1, but it is not a trait that was selected for influencing 
I1. I2’s size has a causal effect on I1, but from the point of view of I2, this effect is 
inadvertent. Size (in itself) is not an adaptation for intimidating rivals28. 
 Compare this ‘inadvertent’ and thus non-communicative sort of behavioural 
influence with a genuine signal. The elongated tail of the male barn swallow is a signal 
of high genetic quality (Moller & de Lope 1994). Like in the case of stag size, an 
elongated barn swallow tail elicits a behavioural effect in a conspecific (namely, sexual 
receptivity in a female). But unlike in the case of stag size, an elongated tail has the 
selected function of eliciting a behavioural response in a conspecific. An elongated tail 
is an adaptation for eliciting sexual receptivity in female barn swallows. In contrast, 
the size of the larger stag is not an adaptation for eliciting a disengagement response in 
smaller stags. Accordingly, Maynard-Smith & Harper (1995, p. 306) defined, in non-
informational terms, a signal as any “action or structure that increases the fitness of an 
individual by altering the behaviour of other organisms detecting it, and that has 
characteristics that have evolved because they have that effect”. 
 However, this solely influence-based definition was itself extensionally 
inadequate. It, too, was overly liberal. It could not differentiate signals from acts of 
coercion. The basic problem is that many kinds of traits are adaptations for 
influencing other organisms. A stronger stag pushing a weaker stag in a confrontation 
over a contested resource is a behavioural adaptation of the stronger stag that is 
selected for influencing the weaker stag. But it is not a signal. As a result, Maynard-
Smith & Harper (2003) strengthened their earlier definition of a signal. As before, a 
                                                          
28 Of course, behaviours that are adapted for advertising or accentuating one’s size might be signals. But 
here we are not dealing with such adaptations: only size as such.   
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signal must be an adaptation (of the sender) designed to influence a receiver. But they 
added the requirement that the elicited response in the receiver must also be an 
adaptation (of the receiver): “We define a ‘signal’ as any act or structure which alters 
the behaviour of other organisms, which evolved because of that effect, and which is 
effective because the receiver’s response has also evolved” (Maynard-Smith & Harper 
2003, p. 3). 
 In subsequent analyses, Scott-Phillips (2008) and Scarantino (2013) noted that 
there is some ambiguity in how we interpret Maynard-Smith & Harper’s (MSH’s) 
more restrictive, influence-based, definition. The ambiguity relates to how we interpret 
the new requirement, related to the adapted nature of the receiver’s response. We can 
interpret it in one of two ways: (a) the receiver’s response to a signal must be an 
adaptation, but not necessarily an adaptation to the signal; (b) the receiver’s response 
must be an adaptation, specifically to the signal. Following Scarantino (2013), we can 
call the first way of interpreting the requirement the generalised response interpretation and 
the second way the specialised response interpretation.  
 Scott-Phillips (2008) argued that an adequate influence-based definition of 
communication must adopt the specialised response interpretation. That is, the 
sender’s act or structure must be “effective because the effect (the response) has 
evolved to be affected by the act or structure” (Scott-Phillips 2008, p. 388, my italics). The 
response should not merely be adapted, it must also “be adapted to fulfil its half of the 
communicative dynamic” (Scott-Phillips 2008, p. 388).  
According to Scarantino (2013), MSH (2003) had in mind the specialised, as 
opposed to general, response interpretation. This is shown by the fact that MSH 
exclude camouflage from being a signal. Camouflage can’t be excluded as a signal 
based on the generalised response interpretation. It can only be excluded based on the 
specialised response interpretation. A predator failing to perceive a camouflaged prey 
as prey is due to evolved properties of the predator’s sensory organs. Thus, the prey 
(the would-be ‘sender’) elicits an effect in a would-be ‘receiver’ (the predator passing 
over the prey), where this effect relies on the adapted sensory organs of the ‘receiver’. 
Moreover, eliciting this effect in the ‘receiver’ is an adaptation of the ‘sender’. So, 
camouflage is a signal under the generalised response interpretation of MSH’s (2003) 
definition. But if we operate with the specialised response interpretation, camouflage 
can be excluded as a signal. This is because the predator’s response to the camouflage 
is not an adaptation to the signal specifically. Rather, the response is an adaptation to 
all kinds of environmental stimuli29. 
 In sum, at this point in the historical dialectic it appeared a definition of 
signalhood was prevailing that: (1) eschewed information (to differentiate signals and 
                                                          
29 This assumes the predator has not evolved specific perceptual mechanisms in response to the 
camouflage which are fooled, in an evolutionary arms race.  
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cues), and (2) stressed the co-adapted nature of communication (to differentiate 
signals and coercive acts). Scott-Phillips (2008, p. 388), making explicit the specialised 
response interpretation of MSH’s (2003) definition, defined a signal in the following 
terms: 
 
A signal is any act or structure that (i) affects the behaviour of other organisms; (ii) 
evolved because of those effects; and (iii) which is effective because the effect (the 
response) has evolved  to be affected by the act or structure. 
 
For present purposes, let’s call this definition of a signal a co-adapted influence definition. 
Components (i) and (ii) demand that communication is a matter of one organism (the 
sender) being adapted to causally influence another organism using a morphological 
structure or a behaviour. Component (iii) demands that this adapted influence be a 
two-way street: receivers must have evolved to be affected by the relevant behaviour 
or morphological structure.  
 
1.1 RECENT CRITICISM OF COMMUNICATION AS CO-ADAPTED INFLUENCE 
 
Recently, a co-adapted influence definition of communication (i.e. MSH (2003), Scott-
Phillips 2008)) has come under fire. According to Scarantino (2013), whose argument 
will be the focus in what follows, a co-adapted influence definition is itself too liberal 
(even on the specialised response interpretation). It includes within its extension 
various co-adapted interactions between two organisms that are not genuine cases of 
communication: namely certain kinds of coercive and reciprocal interactions. 
Scarantino (2010; 2013)30 argues that only by adding an informational component to a 
co-adapted influence definition can the definition be salvaged. First, consider the 
following kind of coercive interaction: 
 
A weaker stag keeps being pushed backwards by a stronger stag. This goes on for a 
while, until the weaker stag adopts behavioural responses to the negative happening 
to which he is being subjected, namely being pushed. In the short term, the response 
may be to give up on the contested resource. In the medium and long term, the 
response may be to accept a more submissive position in the social hierarchy, and 
avoid further confrontations with the stronger stag. (Scarantino 2013, p. 75). 
 
We can safely assume that the stronger stag’s pushing behaviour is an adaptation: it 
was selected for influencing the weaker stag because this was a way for the stronger 
stag to attain the contested resource, to maintain its place in the social hierarchy, and 
                                                          
30 Carazo & Font (2010) also argue for a hybrid definition of communication invoking both (co-adapted) 
influence and information transmission. Their reasons are somewhat different to those of Scarantino, but 
the same upshot of my discussion of Scarantino’s definition applies equally to Carazo & Font’s. The latter 
(2010, p. 663) propose that a signal is “any act or structure that (i) affects the behaviour of other 
organisms; (ii) evolved (or is maintained) because of those effects; (iii) is effective because it transfers… 
information to receivers. Their account of information is very similar to the one I advanced in Chapter 1, 
requiring correlation and teleology on the side of the receiver without cooperation. 
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to avoid future conflicts. Equally, we can safely assume that the response of the 
weaker stag is an adaptation (for the weaker stag): giving up on the contested resource, 
when faced with a stronger competitor, was selected for in the face of potential injury 
from a prolonged contest. Also, accepting a more submissive position in the social 
hierarchy was selected in the face of costly future conflicts likely to be lost. 
 Furthermore, Scarantino argues that the weaker stag’s responses evolved 
specifically to the act of being coerced by the stronger stag: “It seems reasonable to 
posit evolutionary pressures selecting in favour of organisms that take being coerced 
as a sign of a competitor’s superior strength, and change their future behaviour 
towards that stronger competitor accordingly” (Scarantino 2013, p. 76).  
Thus, coercive behaviours with this kind of structure count as signals on 
Scott-Phillips (2008) co-adapted influence definition of communication: “They alter 
what organisms do as a result of being coerced, they evolved at least in part because of 
that effect, and they are effective because the receiver’s response has also evolved” 
(Scarantino 2013, p. 76). However, according to Scarantino (2013, p. 76), “any 
definition of animal signalling that counts coercive behaviours as signals is too broad”. 
Second, consider the following kind of reciprocal interaction: 
 
In cases of reciprocity, actors take turns in benefitting each other. In each interaction, 
the giver produces a positive happening for the receiver (e.g. being groomed)… 
grooming behaviours alter the behaviour of another individual, and presumably 
evolved to influence the recipient’s behaviour towards reciprocation, because this is 
the main expected payoff of an otherwise costly activity. Finally, grooming 
behaviours appear to be effective because the receiver’s response to the behaviour 
has also evolved. This is true both in the sense that the response depends on evolved 
properties of the brain and sensory system of the groomed, and in the sense that the 
response – reciprocating a positive happening – evolved specifically as a response to 
earlier grooming behaviours31. (Scarantino 2013, p. 76). 
 
Thus, certain kinds of both coercive interactions and reciprocal interactions are 
categorised as cases of communication by a co-adapted influence definition. The point 
can be expanded to a more general one. Any time we have co-adapted influence, we 
will have communication, on the definition currently on trial. As a result, Scarantino 
presents a new definition of communication that sets out to be more restrictive.  
 
2. Communication as ‘Information-Mediated Influence’? 
 
Scarantino’s proposed definition is hybrid in nature, incorporating both co-adapted 
influence and information transmission. The co-adapted nature of communication 
remains definitive: the sender’s act of influence must be an adaptation of the sender. 
                                                          
31 When it comes to great apes the response to an initial act of grooming might be produced by general-
learning mechanisms, but it can still be said that the response itself arose, over ontogenetic time, in 
response to the initial act as opposed to any kind of stimuli.   
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Likewise, the receiver’s response to the act of influence must be an adaption of the 
receiver (to the signal). But co-adapted influence is not enough.  
Despite being instances of co-adapted influence, Scarantino argues that 
pushing and grooming are not signals. This is because “a signal must be specialised for 
influencing recipients by carrying information to them” (Scarantino 2013, p. 77, author’s italics). 
Pushing and grooming are “instead specialised for influencing recipients by other 
means, namely the production of, respectively, negative and positive happenings 
through mechanical interactions (Scarantino 2013, p. 78, my italics). But what, exactly, is 
the nature of an act of influence specialised for causally influencing a recipient by 
carrying information to them? Answering this question involves saying briefly what is 
meant by carrying ‘information’; and then making sense of how information, thus 
conceived, plays a causal-explanatory role in behaviour.  
First, Scarantino (2013, pp. 64-66) characterises information as “predictive 
information”32. A signal (S) can be understood as carrying predictive information in 
virtue of changing the probability (P) of some state(s) of the world (W). S carries 
information about W if and only if P(W/S) does not equal P(W). If P(W/S) is greater 
than P(W), then S has raised the probability that W obtains. When S raises the 
probability of W, it carries information about W obtaining. Conversely, if P(W/S) is 
lower than P(W), then S has lowered the probability that W obtains. When S lowers to 
probability of W, it carries information about W not obtaining.  
To narrow down the actual content of the signal we can simply add teleology 
on the side of the receiver, in line with Chapter 1. This will not change the predictive 
information carried by a signal, nor the conclusion of this chapter. Thus, in what 
follows I will speak of the natural meaning carried by a signal, where this can be 
understood as entirely compatible with predictive information. 
Now we come to the question of the causal-explanatory role of the natural 
meaning carried by a signal. More specifically, what does it mean for a receiver to be 
causally influenced by a signal in virtue of the latter’s natural meaning, as opposed to 
the signal’s mechanical properties? Answering this question is not obvious. Indeed, 
the information vs influence debate has recently arisen surrounding whether the idea 
can be made coherent. Information-sceptics lament what they see as a misguided 
turning away from the intrinsic physical properties of signals responsible for triggering 
responses in receivers, towards the idea that information is a separate entity ‘carried’ 
by or ‘contained’ in signals which does the response triggering (Rendall et al. 2009; 
Owren et al. 2010). Sceptics argue that this buys into the ‘conduit metaphor’ of 
communication (Reddy 1979; Blackburn 2007).  
                                                          
32 It is more or less the same as the notion of correlational information advanced by Shea (2007) and 
Skyrms (2010). Scarantino gives a richer and more detailed analysis of this kind of information in his 
(2015). 
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The conduit metaphor of communication is usually discussed in the context 
of linguistic communication: specifically, as being a misguided way of describing the 
actual process of successful communication. We commonly speak of getting one’s 
ideas across in a conversation, or of an utterance containing many good ideas (etc.). But 
in reality, linguistic communication does not actually involve ‘meaning’, ‘content’ or 
‘information’ being packaged into an utterance by a sender, where this content is 
subsequently unpacked from the utterance by the receiver after transmission. 
Although there is some controversy over what, exactly, content is, one thing it 
definitely isn’t is a substance that placed into an utterance and then transmitted from 
point A to point B. When it comes to the content of linguistic utterances, one 
influential view is that content is a function or rule which tells you what a word or 
sentence would refer to, if the world was in a certain way. Another way of putting this 
is that contents are functions from possible worlds to truth-values (Nolan 2005)33.  
Now, it is vital to note that both Scarantino’s (2013; 2015) account of 
predictive information, and the account of natural meaning defended in Chapter 1, are 
both non-metaphorical and non-conduit based. They both denotes a well-defined 
relation between signal and world state, as opposed to a reified substance that is first 
‘packaged’ into a signal by a sender and subsequently ‘unpacked’ by a receiver in the 
process of communication. Still, there remains the issue of making sense of how 
natural meaning, as distinct from a signal’s ‘mechanical’ or intrinsic properties, 
explains receiver behaviour.  
In Section 2.1 I suggest how the natural meaning ‘carried’ by a signal might 
explain the behaviour of a receiver influenced by the signal. However, in Section 2.2 I 
argue that, understood in this way, natural meaning is present in most, if not all, co-
adapted interactions. If this is correct, then defining communication informational 
terms will be too liberal.  
 
2.1 THE CAUSAL-EXPLANATORY ROLE OF NATURAL INFORMATION 
 
What does it mean to say that a receiver is causally influenced by the natural meaning 
of a signal? In other words, what causal-explanatory role does this meaning play in 
understanding a receiver’s respond to such a signal? In proposing an answer to this 
question, I will draw on some philosophical machinery belonging to Fred Dretske 
(1994). More specifically, his distinction between a triggering cause of behaviour, on the 
one hand, and a structuring cause of behaviour, on the other.  
                                                          
33 There is then the further foundational question of what facts make it the case that an utterance has this 
or that truth-condition. One influential view comes from Grice (1957), and takes the content of 
utterances to be grounded by the content of mental states. Roughly speaking, my utterance means what it 
does because of my goal in producing it; and you understand my utterance by (accurately) inferring this 
goal of mine. 
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 Dretske (1994) himself presented the distinction in the context of someone 
moving a cursor on a computer screen by pressing the ‘backspace’ key on the 
keyboard. Pressure on the key is a triggering cause of the cursor’s movement. But 
there is also a different sense in which the particular wiring of the keyboard, for 
example, and the program of the word-processor, are causally responsible for the 
cursor’s movement: they create the “standing conditions” within which backspace 
presses trigger cursor movements. It is in this sense that the particular wiring of the 
keyboard and the program of the word-processor are each structuring causes of the 
cursor’s movement. They both cause (2nd order) the conditions under which, in turn, 
backspace presses cause (1st order) cursor movements. 
Turning back to communication, we can understand the natural meaning 
carried by a signal to be a structuring cause of receiver behaviour. In contrast, the 
mechanical features of a signal can be understood as triggering causes of receiver 
behaviour. For example, vervet monkeys run up trees when they sense a kind of 
acoustic pattern emitted by a conspecific: namely a leopard alarm call (Seyfarth et al. 
1980). The token acoustic pattern can be regarded as the triggering cause of the 
vervet’s tree-climbing behaviour. However, a learning history in which vervet alarm 
calls raised the probability of the presence of a leopard also explains the tree-climbing 
response of the receiver: but as structuring cause as opposed to triggering cause.  
To adequately explain why receiver vervets now run up trees in response to 
leopard alarms, we must note the historical correlation between leopard alarms, on the 
one hand, and certain facts about the world that ‘rationalise’ the response elicited by 
such calls in the receiver, on the other: namely that a leopard was present. This 
historical correlation between leopard alarms and actual leopards is causally 
responsible (2nd order) for the conditions within which leopard alarms now cause (1st 
order) tree-climbing behaviour34. This is like the way in which the particular wiring of 
the computer’s keyboard and the word-processor’s program are causally responsible 
(2nd order) for the conditions within which backspace presses now cause (1st order) 
cursor movements.  
The proximate/ultimate distinction in biology is also useful for illuminating 
the causal-explanatory role of natural meaning35. Following Mayr (1961, p. 1503), 
                                                          
34 If leopard alarms did not correlate with the presence of a leopard over the learning period, receivers 
wouldn’t respond to them by climbing trees. 
35 There has been significant controversy about this distinction in recent years (e.g. Ariew 2003, Laland et 
al. 2011, Dickins & Barton 2013, Scholl & Pigliucci 2015). Despite this, even critics of the distinction 
such as Laland et al. (2011) are not entirely dismissive, acknowledging that it is useful in cases where 
reciprocal causation between development and natural selection are not paramount: where the organism 
has been shaped unidirectionally by selection to match the external environment. However, I side with 
Dickins & Barton (2013) who argue that the proximate-ultimate distinction in no way blinds us to 
developmental influences on evolution, when these are in fact paramount, and that the proximate-
ultimate distinction is in fact needed to highlight such influence in the first place. Development, 
understood (as with Mayr) as a proximate process, is of course influenced by evolution but can also 
influence evolution. 
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proximate causes “govern the responses of the individual (and his organs) to 
immediate factors of the environment” while ultimate causes “are responsible for the 
evolution of the particular DNA code of information with which every individual of 
every species is endowed”. Proximate causes are immediate and mechanical, while 
ultimate causes are historical and made sense of in terms of success (either over 
phylogeny or over ontogeny36). Mayr’s famous example is of bird migration. There are 
two kinds of causal explanation for why a bird migrates for winter. The first, 
proximate explanation, relates to the bird’s present physiology and the influence of 
day length on the concentration of hormones in the bird’s brain. The second, ultimate 
explanation, relates to the historical fact that migrating for the winter allowed the 
bird’s ancestors to avoid starvation. Similarly, there are two kinds of causal 
explanation for why a vervet receiver flees up a tree in response to a leopard alarm. 
The first, proximate explanation, refers to mechanistic factors such as the acoustic 
form of the signal and its interaction with the nervous system of the receiver. The 
second, ultimate explanation, refers to the historical fact that the leopard alarm 
correlated with the presence of a leopard over a learning period. These are two 
different, but of course complementary, reasons for why vervets climb trees in 
response to leopard alarms.  
Both the structuring cause vs triggering cause distinction, and the proximate 
vs ultimate distinction, allow us to get clear on the causal-explanatory role of natural 
meaning in communication. I hope that elucidating the causal-explanatory role of 
predictive information will also render the notion of information more palatable for 
those sceptical of the utility of informational notions in explaining animal 
communication (e.g. Owren et al. 2010; Rendall et al. 2009)37. Often, natural meaning 
is a 2nd order cause of receiver behaviour while ‘mechanical’ factors are 1st order 
causes. Alternatively, natural meaning is often an ultimate cause of receiver behaviour 
while ‘mechanical’ factors are proximate causes. However, I argue in Section 2.2 that, 
understood in this way, natural meaning plays a causal-explanatory role in many, if not 
most, co-adapted interactions. If this is true, then an information-mediated influence 
definition adds very little to a definition of communication stressing merely co-
adapted influence (e.g. Scott-Phillips 2008).  
 
2.2 A PROBLEM FOR AN INFORMATION-MEDIATED INFLUENCE DEFINITION: 
INFORMATION ISN’T SPECIAL 
 
                                                          
36 Mayr had phylogeny firmly in mind but there is no reason why an ultimate explanation for some 
behaviour cannot appeal to success over ontogenetic history. 
37 I have much more to say on this issue in the next chapter. 
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Consider again the case of the two stags pushing each other in a confrontation over a 
contested resource. Scarantino argues, plausibly, that this is a co-adapted interaction: 
I1’s act of pushing is an adaptation for I1, and I2’s responses (i.e. giving up the 
immediate contest, and assuming a lower place in the social hierarchy) are adaptations 
(for I2) specifically to the act of repeatedly being pushed backwards. Granting the co-
adapted nature of the interaction, let us briefly investigate the details surrounding the 
evolution of the I2’s responses. We will see that natural meaning has just as much of a 
(structuring) causal role in explaining I2’s behaviour as it does in genuine cases of 
communication. 
Remember that, in the stag contest, I2’s response to being pushed backwards 
is two-folded. In the short term I2’s response is to give up on the contested resource. 
In the long run I2’s response is to assume a lower place in the social hierarchy. 
Crucially, making sense of why these two responses evolved in the face of losing a 
pushing contest (i.e. being repeatedly pushed backwards by a conspecific stag) 
involves noting a historical correlation between the stimuli eliciting the two responses 
in I2 (i.e. the pushing), on the one hand, and certain facts about the world that 
‘rationalise’ these responses in I2, on the other: in this case the fact that the stimuli were 
produced by a stronger stag. Only when I2 being pushed by I1 correlated with I1 (the 
pusher) being stronger than I2 did it make adaptive sense for I2 to choose to give up 
on the contest, in the short term, and to assume a lower place in the social hierarchy, 
in the long term. Thus, I1 getting I2 to submit (in both the short and long term) 
literally carries natural meaning about I1 being stronger and thus likely to inflict 
potential further damage on I2, win future conflicts against I2, and so on. And 
because, in addition to carrying this meaning the interaction fits all the relevant criteria 
for being a co-adapted interaction, I1 pushing I2 backwards turns out to be a signal on 
an information-mediated influence definition of communication. 
Consider grooming, as well. Here, individual 1 (I1) grooms individual 2 (I2), 
thereby eliciting a response from I2 (namely, I2 becoming more disposed to engage in 
future cooperation with I1). Both I1’s act and I2’s response are adaptations, 
respectively, for I1 and I2. As before, when we inquire into the details surrounding the 
evolution or development of I2’s response in this co-adapted interaction, we will be 
forced to note a historical correlation between the stimuli that causes I2 to become 
more benevolently inclined towards I1 (i.e. the initial act of grooming), on the one 
hand, and certain facts about the world that ‘rationalise’ this response in I2, on the 
other: in this case that I1 is less likely to attack I2 upon I2 reciprocating (among other facts). 
Thus, I1’s act of grooming literally carries natural meaning about I1 being more likely 
to accept future personal contact from I2. And, again, because in addition to carrying 
this information, the interaction fits all the relevant criteria for being a co-adapted 
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interaction, I1 grooming I2 is a signal, according to an information-mediated influence 
definition of communication. 
The problem can be stated in a general way. Firstly, we have two sets of cases, 
C1 and C2; where both sets of cases are comprised of co-adapted, between-organism 
interactions with the following structure: An individual (I1) influences another 
individual (I2), where the selection/learning history of I2’s response to I1’s initial act 
of influence crucially involves a probability-raising correlation between this act of 
influence and some world-state that ‘rationalises’ the response elicited in I2. Secondly, 
however, we require that only in C1 cases was this natural meaning ‘causally relevant’ 
or ‘exploited’ by receivers, while in C2 cases it was not: allowing us to classify C1 
cases, but not C2 cases, as ‘communicative’. As things stand, I do not see a way in 
which to do this. In both sets of cases, I1’s act of influence carries natural meaning, 
and this information is a structuring cause of I2’s evolved response to I1’s act of 
influence. Vervet alarm calls raise the probability that a leopard is present. Similarly, a 
monkey grooming a conspecific raises the probability that it is not going to attack the 
conspecific when the latter reciprocates.  
A possible reply at this point in the argument might be this: ‘OK, even stag 
pushing contests and acts of grooming ‘transmit information’, but not about external 
states of affairs.’ The idea behind the reply is that the information transmitted by a 
stronger stag pushing a weaker stag backwards and winning a contest is about the 
stronger stag (i.e. literally that he is the stronger competitor). But the information 
transmitted by, say, a vervet leopard alarm call, is about the presence of a leopard, 
which is a world-state external to the sender. However, it is obvious why this reply 
fails. Most cases of signalling involve information transmitted about the sender, as 
opposed to the external environment. Despite their paradigmatic status in much of 
the communication literature, alarm calls are the exception38. The peacock’s famous 
tale, indicating high genetic quality, is but one example of a signal transmitting 
information about the sender. A large and impressive tail raises the probability that the 
male sender is of good stock, and this is the state that ‘rationalises’ the adapted 
response of the female receiver. 
The moral is this: conceived of appropriately, i.e. as a structuring cause of 
receiver behaviour, natural meaning is ‘transmitted’ in all sorts of co-adapted 
interactions. This should be no surprise, really. For presumably most, if not all, co-
adapted interactions must occur in the right circumstances. There will always be a 
world-state that ‘rationalises’ the recipient’s response such that the response needs to 
occur in that state of the world (even if this be internal to the sender), which will also 
mean the ‘sender’s’ eliciting act needs to correlate with the rationalising world-state. 
                                                          
38 Why this obtains, when models (Skyrms 2010) show us that signalling about the external environment 
should readily emerge, is raised by Sterelny (2017). 
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This largely completes my analysis of an information-mediated influence 
definition of communication. The moral I would like to draw is the following. If an 
information-mediated influenced definition of communication is to be salvaged, it 
would have to be shown that the natural meaning carried by signals can be 
characterised in a way that is different from the natural meaning pervasive among co-
adapted interactions more generally. In the absence of such an account, an 
information-mediated influence definition seems to suffer from the same problem as a 
co-adapted influence definition: both are too liberal.   
However, before ending I would like to propose one way of modifying an 
information-mediated definition to make it less liberal. The modification involves 
augmenting an information-mediated influence definition with the notion of 
‘arbitrariness’ to rule out co-adapted interactions like stag pushing and grooming 
behaviours. However, despite being able to rule out the latter, I will argue that this 
proposal is unwise. It swings things too far in the other direction, and makes a 
definition of communication too restrictive. This is because many kinds of signals are 
not arbitrary. 
 
3. Adding an Arbitrariness Feature? 
 
Take the famous alarm calls of the vervet monkey. The ‘arbitrary’ nature of these calls 
was originally seen as one of their most exciting features: one suggesting possible 
continuity with human language (Seyfarth et al. 1980). More specifically, the link 
between (a) the physical structure of each alarm call, on the one hand, and (b) the 
function of each alarm call, on the other, was found to be arbitrary. Put colloquially, 
vervet receivers wouldn’t have cared if the physical structure of the actual leopard 
alarm took the structure of what is now the eagle alarm (and vice versa). What is 
important is simply that the leopard alarm, whatever physical structure it takes, be 
distinguishable from an eagle alarm and a snake alarm, and that it correlate more 
strongly with the presence of leopards as opposed to eagles or snakes. But this can 
occur across multiple variations in physical signal structure: so long as each call can be 
perceptually distinguished from each other and from any other signals vervets have 
that are unrelated to predator avoidance39. 
Understood this way, a signal can be arbitrary in two senses: the first ‘all-or-
nothing’; the second contrastive. In the first sense, a signal is arbitrary if at least one 
                                                          
39 This is not to say that vervet alarm calls are completely arbitrary, in the sense I am beginning to outline. 
As Owren et al. (2010) rightly note, the physical form of alarm calls is constrained to some degree. They 
must allow for detection and localization. Also, they must prime listeners by engaging low-level attention 
and arousal mechanisms. However, there seems to be no necessary connection between the physical form 
of a leopard call, on the one hand, and behavioural responses that are adaptive in the presence of 
leopards as opposed to eagles or snakes, on the other. In other words, there is nothing special about the 
physical form of leopard calls, qua signals designating leopards, as opposed to that of eagle or snake calls. 
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alternative physical structure could have been used in place of the actual one. In the 
contrastive sense, a signal is more arbitrary the greater the range of alternative physical 
structures that could have been used in place of the actual one. But how, exactly, do 
we determine whether such-and-such alternative structure could have been used in place 
of the actual one? This is a complex issue. However, there are plausible constraints. 
An obvious constraint is perceptual discriminability. Signals must be detectible by 
receivers. Second, producing the alternative physical structure must have been within 
the behavioural repertoire of senders at the time of signal creation. This rules out 
alternative structure that would have required senders to possess novel perceptual-
motor or cognitive capacities, for instance. A third potential constraint I would 
suggest, albeit tentatively, is that some members of the population must have been 
disposed, at the time of signal creation, to produce the alternative structure in 
response to the same condition others were disposed to respond to with the actual 
structure.  
Accordingly, vervet alarm calls are relatively arbitrary in the contrastive sense 
because each type of call was obviously within the behavioural repertoire of senders at 
the time of signal creation; and also because, plausibly, some members of the 
population were disposed at that time to produce each kind of acoustic structure for 
each of a leopard, eagle or snake. Further, it seems plausible to think that the range of 
alternative acoustic structures that could have been used in place of the actual one - 
for each kind of alarm call - extends beyond the three kinds of structures that are 
actually used for alarm calling. But now compare vervet alarm calls with linguistic 
signs. While there are alternative physical structures the leopard alarm might have 
taken, the word ‘l-e-o-p-a-r-d’ is probably even more arbitrary. A much greater range 
of physical structures could have been substituted for the word ‘l-e-o-p-a-r-d’ at the 
time of initial signal development.  
Now, arbitrariness is a property of interactions held by some ethologists and 
philosophers to be prototypically ‘communicative’40. According to one prima facie 
plausible way of thinking about signals as distinct from other kinds of behaviours or 
phenotypes, the former involve “a distinctive role for relations of involvement 
between [signals] and other things” (Godfrey-Smith 2014, p. 83). The idea is that a 
paradigm signal, as opposed to a non-signal, brings about its effects conventionally as 
opposed to via its intrinsic properties. Skyrms (2010, p. 7) characterises as arbitrary (he 
uses the label ‘conventional’) signals that “are not endowed with any intrinsic 
meaning”. “If we start with a pair of sender and receiver strategies, and switch the 
messages around the same way in both, we get the same payoffs” (Skyrms 2010, p. 8). 
                                                          
40 See Harms 2004, Skyrms 2010; see also Wheeler & Fischer 2012 for a discussion of ‘functional 
reference’ in the ethology of communication, which made much of the arbitrary nature of 
communication in species like vervet monkeys. 
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“This fundamental symmetry is what makes Lewis signalling games a model in which 
the meaning of signals is purely conventional” (Skyrms 2010, p. 8). 
 Consider the mating signals of a female firefly, given in response to the flash 
of a male, which, when sent by the female, functions to attract the male (Lewis & 
Cratsley 2008). The flash brings about its effect of attracting a male by ‘standing in’ for 
a female firefly being ready to mate. Another way a female could get a male to mate 
with her might be to approach a male and perform some firefly equivalent of an 
enticing dance in front of him. Comparatively speaking this would not be a behaviour 
that brings about its effects conventionally. Instead, this behaviour is efficacious in 
virtue of its intrinsic properties. Likewise, there are two ways in which someone could 
come to believe that I’m hungry. I could utter to them the statement ‘I’m hungry’. 
Alternatively, I could let them hear my stomach rumbling. There are also two ways an 
infant could come to know that it’s a good time to feed. Mother could give off a signal 
that stands for the fact that she is ready to feed. Alternatively, mother could simply 
initiate feeding behaviour by exposing her nipple in direct view of the infant. In each 
case there is a difference grounded in the arbitrariness of the ‘communicative’ act, 
compared with the non-arbitrariness of the ‘non-communicative’ act. On this view, 
signals are ultimately efficacious because of sender-receiver co-adaptation as opposed 
to the intrinsic features of the signal.  
This is not to say that in real time signals don’t bring about their effects due 
to their intrinsic properties. Signals don’t operate by magic, mechanistically speaking. 
Instead, the point is related to notion of arbitrariness outlined above. When it comes 
to a signal as opposed to a non-signal, a greater range of alternative physical structures 
could have been used at the time of initial signal development. But now this point has 
a bit more context. It is because receivers ‘choose’ to respond to signals, unlike some 
other kinds of stimuli, that the physical form of signals is relatively arbitrary. Of 
course, this ‘choice’ is often made by natural selection as opposed to the receiving 
organism itself. When natural selection stabilises the communication system, receivers 
attend to signals because signal-effects are adaptively beneficial. While the means are 
different, the comparison with human language is clear. Counterfactually speaking, I 
attend to the utterance “the building is on fire” not because of its intrinsic properties 
but because of what it conventionally stands for, given my desire to stay alive 
unmolested by hot flame. This contrasts with firefly mating signals, where it is natural 
selection that ‘makes the choice’ to keep receivers attending to signals. 
With is in mind, we can now see how the notion of arbitrariness might be 
used by an information-mediated influence definition to exclude co-adapted 
interactions like stag contests and grooming. Compare a paradigmatic signal like a 
leopard alarm call with a stag pushing another stag in resource contest. One might 
think that the relatively arbitrary nature of the leopard alarm, in contrast to stag 
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pushes, renders the former but not the latter co-adapted interaction ‘communicative’. 
Although difficult to quantify precisely, it seems plausible to think that more 
alternative physical structures could have been used as the leopard alarm than as a trait 
for getting competitors to yield a contested resource. Presumably, getting a 
conspecific to give up a resource in a fight can only be done in limited number of 
ways given the physical structure of the world. It involves somehow stopping an 
opponent from getting something you want, via physical coercion. By way of contrast, 
a comparatively large range of possible vocal calls (with the right physical features 
allowing for detection, localisation, and eliciting emotion arousal) could presumably be 
used by vervets to correlate with leopards.  
A similar comparison might be made between the leopard alarm, on the one 
hand, and ‘non-communicative’ grooming interactions, on the other. Compared to the 
range of physical structures that could play the leopard alarm, those that cause 
conspecifics to be more inclined to reciprocate with you in the future are probably 
more restricted (especially if you are a chimpanzee). You must do something which 
confers a benefit on a conspecific, which is plausibly more restricted than producing 
an acoustic call of some kind that correlates with leopards. 
An information-mediated influence definition of animal communication 
bolstered by the notion of arbitrariness would look something like the following. 
While quite a mouthful, it captures how arbitrariness could be combined with an 
information-mediated influence definition to rule out instances of co-adapted 
influence like pushing contests and grooming:  
 
Phenotype P of a sender S is a signal when P has the selected function to trigger a 
certain response in a receiver R, where R’s response is co-adapted specifically to the 
receipt of P, where P carries natural meaning which is a structuring cause of R’s 
response, and where, finally, the link between the physical form of P and its function 
is (relatively) arbitrary. 
 
3.1 ARBITRARINESS IS TOO RESTRICTIVE 
 
While adding an arbitrariness criterion to an information-mediated influence 
definition might seem like a promising way of cordoning off communication from 
other co-adapted interactions, there is a problem. The problem is that many cases of 
communication aren’t all that arbitrary. Worse, certain paradigm communication 
systems, such as the famous waggle dance of the honeybee, don’t seem to be all that 
arbitrary. Take the way in which an incoming bee signals the direction that nectar-
seeking conspecifics should fly upon leaving the hive. It orientates its dance relative to 
the vertical of the hive. The angle of the dance off the vertical of the hive maps onto 
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the angle relative to the sun’s azimuth receiver bees need to take to find food. For 
instance, a dance at 90 degrees from the vertical of the hive communicates nectar at 
90 degrees from the sun’s azimuth (at the time of signalling).  
It is probably not the case that the physical structure of the actual signal could 
have been different, while nevertheless causing the same response. For the fact that 
bees presently orientate their dance relative to the vertical of the hive looks to be a 
product of evolutionary ritualization. At some earlier stage of bee evolution, a worker 
would fly back to the hive to deliver nectar and then ready itself to fly back to the 
same location from which it got its latest batch of nectar. As it prepared to exit the 
hive, it orientated its body in the appropriate direction. Thus, the direction component 
of the dance was probably originally a cue which provided other bees with information 
about the location of nectar (von Frisch 1967). 
Similarly, “indices of quality” (Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003) are a relatively 
non-arbitrary class of signal because of diverging interests between senders and 
receivers. For example, male toads produce aggressive vocal signals designed to deter 
other males in disputes over access to females (Davies & Halliday 1978). Such 
vocalisations are nomically correlated with body size, and thus fighting ability. Low-
pitched vocalisations, by their very nature, tend to be produced by larger toads, and 
hence are more effective at settling disputes in the sender’s favour. Selection acting on 
male responses has effectively imposed an ‘honesty’ demand upon the signal type. 
This honesty demand drastically cuts down on the space of possible alternative 
physical structures that could function to intimidate rivals. 
Yet more signals that an information-mediated influence definition 
(augmented with an arbitrariness feature) would exclude from its extension are some 
of the intentional gestures of great apes. Take the ‘play-tap’ of chimpanzees 
(Tomasello 2008). One youngster approaches a second, wanting to play. The first 
raises his arm, as though to hit the second, and the recipient begins to play upon 
perceiving this initial arm raise. Note how closely the physical form of the signal is tied 
to its function. Tomasello (2008, p. 26) expresses the point by stating “the ‘meaning’ 
or communicative significance of [the gesture] is inherent in [it]”. The (relative) non-
arbitrariness of play taps is reflected in how the signal is learnt. Over repeated 
instances of one individual coming up to a recipient to initiate play by hitting him, the 
recipient learns to anticipate impending unruliness just from a raised arm. The English 
utterance ‘let’s play’ is very unlike a chimp play tap in this respect. The physical form 
of this utterance has no intrinsic connection with playing (which is why the content 
‘let’s play’ can be expressed in many different languages, in many different tones of 
voice, at many different volumes, etc.).  
In response to these cases, there at least two possible ways forward. The first 
is to give up on an information-mediated influence definition of communication to 
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include cases like the bee dance, indices of quality, and certain intentional gestures. 
The second option, however, is to ‘bite the bullet’, keep the definition, and instead 
rule out (as non-communicative) cases like the bee dance, indices of quality, and 
intentional great-ape gestures like the play-tap. After all, only if ethologists are using 
the notion of ‘communication’ consistently would we expect to be able to define 
communication in way that perfectly captures biological practice. One might be 
inclined to question this assumption.  
I suggest the following. We need not assume from the outset that a definition 
of ‘communication’ must capture all biological applications of the concept. There can 
be room for theory to influence scientific practice and scientific intuition. But there 
are limits. It can’t be the case that too many interactions classed as communitive are 
ruled out. Nor should we go so far as to rule out interactions considered to be 
paradigm cases of communication. The bee dance, for example, is one such case of a 
paradigm communication system in biology.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that an information-mediated influence definition of 
animal communication (as presented by Scarantino 2013) is extensionally inadequate. 
It is too liberal, in that it includes various co-adapted interactions which are normally 
considered to be ‘non-communicative’. I then investigated whether arbitrariness could 
be added to an information-mediated influence definition in order to exclude various 
‘non-communicative’ interactions. I concluded that arbitrariness is unhelpful because 
it swings things too far in the opposite direction, excluding many stock-and-trade 
cases of communication. Of particular concern is that it excludes some paradigm 
cases, like the bee dance. We go from a definition of communication that is too liberal 
to one that is too restrictive. 
It might be beneficial at this point to take a step back and assess the general 
strategy. An adapted influence definition of communication (MSH 1995), a co-
adapted influence definition (MSH 2003, Scott-Phillips 2008), and an information-
mediated influence definition (Scarantino 2013)41 are all definitions. Yet, constructing 
a definition is only one way to go about the process of categorising something (like 
‘communication’). It reflects the ‘classical’ approach to categorisation (Margolis & 
Laurence 1999): come up with a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
(hopefully) include all and only instances of communication. 
However, it is no secret that variation characterises many biological 
phenomena. For example, a list of necessary and sufficient conditions is unfit to 
                                                          
41 Including an information-mediated influence definition that includes an arbitrariness feature. 
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categorise species (Hull 1986). Nor is such a list apt to capture the notion of a 
‘Darwinian population’ (Godfrey-Smith 2009). In cases like these, classical 
categorisation is hard because there are many intermediary cases between ‘full-blown’ 
instances of a category, on the one hand, and partial instances of the category, on the 
other42. However, if this chapter is on the right track, then categorising animal 
communication is hard for a different reason. It is hard, not because there are many 
intermediate cases of communication lying mid-way between (say) co-adapted 
interactions, on the one hand, and ‘full-blown’ communication, on the other (although 
this might be an additional reason). Rather, I have sought to show that classifying 
communication is hard because the interactions many want to label as properly 
‘communicative’ are, upon closer examination, simply no different from co-adapted 
interactions more generally. 
The main moral is that neither information, (co-adapted) influence, nor a 
combination of the two, is a defining feature of animal communication. If I am right, 
then it is extremely difficult to specify what, exactly, makes animal communication a 
unique kind of interaction. It can’t be because animal communication is merely a co-
adapted interaction. This is too liberal. And it can’t be because it is a co-adapted 
interaction that involves the transmission of natural meaning (where natural meaning 
is understood as a structuring cause of receiver behaviour). This is because, as I have 
argued, transmitting natural meaning is a feature of most (if not all) co-adapted 
interactions. 
The idea that ‘information transmission’ or ‘carrying information’ is not 
special to co-adapted interactions that are considered communicative might strike 
some as initially strange, particularly when considered against the backdrop of human 
communication and linguistic communication. There seems, at least on prima facie 
reflection, to be something utterly unique about language. Language seems to be an 
exceptionally powerful communication system. As well as expressing feelings and 
emotions, it allows us to communicate about states of affairs massively displaced in 
both space and time, and even completely non-existence states of affairs. As a result, it 
is used to strengthen social bonds (gossip), do science, create poetry, and to 
coordinate complex behavioural interactions like hunting or building bridges. Indeed, 
without language the kind of cultural evolution unique to our species would probably 
be impossible. Surely the extraordinary power of language comes down to the fact 
that language conveys information in some unique sense?  
Maybe so. Perhaps the way in which human language conveys information is 
totally unique. However, even if this is true, it does not mean that nonhuman 
signalling (and non-linguistic signals among humans, like facial expressions) is unique 
                                                          
42 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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in conveying the kind of information that it trades in. If the argument I have 
presented in this chapter is correct, then the great majority of signals sent in the 
nonhuman realm carry a kind of information which is non-unique to communication. 
Indeed, it may even turn out that there is nothing uniquely special about (nonhuman) 
communicative interactions vs other kinds of co-adapted interactions among 
nonhuman animals. 
Finally, I hope that my analysis will be of some interest to those sceptical of 
the idea that signals ‘transmit information’, more specifically of the idea that there is 
any explanatory utility in ascribing informational properties to signals. If I am right, 
then of course information transmission won’t be a defining feature of 
communication. But nevertheless, it will still be the case that signals transmit 
information in the predictive sense proposed by Scarantino, the causal-explanatory 
role of which I have sought to clarify in this chapter.  
Crucially, this view of the causal-explanatory role of natural meaning need not 
commit us to the idea that signals have the selected function of transmitting 
information. The selected function of signals can still be to influence receivers, as 
opposed to inform them (Dawkins & Krebs 1978, Owren et al. 2010; Carazo & Font 
201043). It’s just that receivers were rewarded for paying attention to signals only when 
signals coincided with their ‘referents’ either over phylogenetic or ontogenetic time. 
Carrying natural meaning can thus be regarded as a ‘normal condition’ (Millikan 2004) 
in explaining the phylogenetic or ontogenetic development of communicative 
behaviours, as opposed to the selected function of a signal. 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 3. What is it to explain a receiver’s response by positing that it ‘derived’ natural meaning 
from a signal? What is the explanatory role(s) of natural meaning when it comes to understanding 
receiver responses? Might getting clearer on this go some way towards resolving the information vs 
influence debate? 
  
                                                          
43 As Carazo & Font (2010, p. 663) highlight, “the function… and information content of a signal are not 
the same thing, as evinced by the fact that the same effect (e.g. to intimidate a rival) can be achieved by a 
signal with different informative content (e.g. size, social or residential status).” 
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Chapter 3 
Information, Influence, and the Causal-Explanatory Role of 
Natural Meaning in Understanding Receiver Responses 
 
 
As part of the move away from group selection, Dawkins & Krebs (1978) famously 
argued that signalling systems are not systems of information flow. Because senders 
and receivers are often in competition, we should instead see signals as attempts by 
senders to manipulate or influence receivers. Their position was soon criticised for 
framing receivers as passive dupes, rather than active participants with their own selfish 
interests (Zahavi 1975, Maynard-Smith & Harper 2003). Rather than viewing receivers 
as passive dupes, we should expect receivers to ignore dishonest/manipulative signals, 
forcing communication towards honesty, and thus informativeness. According to 
more recent sceptics of information, however, there is no justification for this “a 
priori” assumption that receiver selection wins out over selection for sender influence 
(Owren, Rendall & Ryan 2010: henceforth ‘ORR’). If receivers are successful in seeing 
off sender influence in one domain or modality, selection should trigger “assaults” in 
other domains. Instead of honesty, we should commonly expect an equilibrium point 
where receivers are “somewhat disadvantaged”.  
If this is indeed the case, then the default assumption of information 
proponents leads to bad biology. It diverts attention from what is most important: 
features of signals designed to exploit sensory and psychological biases in receivers, 
and to facilitate detectability, localizability and avoid receiver habituation. An example 
is the presence of photoreceptors in the sensory systems of some fish that evolved to 
detect prey. These photoreceptors secondarily produced selection for corresponding 
coloration in males: specifically, for males to become more visually salient to females 
possessing the photoreceptors. But according to ORR, this change in males is neither 
‘honest’ nor ‘dishonest’. It isn’t explained by the signal correlating reliably with male 
quality. Instead, it is explained by the signal being linked to sensory biases in female 
receivers. Another example is a species of frog whose sexually selected vocalisations 
evolved to match pre-existing auditory sensitivities in females. What explains the 
physical structure of the male’s signal is not information about male quality, but rather 
the latent sensitivity of the female’s auditory system. Males exploit this sensitively for 
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their own ends. According to ORR, the assumption that signals are designed to 
transmit information blinds researchers to crucial features of signal design, and to the 
evolutionary rationale for these features.  
ORR are right to stress the importance of influence in understanding signal 
design. However, an informational approach is not thereby discredited. I think we 
should conclude that it is unwise to frame the selected function of signals wholly in 
terms of honest information transmission. But information transmission must play 
some role in the evolution of signal form, for two reasons. Firstly, and as ORR 
themselves admit, a signalling system in which perceivers are strongly exploited is 
unlikely to persist. Secondly, something needs to explain why a receiver with a 
particular sensory bias, for instance, responds in the particular way it does. Male fish 
pigmentation must be designed against the background of female sensitivity and 
processing, if only to ensure that females take notice of males looking to mate. Any 
male, even a weak one, able to produce a signal that females find easier to notice will 
increase his fitness. ORR are right that, at this point, a focus on information is 
unilluminating. However, we still need to explain why the female fish responds with 
sexual receptivity, as opposed to some other behaviour, upon seeing the male’s signal. 
This is where information content, in the sense outlined in Chapter 1, becomes crucial. 
Even if there is substantial (non-informative) selection pressure on signals to influence 
receivers, this doesn’t make full sense of the receiver’s response. Why do females 
respond to attention-grabbing signals with sexual receptivity as opposed to predation, 
for example? Of course, it’s possible that females assess males based on other factors 
after receiving the initial signal, and that, as a result, the signal need not correlate 
reliably (or fairly reliably) with male quality. But in the absence of this, females 
become sexually receptive to the signal because, when things went right for females in 
the population over phylogenetic time, the signal correlated with a male of decent 
quality looking to mate. If females are responding with sexual receptivity as opposed 
to predation, this must be because, often enough, this response paid off. And responding 
to the signal with sexual receptivity would only have paid off if it was produced, often 
enough, by a male of decent quality looking to mate. This means that males of low 
quality must have been excluded, often enough, from signalling.  
Thus, an informational approach need not discourage a focus on the intrinsic 
features of signals. For it encourages searching for features of the signal that restrict 
access to ‘dishonest’ senders. If there is selection pressure on receivers for scepticism, 
that makes the information content of the signal relevant, even if that selection 
pressure is sometimes not very effective, leading to sub-optimal decision making by 
receivers.   
ORR also critique an informational methodology on mechanistic grounds. 
They see an informational approach as inflating the mental sophistication of receivers. 
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Information encourages viewing the mechanisms underpinning responses as being 
unduly close to the relevant ones underpinning human language. We should instead 
view the former mechanisms as effect-based, as opposed to ‘cognitive’. Animal 
signals, due to their intrinsic physical properties, evoke attention and arousal in 
receivers directly and without cognitive mediation. Again, senders have the upper 
hand, but this time proximately as opposed to ultimately. In contrast, information 
proponents argue that, at least in some species, receivers control how they respond to 
signals in real-time (Seyfarth et al. 2010). In such species, signals with similar physical 
properties can lead to different responses, depending on what mentally-represented 
information is brought to bear on the information derived from the signal. Similarly, 
signals with different physical properties can lead to the same responses, again 
depending on what mentally-represented information is brought to bear on the 
information derived from the signal.  
Bringing evolutionary and mechanistic considerations together, what 
motivates information proponents is essentially the idea of receiver flexibility. On the 
evolutionary front, proponents argue that putting senders in charge ignores that 
natural selection acts on receiver strategies as well as sender strategies. If being 
influenced by a signal in a certain way is not adaptive for a receiver, then natural 
selection will lead receivers to change their response. On the mechanistic front, 
information proponents argue that, at least in some species, receivers possess the 
cognitive sophistication to control their responses in real-time. If receivers are not 
prisoners of sender influence, then we must infer that receivers respond to signals, 
and respond in the particular way they do, because information is ‘derived’ from 
signals. Because of the view that receivers possess response flexibility, Seyfarth et al. 
(2010) state “the concept of information plays a central role in studies of animal 
communication”.  
I largely agree with information proponents. However, they need to make 
some important distinctions. The response flexibility of receivers can take one of two 
forms, corresponding to two different ways information is ‘derived’ from signals. As 
already stated, information proponents argue that there is good reason to think that 
evolution works on receiver strategies at the population-level to minimise malign 
signal influence. I will label this kind of receiver flexibility diachronic flexibility. 
Furthermore, information proponents argue that in some species receivers themselves 
(i.e. at the individual-level and in real time) possess the cognitive sophistication to 
respond to flexibly to signals. I will label this synchronic flexibility. The main goal of this 
chapter is to show that information proponents do not differentiate clearly enough 
between these two different kinds of flexibility; and, concomitantly, between two 
different ways information may be said to be derived from signals. 
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  As I will show in the final section of this chapter, it can be unclear which of 
the following things information proponents mean when they say that a receiver has 
‘derived information’ from a signal: First, that natural selection, over phylogenetic 
time and at the population-level, has made use of a correlational link between signal 
and relevant world-state in order to install or maintain (in the receiver) a relatively 
fixed response. If the environment has not changed drastically, then this response will 
presently be adaptive. The second thing information proponents might mean by 
saying that a receiver has ‘derived information’ from a signal is this: that receivers (on 
the individual-level) represent a correlational link between signal and world-state, in 
such a way that this information is made available for real-time decision-making. The 
second option brings with it more substantive proximate-cognitive commitments 
which I will identify using Sterelny’s (2003) notion of decoupled mental representation. 
When no such proximate-cognitive commitments are intended, and when it is not 
made explicit in what sense a receiver has ‘derived information’ from a signal, confusion 
can result. It can sound like animal communication is being anthropomorphised, 
which is one of the complaints made against attributing content to signals in the first 
place (ORR, Rendall & Owren 2013).  
My main aim in this chapter, then, is addressed to information proponents. 
However, a subsidiary aim of this chapter is addressed to the sceptics. My subsidiary 
aim is to make the point that information can be attributed to signals without 
depicting the proximate mechanisms of animal communication as being unduly 
sophisticated or otherwise similar to those unpinning human communication. When it 
is done as part of an ultimate explanation of diachronic flexibility, attributing 
information to a signal does not entail that senders and/or receivers are cognitively 
sophisticated. Nor, as I will argue, does doing this entail that receivers are on par with 
senders, when it comes to evolutionary considerations. Thus, I am critical of both 
information proponents as well as sceptics. However, I side with proponents of 
informational terminology. Information (i.e. natural meaning) is indeed useful in 
explaining why receivers respond, given receiver flexibility. However, receiver 
flexibility can be explained in ultimate terms or in proximate terms, corresponding to 
two different ways in which receivers use this natural meaning. 
My plan is as follows. Section 1 explains how natural meaning can be evoked 
as part of an ultimate explanation of diachronic receiver flexibility. Section 2 explains 
how natural meaning can be evoked as part of a proximate explanation of synchronic 
receiver flexibility. Finally, Section 3 addresses a central pro-information paper in the 
debate where the distinctions I highlight are not clear: that is, where it isn’t clear 
whether natural meaning is being evoked as part of a proximate explanation of 
synchronic flexibility, or merely as part of an ultimate explanation of diachronic 
flexibility.  
65 
 
First, I will explore how natural meaning is often attributed to signals as part 
of an ultimate explanation of diachronic response flexibility. Here, this meaning is 
represented by the receiver in a minimal sense only. It is natural selection on the 
population-level, as opposed to the individual organism, making use of the natural 
meaning transmitted by signals.  
   
1. Natural Meaning in Ultimate Explanations of Diachronic Flexibility  
 
Anolis cristatellus lizards are preyed upon by a species of snake, Alsophis portoricensis. 
When it spots a snake, a lizard will perform a conspicuous display: push-ups, in which 
it moves its body up and down in a vertical plane by flexing and extending its legs. A. 
cristatellus lizards escape from snakes in one of two ways. Sometimes, they flee at the 
moment of attack. More often, however, they must struggle and bite their attackers 
once caught. Such struggles are usually violent, involving a significant aerobic 
component. Thus, push-up displays are performed at the very moment a lizard needs 
all the energy it can muster. Why, then, are they performed? 
One explanation for this expensive behaviour is that lizard push-ups are 
‘honest’ (or fairly honest) signals of escape-ability, which communicate to snakes that 
a struggle is not worth the effort. Indeed, during predation, snakes respond to lizard 
push-ups by stopping their approach. Additionally, lizards that signal are attacked 
significantly less often than lizards that don’t signal (Leal 1999).   
If this honest signalling hypothesis is right, then a relationship should exist 
between the intensity of a push-up display, on the one hand, and the ability of the 
signalling lizard to escape attack, on the other. As it happens, the endurance capacity 
of A. cristatellus has been investigated in the lab. The intensity of signals, represented 
by the number of push-ups given by a lizard during predation episodes, has been 
found to correlate significantly with individual physiological condition, represented by 
endurance (Leal 1999)44. Thus, there is reason to think that those push-up displays 
that cause a snake to disengage carry information about the sender being 
physiologically robust and likely to escape. 
 
1.1 THE CONTENT OF A PUSH-UP DISPLAY 
 
A push-up display can naturally mean the sender has a high escape ability without 
entailing high escape-ability. The probability of high escape-ability, given the display, 
just needs to be greater than the probability of high escape-ability in the absence of 
the display. On this view, if a push-up display raises the probability of high-escape 
                                                          
44 The ingenious study tested endurance capacity by encouraging lizards to run around specially 
engineered racetracks. 
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ability from (say) 50% to 80%, the display carries information about high escape-
ability. In addition to this correlational information on the input side of equation, we 
can focus on the output conditions of the signal: i.e. the selected function of the 
receiver in response to signals (Millikan 2004; Stegmann 2009). Out of all the states of 
the world a push-up display correlates with, including the presence of a snake, the 
content of a signal is identified with that state which rationalises the receiver’s 
response. What state of the world made it such that a snake’s response to a vigorous 
push-up display was adaptive over phylogenetic time? Not the presence of a snake. 
Rather, the signalling lizard having a high endurance capacity. This, then, is the natural 
meaning of the signal according to the content-recipe defended in Chapter 1. 
 
1.2 CONTENT AS USED BY NATURAL SELECTION 
 
What explanatory work does the notion of content do in explaining the response 
behaviours of snakes in our example? Upon observing a vigorous push-up display, for 
example, it is intuitive to say that a snake disengages because the push-up display 
‘transmitted’ or ‘carried’ information about the high escape-ability of the lizard. But 
what facts about the world ground this sort of ‘because’? 
 A push-up display is a phenotypic trait of a lizard, the function of which is to 
cause predatory snakes to disengage. Snakes, in turn, possess the biological function of 
responding to vigorous push-up displays by disengaging. We can plausibly assume that 
the mechanisms underlying response behaviour, shaped by natural selection, are wired 
quite directly to certain behaviours or bodily process, and that such mechanisms are 
relatively automatic and ballistic. For instance, there is no indication that a snake takes 
into account a significant range of information, in addition to a push-up display, 
before assessing in a top-down manner whether to disengage from a hunt. 
Concomitantly, there is no indication that a snake uses the information gained from 
observing a push-up display to control responses other than hunt disengagement. In 
this sense the information carried by a signal is represented in a minimal sense only 
(Sterelny 2003). The correlation between signal and world-state explains why the 
receiver’s response mechanisms are hard-wired as they are, but this information is 
probably not something that is decoupled from any particular response. That is, this 
information is probably not something the organism itself thinks about.    
Instead, information comes into the picture when explaining why the signalling 
system is set up (and/or maintained) as it is. For instance, in explaining why a 
particular snake responds to a vigorous push-up display by disengaging, we must note 
the correlational link between a) vigorous push-up displays and b) high escape-ability 
in signalling lizards across past episodes of communication at the population-level. 
Historically speaking, when lizard push-up displays caused ancestral snakes to 
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disengage from a hunt, a condition that accompanied this response, more often than 
not, was that the signalling lizard was physiologically robust with high escape-ability. 
Because of such historical and population-level facts about the system, we now say 
things like ‘a vigorous push-up display produced by a lizard indicates that it is 
physiologically robust’.  
It should be noted that this claim is not an entirely novel one. Teleosemanticists, 
when they have addressed the explanatory role of information, have noted that this 
role is ultimate in nature (e.g. Shea 2007; Millikan 2007). This should come as no 
surprise, seeing as teleosemantic theories of content all appeal to the notion of 
selected function. However, when it comes to purely correlational/non-etiological 
accounts of information (e.g. Scarantino 2015; Skyrms 2010), there has been less, if 
any, precise discussion of the causal-explanatory role of appealing to the information 
carried by signals. 
In exploring this issue further, consider a relatively simple, 2 state, 2 signal, 2 act 
sender-receiver model involving one sender and one receiver at time T1. The sender 
(S) produces a signal depending on whether state 1 or state 2 obtains in the world. As 
a result of being influenced by a signal, the receiver (R) can act in 1 of 2 ways. 
Assume, further, that the system is in equilibrium such that S sends signal 1 when and 
only when the world is in state 1 and signal 2 when and only when the world is in state 
2; and concomitantly that R performs act 1 in response to signal 1 (and only signals 1) 
and act 2 in response to signal 2 (and only signal 2). Finally, assume that the likelihood 
of either state 1 or state 2 obtaining in the world is 0.5. In this signalling system, signal 
1 thus raises the probability that state 1 obtains from 0.5 to 1; and signal 2 thus raises 
the probably that state 2 obtains from 0.5 to 1. As a result, we can say signal 1 carries 
the correlational information that state 1 obtains; and signal 2 carries the correlational 
information that state 2 obtains (Skyrms 2010).  
The question is, when R is causally influenced by a token of signal type 1 at time 
T1, and as a result produces act 1 at time T1, what kind of explanation are we giving 
of R’s response at time T1 by saying ‘R received the correlational information that state 1 
obtains’? Let us call the particular signal token that causally influences R, at time T1, 
‘Signal 10001’. The first thing to note is that the information carried by Signal 10001 is 
grounded by facts about the type of signal 10001 is a token of. More specifically, it is 
grounded by the (population-level) fact that this type of signal was given only when 
state 1 obtained, but not when state 2 obtained. Secondly, by invoking the information 
carried by Signal 10001 in order to explain R’s response, we are not appealing to 
features of the present causal interaction between Signal 10001 and R. Instead, we are 
appealing to past causal interactions: more specifically between past tokens of signal 
type 1 and ancestors of R. We are appealing to the (historical) fact that, when R’s 
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ancestors responded to tokens of signal type 1 by producing act 1, world-state 1 
always obtained. 
Conversely, imagine that sender S gives, for the very first time, a token of signal 
type 1 in state 2 (say, accidently). In this case, the signal will carry the (‘false’) 
information that state 1 obtains, when in fact state 2 obtains. As a result, R responds 
by producing act 1 in state 2. What kind of explanation are we now giving of this 
behavioural response, by invoking the fact that R was given the false correlational 
information that state 1 obtains? We are basically saying that the signal hasn’t co-
occurred with the state that a) past tokens of b) this signal type co-occurred with. In 
other words, we are appealing to a) historical facts and b) population-level facts. 
Compare this with the way in which we explain someone’s death by saying that his 
heart ‘malfunctioned’ (as opposed to giving a mechanistic explanation of what caused 
his bodily-functions to cease). Here we are saying something about the malfunctioning 
heart, but what we are saying is grounded by a) historical facts about past tokens of 
this organ in b) an ancestral population of organisms. Our present malfunctioning 
heart isn’t doing what it is supposed to do. What it is supposed to do is what the 
numerous hearts (population-level) did in the ancestors (historical) of our unfortunate 
subject, such that he ended up with a heart, albeit one that just stopped working. In 
giving the ‘false information’ explanation for R’s response behaviour, and in giving the 
‘the malfunctioning heart’ explanation for our unfortunate subject’s death, we are in 
both cases giving ultimate explanations. 
 
1.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
The first moral is directed towards information proponents. Information is often said 
to be ‘derived’ by receivers from signals sent and received among fairly cognitively-
simple organisms: organisms whose signalling strategies are hard-wired, and who map 
stimuli onto response behaviours in a relatively direct and automatic manner. When 
information is said to be derived from a signal by a receiver in such a case, this should 
be seen as part of an ultimate explanation of the receiver’s response. The information 
derived from the signal is not freely available to drive decision-making in real-time. 
Instead, it explains why the receiver’s typical response strategy takes the form that it 
does. Using Dretske’s terminology introduced in Chapter 2, the information explains 
(2nd-order) the conditions responsible for the current situation in which signal tokens 
of the relevant type cause (1st-order) the typical response. 
 Moreover, in such cases information is central to explaining why receivers are 
not necessarily prisoners of sender manipulation. As shown by Leal (1999), a push-up 
display is a relatively honest signal of escape-ability. In other words, vigorous push-up 
displays correlate with high escape ability. This is almost certainly due to population-
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level variation on the receiver’s side, allowing receivers to ignore vigorous push-up 
displays that do not correlate with high escape-ability. This, in turn, creates selection 
pressure for costly signals which ensures signal honesty (Maynard-Smith & Harper 
2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005). But note that the flexibility creating honest and 
informative signals exists over phylogenetic timescales, in this case. It is explained 
ultimately as opposed to proximately.   
The second moral is directed towards information sceptics. In 
communication systems like the one discussed, attributing information to signals in no 
way anthropomorphises the communication system. It does not depict sender and/or 
receiver strategies as being driven by anything like the psychological abilities 
underpinning intentional human communication. Moreover, attributing information 
to signals does not entail that receivers are on a complete par with senders, when it 
comes to game-theoretic considerations. A lizard’s push-up display can carry the 
information that it is likely to escape even if, sometimes, the lizard would not escape if 
pursued. Indeed, when it comes to lizard push-ups, signal honesty is enforced by the 
target receiver, as opposed to being ensured by cost paid up-front. As a result, we 
should expect some amount of dishonest ‘bluffing’ to occur (Bruner at al. 2017). 
Because a snake’s evolved, species-typical, response to a vigorous push-up display was 
adaptive in ancestral environments when and only when the lizard was physiologically 
robust, the display carries information about the lizard being physiologically robust as 
outlined in Chapter 1. This remains the case even if relatively weak lizards sometimes 
‘bluff’, producing a vigorous push-up display and dangerously expending valuable 
energy. 
I will now explore how information is sometimes evoked as part of a 
proximate explanation of synchronic response flexibility. Here, information is represented 
by receivers in a more substantive sense. It factors into the real-time decision-making 
process of individual receivers.  
 
2. Natural Meaning in Proximate Explanations of Synchronic Flexibility 
 
A famous paper published in 1980 by Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler brought to the 
wider attention of biologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers and linguists 
the now infamous alarm call system of the vervet monkey. Along with this pioneering 
work, research on other primate species (Pereira & Macedonia 1991) and chickens 
(Evans et al. 1993) eventually gave rise to the idea of ‘functional reference’ in animal 
communication theory. Combined with Donald Griffin’s work on using 
communication as a ‘window’ into what animals think, it also contributed to the rise 
of cognitive ethology (Manser 2013).  
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Seyfarth et al. (1980) found that vervets have distinct acoustic calls for 
leopards, eagles and snakes which elicit specific and context-appropriate responses. 
Upon receiving a leopard call, conspecifics run up trees. In response to eagle calls they 
run into a bush, or if they are already in the top of a tree, they move down closer to 
the centre of the tree. In response to a snake call, receivers stand up bipedally and 
look around. These predator-avoidance behaviours are also triggered when individuals 
encounter the predators themselves, as opposed to alarm calls designating them. 
However, Seyfarth et al. managed to trigger each kind of avoidance behaviour in the 
absence of the eliciting predators, by playing back pre-recorded alarm calls from 
speakers strategically hidden in trees and bushes. 
This work caused much excitement. It was taken to constitute evidence, for 
the first time, of ‘symbolic’/‘arbitrary’ reference in a nonhuman species (Hauser 1996). 
The idea that nonhuman signals could bear a symbolic or arbitrary association with 
their ‘referents’ went against the then prevailing understanding of animal 
communication. The then prevailing view was that signals merely reflect the internal 
motivational state, or the immanent behaviour, of the sender (e.g. Dawkins & Krebs 
1978; Owren & Rendall 1997). According to this non-symbolic view, signal form was 
seen as highly constrained. This stands in contrast to words.  
A dog baring its teeth is a non-arbitrary signal of an emotional state liable to 
produce aggression. This is because the physical form of the signal vehicle is highly 
counterfactually constrained. Only a very small number of alternative candidate signal 
vehicles might have been used to transmit the same information, at the time of initial 
signal development. This contrasts with some linguistic signals, in which signal form is 
counterfactually constrained to a lesser degree. The physical form of the printed word 
‘d-o-g’, for instance, could have taken a number of different forms at the time of 
initial dubbing (for instance ‘d-a-g’). It is because of this that we have the intuition that 
the physical sign ‘d-o-‘g’ carries the information that it does in virtue of coordination 
among senders and receivers, as opposed to ‘physical necessity’.  
Vervet alarms were found to be relatively arbitrary in this sense - in a way 
that, say, a threat signal from a dog is not. When it comes to the former, coordination 
plays a substantial role in explaining why a leopard alarm call (individuated here purely 
in virtue of its physical form) is now used to signal the presence of a leopard45. On the 
other hand, coordination between senders and receivers plays a less substantial role in 
explaining why a teeth-baring display among dogs is now used to signal the sender’s 
aggressive emotional state. 
More recently, ethologists working on the informational content of 
‘referential’ signals adopted the watered-down phrase ‘functionally referential’ to refer 
                                                          
45 Although here coordination is not the result of rational processes, as opposed to the law of effect. 
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to signals like vervet alarms (Hauser 1996). The watered-down claim that such signals 
possess functional reference, as opposed to full-blown reference, reflected caution 
relating to the mechanisms underlying signal-production. The underlying mechanisms 
are most likely different46.  
Signals considered to be functionally referential, like vervet alarm calls, are 
usually thought to display the following two features47. Firstly, signal production by 
senders must be context-specific. That is, signals must be produced in a narrow range 
of circumstances. Secondly, the appropriate response to a signal carried out by a 
receiver (say, running for cover from a predator) must occur even in the absence of 
the circumstances that normally cause signal production (i.e. a predator). That is, the 
call must be sufficient to elicit behaviour appropriate in the state of the world 
‘referred’ to by the call (Manser 2013). 
The first condition, context-specificity, arguably presents further trouble for 
the idea that functionally-referential systems are akin to reference in human language. 
As Wheeler & Fischer (2012) note, the more context-specific a signal is, that is, the 
more tightly its production is linked with specific states of the world, the less cognitive 
sophistication is required to respond to it adaptively48. Context-specificity implies that 
the amount of cognitive sophistication needed for a receiver to respond as though a 
signal refers to something in the world is not very high. A receiver need only be 
stimulus-bound; automatically responding to a particular signal with an invariant 
behaviour. This relatively simple stimulus-response connection could be formed by 
either evolution or simple behavioural conditioning in a learning period49.  
A similar moral can be drawn from Sterelny’s (2003) work on the evolution of 
cognition. If cues/signals reliably correlate with various states of the world, then in 
order for responses to such stimuli to be adaptive, natural selection need only provide 
receivers with modest response mechanisms that invariantly trigger some very specific 
and ballistic behaviour. When signals are not given in very narrow contexts, i.e. where 
the environment is ‘epistemically opaque’, then it can become more adaptive for 
receivers to respond in a flexible and non-ballistic manner to incoming stimuli. So, 
there seems to be no necessary connection between functional reference and 
linguistic-like psychological sophistication (on the part of receivers, in this case). If 
                                                          
46 Although Wheeler & Fischer (2012, pp. 196-197) note “the idea that functional referential signals 
require greater cognitive complexity and provide a clearer link to human language than do other types of 
animal signals remains pervasive in the animal communication literature”.  
47 Although see Scarantino (2013) for an alternative proposal. 
48 And also, the less like a word it is. As Sterelny (2016), following Deacon (1997) has stressed, very few 
tokens of “tiger” are uttered in the presence of tigers.  
49 There is an important caveat. Even if the receiver’s cognitive mechanism for learning the signal-world 
correlation is more sophisticated it would still not follow that the signal would be anything like a word. If, 
for example, the receiver learns what the signal correlates with via a form of social learning, such as by 
observing the responses of other animals, this would not make the signal word-like. This is because what 
is being learned, however cleverly or not, is just a very specific signal-world association. And, as Deacon 
(1997) pointed out, word meaning is more complicated than a large list of signal-world associations.  
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anything, the inference seems to point the other way; towards psychological 
simplicity50.  
Despite the attention received by vervets relating to the issue of referential-
like communication, what is significant for the current discussion is not strictly 
speaking whether or not signals correlate reliably with a limited range of world-states. 
Instead, what is significant about vervet communication is the response flexibility 
displayed by receivers (a feature which is not directly connected with the functionally-
referential nature of alarm calls). This response flexibility was revealed by different 
studies carried out, again, by Seyfarth, Cheney and colleagues.  
Eight years after their original ground-breaking paper on vervets, Cheney & 
Seyfarth (1988) presented some new research suggesting that receiver vervet monkeys 
mentally represent the information derived from vocal signals in a fairly rich sense. 
This time the research was carried out on inter-group contact calls, as opposed to 
alarm calls. Individual vervets would learn that a particular vocal signal normally 
indicating contact with another group and coming from a particular conspecific was 
unreliable. As a result, they would become bored with the signal and soon ignore it. In 
other words, they habituated to the signal. However, as a result they also came to 
ignore an acoustically different signal given soon after by the same conspecific - so 
long as the two acoustically different calls carried the same information (in this case, 
about the presence of another group of vervets nearby). If, however, the two different 
acoustic calls carried different information, then habitation was not transferred. 
Moreover, if the identity of the sender changed between the first and second call, 
habituation was not transferred. 
 The idea is as follows: if habituation to a first signal produces habituation to a 
second, receivers have judged the two signals as being the same in some way. There 
are two different ways in which two signals might be judged the same in the mind of a 
receiver. First, they might be grouped based on their similar acoustic features. Second, 
they might be grouped based on their shared informational content (if, in fact, they 
share content). If the two signals sharing content are grouped together while at the 
same time differing markedly in acoustic features, then they must have been grouped 
together because of their shared content. 
 In Cheney & Seyfarth (1988), an initial inter-group contact call type C1 was 
produced as though coming from sender S1, but in the absence of inter-group contact 
(its normal content). It thus constituted ‘fake news’ for the receiver R. As a result, R 
habituated to it. One deflationary hypothesis is that R was simply habituating to the 
proximal nature of the stimulus, as opposed to its meaning. However, if this was the 
explanation then R should presumably not have habituated to an acoustically different 
                                                          
50 For debate about the continuing importance of the functional reference paradigm, see Wheeler & 
Fischer 2012 and the subsequent exchange between Scarantino & Clay 2015 and Wheeler & Fischer 2015. 
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call, C2, which nevertheless carried the same information. Instead, R should have 
become vigilant as though another group was nearby. Instead, R remained bored by 
this new signal, as though R knew what distal world-state it was supposed to indicate 
(along with the prior knowledge that this world-state was not actual). Moreover, as 
noted, if instead the second signal-form C2 was produced as though coming from a 
different sender S2 such that the identity of the sender changed between C1 and C2, R 
took tokens of C2 seriously as though another group was indeed nearby – despite not 
taking C2 tokens seriously if produced by S1. In other words, despite having come to 
distrust the information from S1 that another group was incoming, R suddenly took 
this information seriously when it appeared to come from a different sender. 
According to Cheney & Seyfarth, this suggests that R was mentally representing both 
the reliability of the sender as well as the distal world-state normally indicated by the 
signal.  
 The same kind of study was carried out a decade later by Zuberbuhler, 
Cheney & Seyfarth (1999), this time on Diana monkeys. The study provided evidence 
for the same kind of rich processing of signals on the part of receivers. Here, Diana 
receivers were played sequences of 2 vocalisations separated by 5 minutes of silence. 
There were four different vocalisations to draw from to create a sequence of 2 
vocalisations. The four possibilities were, firstly, the growl of a leopard; second, the 
shriek of an eagle; third, a conspecific Diana monkey’s leopard alarm call; fourth, a 
conspecific Diana’s eagle alarm call.  
In the baseline condition, receivers heard a predator call from a conspecific 
followed by another token of the same predator call from the same sender. Because 
the acoustic and the semantic features remained the same across the 2 vocalisations, 
habituation was transferred from the first vocalisation to the second. In the test 
condition, however, receivers heard a conspecific Diana’s alarm call, this time 
followed by the corresponding vocalisation of the actual predator. Here, only the 
semantic features remained the same across the 2 vocalisations, while acoustic features 
differed. Interestingly, it was found that in this case habituation was transferred from 
an alarm call to the vocalisation of the actual predator – despite the different acoustic 
properties of the stimuli. According to the authors, this suggests that Diana monkeys 
mentally represent the world-state indicated by signals in a fairly rich manner. 
 Here we have two examples of communication in which receivers display a 
significant amount of real-time flexibility in their response profiles. The moral, to be 
fleshed-out now, is that in cases like these, information is derived by receivers from 
signal-world correlations in a very different sense to the way information is derived by 
receivers from lizard push-up displays.  
 
2.1 MENTALLY REPRESENTING THE CONTENT OF SIGNALS IN A RICH SENSE 
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In the last study discussed above, the authors conclude as follows:  
 
When hearing natural stimuli, monkeys do not rely only on the acoustic features of 
these stimuli alone to govern their behavior but instead access a common associate, 
possibly a mental representation, of the predator category. Perhaps these mental 
representations are not unlike those linked to the human linguistic concepts of leopard 
and eagle. Zuberbuhler et al. (1999). 
 
There are many ways of understanding the notion of mental representation. In 
cognitive science, one traditional way is to view mental representation as an internal 
‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975). According to this view of the mind, mental states 
like beliefs and desires are structured symbolic representations composed out of more 
basic symbolic states called concepts, analogous to how sentences are systematically 
composed out of more basic representational units (i.e. words).  
 In comparative psychology, however, the received view is somewhat 
different. The notion of a concept/representation is operationalised. Organisms 
possessing mental representations behave flexibly, as opposed to rigidly. Their 
behaviour goes beyond a one-to-one mapping between stimuli and response. E.O. 
Wilson (1971) presented the case of the Pogonomyrmex barbatus ant’s reaction to dead 
conspecifics. Workers respond to the dead body of one of their sister workers by 
grasping it and carrying it away to a waste pile. Dead conspecifics are identified via a 
chemical product that they produce. However, workers are relatively unsophisticated 
in their identification abilities: almost any object tainted with a similar chemical 
product will be treated like a corpse and relegated to a waste pile. Thus, worker ants 
seem to lack anything like a ‘concept’ of a dead conspecific. They respond invariantly 
to a single cue that is normally co-extensive with dead conspecifics, regardless of 
whether the cue actually co-occurs with a dead conspecific at that time.  
On the present view, an organism that possesses a genuine concept - say, of a 
kind of predator - should respond in a functionally relevant manner to that kind of 
predator across a range of perceptual stimuli. In other words, its behavioural profile 
must be at least many-to-one: adaptively mapping various kinds of perceptual stimuli 
onto a particular response. However, this many-to-one behavioural mapping must go 
beyond perceptual stimulus generalisation. Perceptual stimulus generalisation involves an 
organism extending control over some response from a class of stimuli previously 
associated with the response to some novel stimulus perceptually like the previously-
associated stimuli. The generalisation is made possible because the novel stimuli is 
perceptually like the previously-associated stimuli.   
For instance, if a dog has been conditioned to fear the sight of its cruel owner 
who happens to have a large black beard, it may also display a fear response to a fake 
black beard attached to a mask worn by someone else. The behaviour of parrots in 
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categorisation tasks in the lab indicates that they engage merely in perceptual stimulus 
generalisation. After being trained to group pictures of different kinds of trees under 
the one category, they then overgeneralise and include broccoli due to the crude 
perceptual similarity between a picture of a tree and picture of a broccoli. 
The acid test (Shettleworth 2010) of concept possession in comparative 
psychology is the ability to generalise, not merely to novel stimuli that are perceptually 
simular to a stimulus previously associated with a response, but rather to novel stimuli 
that share an abstract or higher-order similarity with a previously-associated stimulus 
(see also Allen & Hauser 1991). Humans, for instance, place broccoli in a different 
category to trees, due to functional and other higher-order differences between trees 
and broccoli.  
In addition to higher-order, many-to-one, categorisation abilities on the input 
side, Sterelny (2003) and Bermudez (2003) have argued that concept/representation-
possession is evinced by a behavioural profile characterised by significant flexibility on 
the output side of behaviour, as well as the input side. Sterelny (2003) identifies a 
series of incrementally more sophisticated ways in which an organism might represent 
its environment. The baseline is an organism which conditions a relatively fixed 
response on only one kind of cue. The next step up is an organism which engages in 
‘robust tracking’. Robust tracking involves an organism conditioning a fixed response 
on more than one sort of cue (i.e. many-to-one categorisation). Conditioning 
behaviour on multiple cues allows for informational redundancy in ‘opaque’ 
environments: i.e. environments in which information from any single cue might be 
unreliable. This might be due to environmental fluctuations or deception from hostile 
organisms. However, response breadth might vary independently of input 
redundancy. Thus, a creature might face an opaque environment but still perform a 
relatively fixed behaviour when a world-state has been identified as obtaining based on 
multiple cues. Alternatively, some organism might respond flexibly to a range of 
incoming cues with a range of behaviours (see figure 1). This is the next incremental step 
above robust tracking. Sterelny calls it ‘decoupled mental representation’. In a creature 
possessing decoupled mental representations, the environment is represented both a) 
robustly and b) in such a way that these representations are not tied to any one 
response.  
When it comes to the communicative behaviours of receiver monkeys, 
Cheney & Seyfarth (1988) and Zuberbuhler, Cheney & Seyfarth (1999) seem to 
highlight a many-to-many response profile indicative of decoupled mental 
representation. For instance, a Diana receiver can use a range of quite different stimuli 
(i.e. eagle alarm calls or the sound of an actual eagle) to trigger a particular response 
(i.e. running into a bush). Also, it can respond in a range of different ways (i.e. looking 
up or running into a bush) to a particular kind of stimuli (i.e. an eagle alarm call). 
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Applying Sterelny’s (2003) terminology, we can thus say that a Diana monkey has a 
decoupled mental representation of an eagle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 A many-to-many behavioural profile indicative of decoupled mental representations 
 
2.2 INFORMATION AS USED BY THE INDIVIDUAL ORGANISM 
 
Information proponents studying animal communication invoke decoupled mental 
representations. They do this primarily in order to explain the flexibility inherent in 
the comprehension side of nonhuman primate vocal communication. The 
comprehension of vocal communication in primates is plastic over ontogeny, with 
receivers having to learn what signals designate. This stands in contrast to the 
production side, where the contexts that elicit signal production usually come 
hardwired from birth and do not change much over ontogeny51. That is, receivers 
learn their signalling strategies to a significantly greater extent than senders. This 
asymmetry in vocal communication is widely noted in the literature (e.g. Seyfarth & 
Cheney 2003, 2010; Zuberbuhler 2005; Tomasello 2008; Fitch & Zuberbuhler 2013)52. 
In what initially seems puzzling, Seyfarth & Cheney (2003, p. 153) argue that 
the consumption side of vervet communication is representational because the 
production of alarm calls is “strongly associated with a very narrow range of eliciting 
stimuli”. However, we saw previously that whenever signal production is bound 
tightly to particular contexts, we don’t need to appeal to cognitive complexity in order 
to explain adaptive responses (Sterelny 2003; Wheeler & Fischer 2012). Seyfarth & 
Cheney (2003, 2010), however, endorse a cognitively rich account of Pavlovian 
conditioning. For them, learning to associate a signal with some state of the world 
involves an organism conjoining two mental representations of its environment: a 
                                                          
51 Vervet infants initially give alarm calls to warthogs and pigeons that pose no danger to them. But such 
mistakes are not random: infants ‘over-extend’ leopard alarm calls to terrestrial mammals and eagle 
alarms to birds. From birth then, vervets divide predators from non-predators, and within the predator 
category they divide terrestrial carnivores from aerial predators (Seyfarth & Cheney 2010). 
52 This is not to say that signal production in old-world monkeys is inflexible and insensitive to context. 
Senders do not have to learn the circumstances under which a signal is to be produced, but nevertheless 
they often must take into account contextual features of the situation to determine whether or not to 
signal, at any particular time. Audience effects are a good example: senders are sensitive to conspecifics, and 
adjust when they produce signals based on their presence or absence (Seyfarth & Cheney 2010, Fitch & 
Zuberbuhler 2013). 
Conspecific alarm Remain silent EAGLE 
Give own call Eagle shriek 
Run into a bush Eagle observation 
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representation of the signal, on the one hand, and a representation of the indicated 
world-state, on the other53.  
The idea that Pavlovian (or classical) conditioning involves an organism 
‘representing’ its environment has become the received view in learning theory 
(Rescorla 1988; Gallistel 2003; Holland 2008). The idea that Pavlovian condition is 
simply the registration of co-occurrence is an outdated view of the process of 
conditioning. The alternative, representational, view is based on findings that 
organisms don’t associate any two stimuli that simply co-occur in experience. On the 
representational view, organisms come to associate a novel stimulus with some other 
event only if the novel stimulus provides the organism with information about the 
event, in a sense strikingly congruent with Claude Shannon’s (1948) notion of 
uncertainty reduction. That is, what is required for an organism to learn the 
connection between two stimuli is contingency (where a stimulus alters the probability 
of the other event), as opposed to contiguity (where a stimulus simply co-occurs with 
the other event).   
Rats, for example don’t associate a novel stimulus (say, a tone) with a well-
known stimulus (say, a mild shock) if the shock occurs frequently in the absence of 
the tone. This is true even if the tone, whenever it is presented, always co-occurs with 
the shock. Rather, the tone must raise the probability of the shock for the two stimuli 
to be associated by the rat. Moreover, if a novel stimulus, S2, is presented alongside a 
familiar stimulus, S1, where S1 is known to be connected with some salient event, E; 
and if the organism is then presented with both S2 and S1 whenever E occurs, it will 
not come to associate S2, the novel stimulus, with E. This is because S2 provides no 
(new) information about E that S1 doesn’t provide. That is, S2 doesn’t decrease the 
organism’s ‘uncertainty’ about E (because S1 already has). This phenomenon is called 
blocking. Similarly, when two novel stimuli are presented together for association with 
some other event so that there is redundancy, the organism ignores one of the novel 
stimuli because it provides no (unique) information. This is called overshadowing. It is 
very similar to blocking, the only difference being that overshadowing involves the 
presentation at the outset of two as yet non-associated novel stimuli contingent with 
                                                          
53 It was argued previously that the idea of functional reference is a red herring when it comes to the 
psychological sophistication of animal communication. This was because the context-specific nature of 
signals thought to ‘refer’ in fact rules out the likelihood that response mechanisms are sophisticated or 
language-like. The view being considered now is that vervet communication, for example, is of interest 
because signals correlate reliably with distal states. This seems like a contradiction. However, note that the 
mechanisms which are sensitive to the tight signal-world relation in the case of vervets are ontogenetic 
(on the consumption side of communication), while the functional reference paradigm would characterise 
hard-wired response mechanisms as possessing some interesting kind of sophistication. The implication 
is that if Pavlovian conditioning in some animals is representational, as will soon be discussed, then 
functional reference might be significant for the issue of human-nonhuman communicative continuity if 
it restricts itself to context-specific signals that are learnt, as opposed to context-specific signals that are 
developmentally canalized.  
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some further event, whereas in this case of blocking one of the two stimuli is already 
associated with the event at the outset. 
Other findings related to how animals associate stimuli have led to the now 
widespread view that Pavlovian condition is a representationally-rich process: indeed, 
one involving decoupled mental representations underpinning many-to-many 
response profiles. Assume that some organism has come to associated S1 (say, a tone) 
with S2 (say, a shock), based on the tone raising the probability of a shock. That is, the 
probability of the shock, given the tone, is higher than the probability of the shock 
alone. Also, suppose the tone is not made redundant or blocked by some other 
stimuli. After a learning period in which the organism has associated the tone with the 
shock, suppose the organism now responds to the tone with fear. There are at least 
two possible reasons why the organism might respond with fear to the tone. First, 
because the organism’s pre-existing response to the shock (i.e. fear) has simply been 
connected to the tone during the learning episode. Second, because the organism has 
connected separate mental representations of the tone, on the hand, and the shock, on 
the other. 
The difference here is important. It is between a picture of Pavlovian 
conditioning in which the internal association forged during learning is ‘stimulus-
response’ (S-R), versus one in which the internal association forged is ‘stimulus-
stimulus’ (S-S). S-S forms of learning are representationally rich, while S-R forms are 
not (Holland 2008). S-S learning involves the organism associating a mental ‘image’ or 
‘re-presentation’ of the unconditioned stimulus (the tone) with an image or re-
presentation of the conditioned stimulus (the shock). S-R learning involves the 
organism directly wiring an old response (fear) to registration of the unconditioned 
stimulus (the tone). S-S learning involves greater psychological mediation, in that the 
response elicited by the novel stimulus (the tone) is a product of the novel stimulus 
activating a mental representation of the conditioned stimulus (the shock).  
The issue concerns the structure of the process by which Pavlovian 
conditioning effects behaviour. Does the tone simply become capable of evoking the 
response originally under the control of the shock? Or does the tone become 
associated, not merely with a pre-existing response to the shock, but rather with a 
representation of the shock? If the latter option is actual, then the organism can 
respond to the tone such that the tone predicts the shock, as opposed to merely 
responding to the tone in the same way it would upon getting shocked.  
The latter, S-S, option is more like the kind of many-to-many response profile 
depicted in figure 1. We can think of the contrast between S-S learning and S-R 
learning as follows: After I learn that the weather report’s forecast of rain is predictive 
of rain, because a rain forecast raises the probability of rain, I don’t respond to reports 
of rain by immediately putting up my umbrella in my lounge room. Instead, upon 
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receiving a rain forecast, I respond by planning for rain. I put my umbrella with my 
bag so that I take it with me when I leave in the morning, or if I don’t have an 
umbrella, I get my coat out and hang it on my door.  
Interestingly, it has been found that after an organism has associated a tone 
with a shock, where the natural response to a shock is abruptly increased activity (no 
doubt to get away), it responds to the tone not with increased activity but with 
dramatically reduced activity (Rescorla 1988). It has also been found that two different 
stimuli predictive of some salient event can evoke quite different responses. For 
example, rats that have associated both a tone and a localized prod with a shock 
respond to the tone with immobility, but respond to the prod with attempts to hide 
the prod from view by using any available material they can find to cover it up 
(Rescorla 1988). These kinds of findings show that Pavlovian conditioning is S-S: 
involving an organism associating a novel stimulus with a (decoupled) mental 
representation of another stimulus, as opposed to simply associating a novel stimulus 
with the response normally elicited by the unconditioned (i.e. familiar) stimulus.  
The point of this detour into learning theory was to illustrate the kind of 
proximate mechanisms taken by information proponents to underlie the flexible 
responses of some primate receivers during communication. Cheney & Seyfarth 
ground their notion of mental representation using an S-S theory of conditioning. 
During the period in which a Diana receiver R learns the connection between 
conspecific eagle alarm calls and the presence of actual eagles, R does not simply wire 
the novel stimulus (i.e. eagle alarms) with a pre-existing response (i.e. eagle-avoidance 
behaviour). Instead, R wires the novel stimulus with an EAGLE mental 
representation which is decoupled in Sterelny’s (2003) sense. Thus, when R hears an 
eagle alarm subsequent to learning, R can display ‘foresight’. R can give its own eagle 
alarm call if the presence of an eagle is new news. Alternatively, R can remain silent if 
the presence of an eagle is old news. 
The important point is that R’s behavioural response is not determined by 
any particular input R receives. This is because learning how to avoid eagles in 
ontogeny involves, for a vervet, an underlying process more sophisticated than the 
wiring of a novel input to a particular response. The link between input and response, 
formed during ontogeny, seems instead to be mediated by a decoupled 
representational state. The result is a many-to-many mapping between inputs and 
outputs in the sense depicted by figure 1. 
 
2.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
The first moral to be drawn from this section is directed towards information 
proponents. Information is sometimes said to be derived by receivers from signals in a 
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cognitively-rich sense. At least in old-world monkeys, adapting to information in 
ontogeny as opposed to phylogeny is a cognitively-mediated process. That is, it results 
in the organism flexibly representing the contingent relationships in its environment. 
This rich way of representing the information derived from signals contrasts with the 
way in which receivers derive information from the likes of lizard push-ups.  
Thus, the information carried by signals can be used in different ways by 
different organisms, depending on how they adapt to this information and whether 
this information is represented in a rich sense or only minimally. In species where 
strategies are hard-wired and where there are no decoupled representations, the 
natural meaning of a signal is represented in only a minimal sense by the organism. It 
is a population of organisms, as opposed to any particular organism, which has picked 
up on the relationship between signal and world-state. What explains the (diachronic) 
flexibility enjoyed by receivers in such populations is natural selection, as opposed to 
cognitive prowess on the individual-level. Alternatively, in at least some species whose 
signalling strategies are acquired in ontogeny such as old-world monkeys, the natural 
meaning of a signal can be represented in a rich sense by the organism. If the 
organism has the right kind of cognitive sophistication, then this information can be 
mentally represented such that it combines with other internally represented 
information, enabling the organism to respond flexibly and intelligently to its 
environment in real time. 
The second moral to be drawn from this section is directed towards 
information sceptics. Attributing decoupled mental representations in order to explain 
synchronic receiver flexibility might present a genuine challenge to the idea that the 
proximate mechanisms underpinning signal-interpretation in monkeys are 
discontinuous with those underpinning interpretation in humans. If relatively 
sophisticated and decoupled brain states standing midway between sensory 
registration and behaviour must be invoked in order to explain flexible response 
behaviours in real time, this might indeed bring communication closer towards the 
realm of human communication – specifically when it comes to the issue of meaning. 
It is not my intention here to resolve this complex issue related to the evolution of 
communication. I will, however, make a few brief remarks.  
On the one hand, one might think that even decoupled mental representation 
need not imply continuity with human communication when it comes to the issue of 
meaning. According to an influential line of thought on the evolution of human 
communication (e.g. Tomasello 2008, 2014; Scott-Phillips 201554), recognising what a 
speaker ‘non-naturally’ means by uttering something requires not merely decoupled 
                                                          
54 These researchers are influenced by Grice’s (1957) analysis of non-natural meaning. Tomasello and 
especially Scott-Phillips also take inspiration from Sperber & Wilsons (1986) ‘Post-Gricean’ explanation 
of human communication which stresses the necessity of high-level recursive mindreading. 
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representational states simpliciter, but rather decoupled representations of the speaker’s 
decoupled representational states: an ability known as ‘meta-representation’ or 
‘mindreading’. If human communication requires decoupled representations of 
representations, as oppose to decoupled representations simpliciter, then the findings 
presented above on the vocal communication of monkeys might be taken as 
interesting but relatively inconsequential for the issue of continuity. For there is not 
much evidence to think that monkeys are representing each other’s mental states 
when they respond flexibly to the calls of conspecifics (Seyfarth & Cheney 2003). 
On the other hand, one might reasonably think that the cognitive ability to 
flexibly adjust behaviour based on integrating a range of mental representations with 
varying contents, as vervet and Diana monkeys seem to be capable of, constitutes at 
least a partial step towards the ‘inferential’ and domain-general nature of interpretation 
in human communication (Fitch 2010; Seyfarth & Cheney 2017). A Diana monkey 
that transfers habituation from an eagle alarm call to the vocalisation of an actual 
eagle, despite the different acoustic properties of the two stimuli, might reasonably be 
thought to have engaged in a process of rational (or proto-rational) inference. On this 
view, mental representations are not only decoupled from any particular response, 
their decoupled status allows them to combine with other decoupled representations 
in a process of rational, or proto-rational, inference. While this inferential process 
might not operate over representations of others’ mental states, the flexibility of this 
process might nevertheless represent a vital ingredient in human communication. 
 
3. Information vs influence and receiver flexibility 
 
It is now time to show why the distinctions made in the previous sections matter for 
the information vs influence debate. In a key paper defending “the central importance 
of information in studies of animal communication”, Seyfarth et al. (2010, p. 3) state 
that “the concept of information plays a central role in studies of animal 
communication”. Why? Because “both theory and data… argue against hypotheses 
based exclusively on manipulation or on a fixed, obligatory link between a signal’s 
physical features and the responses it elicits” (Seyfarth et al. 2010, p. 3). In other 
words, a pro-information stance is justified because of the reality of receiver flexibility. 
Receivers display plasticity in their responses to signals: they are not necessarily 
subject to the whim of senders. Thus, ‘information’ essentially becomes short-hand 
for a view of communication in which sender influence is balanced by receiver 
flexibility. If there is no obligatory link between signal and response, then receivers are 
running the show, at least to some degree.  
However, as I have argued in this chapter, information is applicable to two 
different kinds of explanation (ultimate vs proximate) of two different kinds of 
82 
 
receiver flexibility (diachronic vs synchronic). It is important to note the ambiguity in 
the idea that there is no obligatory link between signals and responses. The link 
between a signal’s physical features and the response it elicits can be flexible in two 
very different ways. Firstly, flexibility may or may not hold diachronically, or over 
phylogenetic timescales. Alternatively, it may or may not obtain synchronically, or in 
real-time.  
In the case of diachronic flexibility, flexibility is possible due to natural 
selection. Natural selection can lead to a change in receivers’ signalling strategies, 
given enough time, and assuming the current strategy is sub-optimal for receivers. As 
a result of this selection at the population-level, information is created. Whether this 
occurs is not inevitable, however. Owren, Rendall & Ryan (2010) point out that when 
interests diverge, we senders should be expected to tap into pre-existing sensory biases 
in receivers, such that receivers are prisoners of dishonest signals. The idea of receiver 
flexibility over phylogenetic time is, as such, a substantive empirical issue55.   
In contrast, synchronic flexibility is possible due to cognitive prowess. With 
the right kind of internal psychological sophistication, the link between the physical 
properties of signals on the one hand, and the responses elicited in receivers on the 
other, can be flexible in real-time. In such cases receivers possess response flexibility 
because the correlational link between signal and world-state, acquired in the 
individual’s lifetime, is represented in a comparatively rich sense. The idea of 
synchronic receiver flexibility is a substantive empirical issue of a different sort to 
diachronic flexibility. It is largely a proximate issue, while the idea of diachronic 
receiver flexibility is largely an ultimate/evolutionary issue. 
The two different ways in which receivers possess response flexibility are not 
always distinguished clearly by information proponents. For example, in the first 
section of the paper following the introduction, entitled ‘information in animal 
communication’, Seyfarth et al. (2010, p. 5) seem to defend the idea of diachronic 
flexibility. They state: 
 
Receivers are not, then, prisoners of the influence that specific acoustic properties 
have on their sensory systems. Instead, selection will favour receivers that act 
selfishly, adjusting their ‘assessment rule’ so that it is most effective in reducing 
uncertainty, or in providing them with information. 
 
Here, the work of Grafen (1990) and Searcy & Nowicki (2005) is endorsed: work 
which focuses on the question of why, over phylogenetic time, signalling should be 
honest on average56. While natural selection operates on senders to influence the 
                                                          
55 But so too is how much flexibility senders have to exploit these pre-existing biases in receivers, it must 
be noted.  
56 As noted in the introduction, information proponents take the existence of communication as evidence 
for signals being honest, unlike information sceptics who emphasise sensory manipulation. 
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behaviour of receivers to the advantage of the former (signals are, after all, phenotypes 
of senders), natural selection also operates on receivers so that receivers attend to 
signals only if it is beneficial for them to do so, on average. The normal condition for 
such benefits accruing to receivers is that signals correlate with appropriate states of 
the world. If signals are costly to produce, then it can be ensured that they do in fact 
correlate with the appropriate world-states. Signal costs ensure there is a correlation 
between signals and world-states, which can be quantified in models, and where this 
quantity can be labelled ‘information’ (of the correlational variety).  
However, in the very next section, on ‘receiver flexibility’, the authors switch 
without warning to what seems to be the issue of synchronic flexibility: 
 
Supporting the view that selection can act just as forcefully on receivers as it does on 
signallers, there is ample evidence that receivers can learn to respond in specific ways 
to signals regardless of the signals’ acoustic properties… (Seyfarth et al. 2010, p. 5). 
       
Here, information is represented in a rich sense. The correlate of a signal is 
represented in a manner that is decoupled from any particular response. Confusingly, 
they then state the following two paragraphs later: 
 
Of course, there are also many cases in which acoustic features are closely linked to 
call function. Two examples are the relationship between call frequency and body size 
in frogs and toads (reviewed in Searcy & Nowicki 2005), and between formant 
spacing and body size in several mammals (reviewed in Fitch & Hauser 2003). In 
both of these cases, however, listeners attend to a crucial acoustic feature not just 
because it induces a ‘nervous-system response’ (although it may do this) but also 
because it reduces uncertainty (that is, provides information) about a competitor 
(Seyfarth et al. 2010, p. 5). 
 
Is the second ‘because’ here, regarding ‘uncertainty reduction’, a proximate or an 
ultimate explanation? Presumably, the fact that signals induce a nervous-system 
response is the proximate reason why receivers respond. Presumably, the fact that 
signals reduce uncertainty is the ultimate reason why receivers like toads and frogs 
maintain their responses to signals. However, one could be forgiven for interpreting 
the second ‘because’ as a proximate-psychological explanation. This has the potential 
to make a reader think that what is being argued for is the idea that frogs and toads 
have decoupled mental representations as opposed to the much less controversial idea 
that, over phylogenetic time, low call-frequency in frogs was more often than not a 
feature of signals given by high quality males as opposed to low quality males. 
 Generally speaking, it may indeed be the case that “recipients are not 
powerless, unable to resist certain signals” (Seyfarth et al. 2010, p. 6). However, even if 
this is correct the relevant flexibility can be realised by very different means and over 
different timescales: diachronically, firstly; and secondly (at least in species with the 
required cognitive mechanisms), synchronically. Both ultimate and proximate sources 
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of receiver flexibility are valid and important, and they may indeed overturn a purely 
sender-driven view of communication favoured by information sceptics. Conceptually, 
however, they need to be clearly distinguished. They need to be distinguished, firstly, 
so that they can be properly empirically investigated. Whether or not receivers in a 
species whose strategies are hard-wired are being exploited by hostile senders is a 
different issue from whether or not receivers in some other species represent, in 
decoupled fashion, the content of a signal (Stegmann 2013).  
Secondly, they need to be distinguished in order to ward off the possibility of 
misunderstanding regarding the amount of cognitive sophistication attributed to 
animals that are said to derive information from signals. Some receivers derive 
information from signals in a minimal sense. Here, an invariant response is triggered 
by a signal. The response will occur in the appropriate world-state, assuming the 
environment has not changed drastically from the one in which the signalling system 
was stabilised. Alternatively, some receivers derive information from signals in a richer 
sense. Here, the natural meaning of a signal is mentally represented by the receiver in a 
decoupled manner. This representation combines flexibly with other decoupled 
representations so that appropriate action can be inferred in real-time.  
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 4. Why attribute non-natural meaning to utterances? What is non-natural meaning and 
what are its psychological commitments? 
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Chapter 4 
A Psychological Notion of Non-Natural Meaning for Signals 
 
 
“Infants… may on occasion, of course, learn to associate one of these noises with a perceptual event in much the 
same way a household pet may understand that the sound dinner heralds the arrival of food. But this is not 
language. Sounds become language for young children when and only when they understand that the adult is 
making that sound with the intention that they attend to something” (Tomasello 1999, pp. 100 – 101). 
 
This thesis is concerned with different notions of meaning and their explanatory roles. 
One has been a notion of natural meaning grounded by signal-world correlation and 
teleology. As argued in Chapters 1-3, natural meaning is important when it comes to 
an evolutionary understanding of communication: why do receivers respond to 
signals, given fitness interests often diverge? Receivers respond to signals because, 
when it mattered in the past57, signals were produced in a world-state explaining why 
the typical response of receivers was successful. Chapter 3 then argued natural 
meaning is sometimes relevant to proximate explanations of why receivers in some 
species respond to signals flexibly, in real time. Receivers in such species learn the 
natural meaning carried by signals in ontogeny, where this learning involves 
combining decoupled mental representations. Because the correlate of a signal is 
represented in decoupled fashion, receivers can combine the natural meaning derived 
from a signal with other decoupled representations, to infer an appropriate response 
‘on the spot’.  
This chapter examines a different kind of meaning: one the philosopher Grice 
(1957) called “non-natural meaning” (henceforth: ‘meaningNN’). Grice argued that 
meaningNN is expressed by behaviours that are, at least in the human domain, 
genuinely ‘communicative’, as opposed to ordinary instrumental behaviours like 
pushing Roger out of the way. It is important to keep in mind that, along with talking about 
a different notion of ‘meaning’, compared to earlier chapters, we are now also talking 
about a different kind of ‘communication’. Recall Chapter 2, which weighed into the 
debate about what counts as animal ‘communication’. There the relevant kind of 
communication was not restricted to individuals capable of intentional behaviour. In 
this chapter and the next, however, the focus is on a kind of communication (and the 
kind of meaning expressed and recognised in this kind of communication) that is 
                                                          
57 This could be either in phylogeny or ontogeny. 
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restricted to intentional systems. However, it is restricted not only to animals capable 
of intentional behaviour, but also to animals that are, in addition, capable of recognising 
the intentions that lie behind others’ behaviour. I will call this ‘bi-intentional 
communication’. Henceforth, ‘communication’ will mean bi-intentional 
communication, unless otherwise indicated. 
On the views I will be discussing in this chapter, communicative behaviour 
(i.e. meaningfulNN behaviour) is commonly distinguished from non-communicative 
behaviour (which doesn’t express meaningNN) by the intentions giving rise to it. To 
meanNN something, one must behave motivated by an ‘informative’ intention, on the 
one hand, and a ‘communicative’ intention, on the other (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
Moreover, communicative intent – the second kind of intention just referred to - is 
thought to include informative intent embedded within it. Because of this recursive 
intentional structure, signals carrying meaningNN are quite different from 
morphological features or behaviours carrying merely natural meaning. To carry 
natural meaning, as opposed to meaningNN, a behaviour need not be intentional, let 
alone recursively so. 
The task of this chapter is to flesh out the notion of meaningNN, along with 
its explanatory commitments. The question will be: what psychological abilities do 
individuals need to possess to express and recognise meaningNN? The point of asking 
this question, for my thesis, is mostly comparative. MeaningNN is not, at least 
obviously, restricted to the communicative behaviour of human beings. While some 
researchers take the intentional demands of meaningNN to be a defining feature of 
human communication, and from this argue that human communication is set 
categorically apart from nonhuman communication (e.g. Scott-Phillips 2015), others 
argue that (some) nonhuman signals carry meaningNN: in particular, some great ape 
signals (e.g. Moore 2016; 2017). I am sceptical of these comparative claims, explaining 
why in the next chapter. 
Section 1 begins with Grice’s analysis of the concept of meaningNN, noting 
how this analysis was taken up by ‘post-Griceans’ interested in explaining the 
psychological abilities needed to express and recognise meaningNN. Section 2 
explores the explanatory role of these intentions according to post-Griceans: more 
specifically, how the expression and recognition of these intentions constitutes the 
expression and recognition of meaningNN. Section 3 lays out the meta-
representational abilities necessary for expressing and recognising meaningNN. This 
chapter is largely expository, laying the groundwork for the next one. As will become 
clear, the intentional demands of expressing and recognising meaningNN are 
significant. This presents a prima facie problem, seeing as young children can express 
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and recognise speaker meaning58 in the absence, arguably, of the recursive intentional 
abilities required for dealing in meaningNN (Moore 2017). As a result, Chapter 5 
explores ways of deflating the intentional demands of human communication. It then 
examines whether nonhuman primates are capable of expressing and recognising 
meaning in same fundamental way humans do.  
 
1. Grice’s analysis 
 
Grice sought a notion of ‘meaning’ that would apply to all and only those intentional 
behaviours that are ‘communicative’. Intuitively, my pushing you out of the way is an 
intentional behaviour, but it isn’t a communicative one. Intuitively, my asking you to 
go away is a communicative behaviour. Grice sought to reveal the necessary and 
sufficient conditions honouring intuitions like this about which intentional behaviours 
do and do not count as communicative. Genuinely communicative behaviours are 
those that carry meaningNN, according to Grice. Moore (2017) summarises what is 
required by Grice for a speaker S to meanNN something by uttering x to hearer H. I 
will take Moore’s analysis as adequate in what follows. Specifically, S must utter x 
intending: 
 
1. H to produce a particular response r  
2. H to recognise that S intends (1). 
 
The first condition for some behaviour to carry meaningNN is that it be intentional59. 
The content of the speaker’s meaningNN is then identical to the effect the speaker 
intends their utterance to have on the hearer. Such (‘informative’) intentions can take a 
variety of forms. For example, a speaker might intend, by vocalising or gesturing, that 
the hearer do something: for example go away. Alternatively, the speaker might intend 
that the hearer believe something: for example the proposition it’s raining. There are 
many other kinds of informative intentions a speaker might have in uttering. Each 
kind of informative intention corresponds to a particular type of effect a speaker 
intends his utterance to have on the hearer. Thus, for a speaker to meanNN 
something by behaving in a certain way, the speaker must intend something: typically, 
to modify the hearer’s behaviour or mental states in some way. Conversely, for a 
hearer to recognise what a speaker meansNN, the hearer must identify the speaker’s 
informative intention. This leads to a crucial point. Expressing and recognising 
                                                          
58 Thus, it is an open question whether speaker meaning is in fact identical with meaningNN. 
59 The push-up display of a lizard is unlikely to be intentionally produced. Likewise, many think the alarm 
calls of vervet monkeys are not intentional (Seyfarth & Cheney 2003; Tomasello 2008). In the next 
chapter, exactly what intentional behaviour is will be explored in some detail as it is crucial to the issue of 
attributing meaningNN. This fundamental issue has, by and large, been ignored in the relevant literature. 
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meaningNN depends on the cognitive abilities that allow us to understand each other 
as intentional beings. To say that I meanNN something, it is necessary that I perform 
an intentional behaviour. Concomitantly, to say that Rick understands what I 
meanNN, it is necessary that Rick recognises the intention motivating my behaviour. 
Behaviours that carry meaningNN were thought by Grice to be unique in a 
second important respect. They are not merely intentional, they are “overtly 
intentional” (Sperber & Wilson 1987). Imagine I am your boss. I could intend to bring 
it about that you leave your office by setting the fire alarm off. Alternatively, I could 
intend to bring it about that you leave your office by making you realise that I intend 
you to leave your office. The latter is meaningfulNN, while the first is not. Likewise, I 
could intend for you to buy me another drink by moving my empty glass into your 
field of view hoping that you notice my glass is empty and believe it’s your turn to buy 
the next round. Alternatively, I could move my empty glass into your field of view 
while also making eye-contact with you, pointing at my empty glass, and raising my 
left eye-brow. In the second case (but not the first) it is plausible that, in addition to 
intending that you believe the next round is on you, I moreover intend that that you 
recognise I have this intention. In this way meaningNN is overtly intentional. 
 
- Justification or description? – 
 
Taken as an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions separating 
communicative behaviours from non-communicative ones, the above analysis might 
have some appeal. However, depending on one’s view of psychological explanation, 
this appeal declines when the issue switches from analysis to explanation. The picture 
Grice held of psychological explanation becomes tantamount here.  
Some (e.g. Grandy & Warner 2017) think that, for Grice, psychological 
explanation is normative as opposed to descriptive. That is, psychological explanation 
specifies how we ought to think, or think under ‘optimal’ conditions, as opposed to 
how we in fact think. If this view of Grice is correct, then an intentional description of 
some behaviour, for Grice, is ultimately an exercise in normative reconstruction. As a 
result, the recursive intentional structure deemed necessary and sufficient for 
meaningNN is not something that Grice thought speakers typically have in mind 
whenever they communicate. Instead, this intentional structure is something hearers 
attribute to speakers when the former need to justify the actions and beliefs caused by 
the speaker’s utterance. If all this is true, then the recursive intentional structure 
emerging from Grice’s analysis of non-natural meaning was not intended to be part of 
a cognitive explanation of how communication operates. 
What about someone holding a descriptive, as opposed to normative, picture 
of cognitive explanation? That person might think Grice’s intentional structure is of 
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little scientific importance. On the other hand, a recently influential group of 
researchers have taken the intentional structure analysed by Grice to be central to 
(descriptively) explaining how human communication works. These ‘post-Griceans’ 
take Grice’s analysis of the intentions necessary for communication as central to 
explaining how communication is both a) initiated, and b) used successfully, once 
initiated (Sperber & Wilson 1986; 2002, Tomasello 1998; 2008, Bloom 2000, Csibra 
2010). These accounts also form the basis of much developmental and comparative 
research (Gomez 1994, Hurford 2007, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015, Moore 
2016; 2017). I will have much more to say on the explanatory status of intentional 
states in Chapter 5, as the issue is crucial for assessing accounts of communication 
that rely so heavily on intentional states.  
 
2. From analysis to explanation 
 
Recall from Section 1 that meaningNN is thought to be limited to behaviours that are 
overtly intentional. Making one’s informative intent overt is thought to be necessary to 
communication for at least two reasons. First, so that communication can be initiated. 
Unless the hearer recognises that I am attempting to communicate, as opposed to, say, 
moving my glass away from some ants crawling on the table, he might simply take my 
glass-moving behaviour to be of no concern. Second, unless the hearer recognises that 
I am attempting to communicate via my glass-moving behaviour, he will not invest 
the cognitive resources required to bridge the inferential gap between the information 
carried by my explicit action (i.e. my glass-moving behaviour), on the one hand, and 
my informative intention, on the other. After all, my glass-moving behaviour is 
rationally compatible with a wide range of possible informative intentions. If my 
interlocutor is to successfully infer a) the kind of informative intention underling my 
action (a request for more beer, as opposed to an invitation to emote at the style of 
the glass, for example), and also b) the content of this request (that my interlocutor buys 
me another drink, as opposed to depositing the empty glass back to the bar, for 
example), then he must make various ‘pragmatic’ assumptions that fill the inferential 
gap between glass-moving behaviour, on the one hand, and a request for another 
drink, on the other.  
Now, human communication depends on a wide range of psychological 
abilities, only a subset of which include skills related to understanding intentionality 
(or the mental states that underpin intentional behaviours: mindreading). However, in 
recent years significant explanatory focus has been placed on the ability of human 
communicators to both express and recognise intentions. There are a couple of 
reasons for this. First, the role of mindreading in human communication is deemed 
important because of the commonly perceived gap between the mindreading abilities 
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of human beings, on the one hand, and similar abilities in nonhuman primates. This 
gap, combined with the fact that nonhuman great-ape communication is greatly 
impoverished compared with human communication, has encouraged the view that 
the evolution of more powerful mindreading abilities was crucial to the evolution of 
human linguistic (and non-linguistic) communication (Hurford 2007, Tomasello 2008, 
Scott-Phillips 2015).  
Second, human communication seems to operate in a way that is arguably 
entirely unique. Unlike communication in any other species, human communication 
seems to be possible in the absence of a ‘code’. The concept of a communicative 
‘code’ is a not entirely a transparent one, but one of the main features of this concept 
is meaning in virtue of ‘convention’ (Lewis 1969, Skyrms 2010). Whether the convention is 
established by blind trial and error (either natural selection of simple learning), or via 
more sophisticated means (rational agency), and moreover whether the code involves 
a combinatorial structure or not, the resulting code fixes meaning in advance. 
Interlocutors must choose from a set menu of communicative options. In contrast, 
human communication is flexible to a degree that indicates that it goes above and 
beyond a code, even considering the combinatorial structure (i.e. syntax) of the codes 
we use. We employ codes (paradigmatically, languages) in communicating with each 
other, but we can make these codes mean a wide range of things. Meaning is not fixed 
in advance. Instead of codes determining meaning, they merely provide evidence of 
what we mean. Moreover, we can wield our linguistic codes flexibly, and at will. While 
it may take many generations of sex and death for a signal in a relatively simple 
communication system (say, frog mating calls) to acquire a different coded content, I 
can employ the coded content “do you want to get out of here?” to mean completely 
different things, depending on my intentions and the context. This is just to express 
the rather uncontroversial point that, when it comes to human communication, 
speaker meaning is not exhausted by coded (or ‘semantic’) content. However, this 
point has very significant implications for proponents of the post-Gricean picture. 
This is (and here we return to the issue of mindreading) because bridging the gap 
between coded meaning and speaker meaning is thought to rely on the ability of 
human beings to understand each other as intentional agents.  
 
2.1 THE EXPLANATORY ROLE OF INFORMATIVE INTENTIONS 
 
The post-Gricean picture begins with the following proposition: in communication, 
the coded content of an utterance usually, if not always, underdetermines what the 
speaker means by uttering it. Coded content merely provides evidence for what the 
speaker means, as opposed to exhausting meaning. For example, the coded content of 
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my utterance ‘It’s your turn’, said to my friend Rick at drinks, represents60 that it is his 
turn to do something. But exactly what it is his turn to do is not specified. Thus, for 
communication to be successful, Rick must somehow bridge the gap between the 
coded content of my utterance, on the one hand, and the intention (or goal) I have in 
producing this utterance, on the other. In the present example, my intention is that 
Rick buys the next round of drinks. To infer my intention (which is a necessary step to 
complying with it), Rick must move from representing the coded content ‘It’s your 
turn’, to representing my goal that he believes it is his turn to buy the next round. By 
doing so Rick grasps what I mean (as opposed merely to the coded content of the 
sentence I uttered).  
Thus, as mentioned, there is a clear distinction being made between coded 
content, on the one hand, and speaker meaning, on the other. The former is simply the 
conventional content of the linguistic code, and is a product of combining lexical 
items according to grammatical rules to produce a semantic representation: but one 
which, by itself, often (if not always) underdetermines speaker meaning. The second 
thing to note is the way in which the gap between coded linguistic content, on the one 
hand, and speaker meaning, on the other, is inferentially bridged (by the hearer). 
Sometimes, bridging this gap will no doubt involve the application of relatively simple 
heuristic rules. At other times, however, it involves the hearer running a rich and 
flexible online model of what is “mutually manifest” (Sperber & Wilson 1986) or 
“common ground” (Tomasello 2008) to both speaker and hearer.  
An example will help illustrate the phenomena of mutual 
manifestness/common ground61. Imagine that Rick has finally bought the next round 
of drinks and we are once again both sitting at our table chatting away. We happen to 
be sitting next to each other, and I am on the right-hand side of Rick. Suddenly, mid-
conversation, I happen to randomly glance over my right shoulder. As a result of 
doing this, I spot Roger, an associate who we both do not particular like, walking 
towards us. I lean back suddenly so that Rick can see that Roger is coming, with eye 
brows clearly raised at Rick. My actions (in particular, my leaning back) meanNN 
something like ‘Arrgg, here comes Roger, prepare yourself!’. My intention in leaning 
back is to get Rick to believe that Roger is coming, and to ready himself for an 
annoying exchange with a person he doesn’t like. However, in order that Rick infers 
my intention (my meaning), he must understand what I will expect him to attend to in 
his newly modified visual field. Only by representing the kinds of things that are 
thought by me to be salient to him will Rick be able to ‘connect the dots’ between my 
                                                          
60 I use the term ‘represents’ as opposed to ‘means’ because I am restricting the notion of ‘(non-natural) 
meaning’ to speaker meaning, as opposed to semantic/coded content. 
61 I will speak of ‘mutual manifestness’ in what follows, but I do not thereby intend to be choosing one 
account over the other: both the idea of mutual manifestness and of common ground are close enough to 
each other for present purposes.  
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leaning back, on the one hand, and my intention (my meaning) in so acting, on the 
other. For there are multiple sources of new information that Rick might attend to 
because of my leaning back: the bar window, the weather outside, various people and 
tables, someone he finds attractive, and anything else that my body was formally 
obstructing from his view. 
This is where the notion of ‘relevance’ enters, at least on one post-Gricean 
account (Sperber & Wilson 1986). Because on this account cognition is ‘relevance-
based’, then if I have an internal model of what is mutually manifest to both Rick and 
myself, I can have a decent (if fallible) handle on what assumptions Rick is likely to 
make in trying to get from my utterance, or communicative act (i.e. my leaning back), 
to my informative intention or meaning. This raises the question of what it means to 
say that cognition is ‘relevance-based’. The hypothesis is that cognition seeks to bring 
about the greatest cognitive upshot for the least amount of processing effort. What is 
cognitive upshot? Sperber & Wilson (1986, p. 48) posit that it is the derivation of 
inferences from new information. On this view, what makes a potentially new bit of 
information p more relevant than q, is that p can be combined with old information (i.e. 
in memory) to give rise to the derivation of more inferences than would follow from q 
being combined with this old information (assuming processing effort is equal)62.  
A plausible assumption of the view is that conceptual processes can’t attend 
to all stimuli made available by the sense organs at any moment. This is reflected in 
the fact that, when I lean back for Rick, he cannot attend to everything in is newly 
modified visual scene. But because human cognition operates according to the 
principle of relevance, Rick will attend to that feature of the visual scene which, given 
the information already contained in his mind, will give rise to the most inferences. 
When it comes to our imaginary scenario, what gives rise to the most inferences in 
Rick’s mind is the sensory information indicating the approach of the malign Roger. 
Thus, this information is most relevant to Rick. From this new information (i.e. that 
Roger is approaching), Rick will be able to derive a host of new information, such as 
that he should move, or avoid behind seen, or prepare for a sarcastic exchange. Given 
the information already stored in Rick’s mind, including the belief that he finds Roger 
intolerable, much more follows (for Rick) from new information about the approach 
of Roger, than, for example, new information about the current state of the bar 
window (also revealed by my leaning backwards).   
What does this have to do with communication, and with mutual 
manifestness, in particular? The idea is that if I know what information is potentially 
                                                          
62 One might wonder if a circularity lurks here. Cognitive upshot, in any useful sense of that term, surely 
can’t be measured by the quantity of new information inferred from old information. This is because an 
enormous number of uninteresting facts can be inferred from just about any additional item of 
information. Instead, cognitive upshot must surely consist in the quantity of salient (i.e. relevant!) new 
information inferred from old information. 
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manifest to Rick in the environment I share with him, and if I ‘know’ (if only 
implicitly) that his mind seeks relevant information, then as a result I have a fairly 
decent idea of what stimuli to produce for him in order that he is likely to infer what I 
want him to. To bring it back to the imaginary example, I know that Rick dislikes 
Roger and that Rick will find the approach of Roger salient. Thus, by leaning back on 
my chair and creating a clear line of sight between Rick and the impending Roger (as 
well as other, less relevant things), I can be quite confident that he will infer my 
intention in so acting (i.e. that he believe roger is approaching, as opposed to, say, 
believing the weather outside is nice).  
A slightly different variant on the standard picture63 focuses on something 
known as the ‘cooperative principle’ as opposed to the principle of relevance, but the 
broad moral is similar. The cooperative principle is a normative claim - about what 
interlocutors should do when communicating - as opposed to a descriptive claim - 
about how the psychological processes underpinning communication do operate. 
However, as with the (descriptive) principle of relevance, the (normative) cooperative 
principle provides a way to ‘plug the gap’ that exists between literal-linguistic (‘coded’) 
meaning, on the one hand, and speaker meaning, on the other. Just like the principle 
of relevance, the cooperative principle holds that “communication creates 
expectations which it then exploits” (Sperber & Wilson 1986, p. 37).  
The cooperative principle states that speakers and hearers should try to 
adhere to certain guidelines when performing their respective roles in an episode of 
communication. From knowledge that the speaker is following certain communicative 
norms, it should be possible for the hearer to infer the speaker’s meaning from 
observation of a) the speaker’s utterance/action and b) the context. This is because, 
out of all the possible thoughts a speaker might have in mind by uttering, for instance, 
‘It’s your turn!’, only one will be compatible with the cooperative principle: namely, 
‘It’s you turn to buy the next round of drinks’. Thus, the speaker’s role is to aim to produce 
an utterance which will have only one interpretation compatible with the cooperative 
principle (just like, above, the speaker is simply calibrated – as a matter of 
psychological design - to produce an utterance with only one interpretation 
compatible with the principle of relevance).   
The cooperative principle states a set of ‘maxims’: for instance, of quantity, 
quality, relation and manner. These include norms like a) make your contribution as 
informative as required without giving too much information, b) do not say what you 
believe to be false or what you lack sufficient evidence for, c) avoid ambiguity, e) be 
relevant, and so on. If the hearer supposes that the speaker is following such maxims 
according to the cooperative principle, then he can eliminate those interpretations of 
                                                          
63 Indeed, one that is more directly indebted to Grice than is relevance theory, the latter being usually 
referred to as a ‘post-Gricean’ theory of communication (Scott-Phillips 2015). 
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the speaker’s utterance incompatible with the idea that the speaker is following the 
maxims. For instance, me overtly leaning back on my chair is relevant to Rick only if 
he assumes that I intended him to observe the impending Roger. 
In summary, informative intentions are the ‘stuff’ of communication. They 
constitute what I (non-naturally) mean in communicating with you. The hearer’s ‘job’, 
in communicating, is to identify the speaker’s informative intention. One important 
issue to be explained, in understanding communication, is how the hearer manages to 
grasp the speaker’s informative intention, given that coded meaning usually (if not 
always) underdetermines the speaker’s informative intention. Furthermore, successful 
communication often occurs in the complete absence of a coded utterance (as when I 
lean back for Rick, or when I’m travelling in a foreign country and don’t speak the 
native tongue). The standard picture posits that the hearer inferentially grasps speaker 
meaning by interpreting the actions of the speaker in accordance with a key 
assumption: that the speaker’s utterance was produced in line with the principle of 
relevance (or something functionally similar). As a result of operating in accordance 
with this assumption (and if the speaker has indeed fulfilled his part of the bargain), it 
should be possible for the hearer to infer something close enough to the speaker’s 
informative intention by taking into account any coded content or other action 
produced, along with information about what is mutually manifest to both speaker 
and hearer. 
 
2.2 THE EXPLANATORY ROLE OF COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS 
 
This leads us to the topic of communicative intentions. According to one 
interpretation of the Gricean analysis of meaningNN (i.e. Moore 2016), an action is 
meaningful or communicative (as opposed to just another ordinary, non-
communication, action) only when the speaker intends that his informative intention 
is manifest to the hearer. That is, communication involves (1) the speaker intending 
his utterance to have effect r on the hearer (informative intention), along with (2) 
intending that (1) is manifest to the hearer (communicative intention). 
Why is this important to the process of communication? Firstly, so that a 
hearer knows when an action is intended to be communicative, as opposed to non-
communicative. Unless Rick thinks that by leaning back on my chair I intend to 
change his beliefs about the world, he won’t have any reason to make the relevant 
inferences about my informative intention in so leaning back. In other words, 
communicative intentions signal signalhood (Scott-Phillips 2015). This has a secondary 
importance, related to the issue of relevance. In Section 2.1, we explored the role that 
relevance plays in communication according to influential post-Gricean accounts. 
Communication involves a hearer assuming (if implicitly) that the speaker’s utterance 
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was produced according the principle of relevance (or something similar). Now, the 
role of communicative intent is precisely to signal when actions are, in fact, produced 
in this way. That is, communicative intentions are intentions that the hearer recognise 
that the speaker has produced a stimulus, for the hearer, that is guaranteed to be 
relevant. 
This can be seen mostly vividly when communication involves no coded 
content, such as when I lean back for Rick. Recall that in the hypothetical scenario my 
action (i.e. leaning back) was accompanied by another: me raising my eyebrows with 
face clearly oriented towards Rick. The eyebrow raise is me signalling signalhood to 
Rick. It is the result of my communicative intention that Rick recognise that my 
leaning back is relevant for him. My expressing such an intention and Rick recognising 
such an intention is crucial so that he invests some cognitive resources in identifying 
my informative intention in leaning back. Because my eyebrow-raise signals 
signalhood - and with signalhood, relevance - Rick can discount non-relevant stimuli 
that I have drawn his attention to by leaning back. After doing so, he will be left with 
the information that Roger is looming, and that it was my (informative) intention to 
make him believe this. In short, Rick is in a much better position to infer my 
informative intention from having recognised my communicative intention.  
To make the role of my communicative intention even more vivid, imagine 
that roger is approaching the bar from outside and is some distance away, mixed in 
with other people on the move, and other features of the environment, such as the car 
park, people sitting on outside tables, and so on. In this case it will be even more 
essential that I signal communicative intent to Rick, in order that he might accurately 
infer my informative intention. In the former case, where Roger was approaching our 
table from inside the bar, my act of leaning back might have alerted Rick to Roger. 
However, in this case were Roger is approaching from outside the bar at some 
distance and mixed in with other people, only by indicating to Rick that there is 
something of relevance for him to attend to in that direction will he invest the 
cognitive resources needed to distinguish the important information from all the other 
distracting information.  
It is crucial to note that, sometimes, communicative intentions will be 
expressed in a separate action to the one expressing the informative intention, as in 
the imaginary example we have been entertaining so far (the eyebrow raise). However, 
they need not be. Often, communicative intentions can be expressed using same 
action as the utterance, such as when I cry ‘Look out!’, after badly slicing a golf ball in 
the direction of some unfortunate bystanders. In this case, my guarantee of relevance 
is attached to the cry itself. Indeed, all cases of linguistic communication are thought 
to be accompanied by a tacit guarantee of relevance, explaining why we find the 
person who goes on and on in a conversation annoying. He is providing far too much 
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information, violating the principle of relevance. We are automatically drawn to expect 
relevant information - new information which can combine with information we 
already possess to derive new information - when, to our displeasure, there simply is 
none.  
In summary, the role of the communicative intention is to signal signalhood, 
and thus relevance (or alternatively, the fact that the speaker is operating according to 
the cooperative maxims, or something functionally similar). I should stress that I do 
not necessarily endorse this account of communication. I am simply trying to make 
the account explicit to reveal its cognitive commitments. In the next section, I address 
what some take to be the cognitive abilities needed to express and recognise both 
informative and communicative intentions.  
 
3. The psychology of expressing and recognising meaningNN 
 
According to recent post-Gricean explanatory accounts of communication64, the 
cognitive abilities required to express and recognise meaningNN are substantial. I lay 
them out in this section. I split the performance analysis into two parts: initiating 
communication (expressing and recognising communicative intent), on the one hand, 
and using communication successfully (correctly producing and inferring informative 
intentions), on the other.  
 
3.1 INITIATING COMMUNICATION 
 
- Speakers - 
 
1st-order intentionality: A speaker must possess at least a 1st-order intention towards a 
hearer. In the case of directive communication, my informative intention is an 
instance of 1st-order intentionality: i.e., I intend1 that you go away.  
 
2nd-order intentionality: Sometimes, however, we communicate with the intention that H 
believe (or take some other cognitive attitude towards) some proposition p. That is, 
sometimes we are not communicating with an intention to merely influence behaviour 
(as with gesturing you to go away, for instance). Rather, I might (as my informative 
intention) intend1 that you believe2 (for example) that it’s raining.  
 
                                                          
64 Sperber 2000, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015. Sperber and Scott-Phillips, as opposed to 
Tomasello, are quite explicit about the psychological abilities required. However, Tomasello does 
sometimes explicitly state that multiple orders of recursive mindreading are necessary for human 
communication (e.g. Tomasello 2008, p. 159). 
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3rd and 4th-order intentionality: We are yet to introduce the communicative intention into 
the picture. In order to signal signalhood, and so prepare you for relevant information, 
I must (according to the standard post-Gricean picture) intend1 you to believe2 that I 
intend3 you to believe4 it’s raining. In order that you realise I have intentions towards 
you produced in accordance with the principle of relevance (or something similar), I 
must not only intend you to be influenced in line with my informative intention. In 
addition, I must also intend you to recognise I intend to affect you in this way. Only 
then will you invest the required cognitive resources needed to infer my informative 
intention, given the under-determination of my informative intention by coded 
linguistic meaning (or other signals). Alternatively, if the speaker’s informative 
intention is merely that the hearer go away, as opposed to believe (or doubt, etc.) a 
proposition, then S need only intend1 that H believe2 S intends3 H to go away. 
 
- Hearers - 
 
2nd-order intentionality: Take a speaker S motivated by the informative intention that H 
go away. In order for H to grasp S’s meaning (i.e. S’s informative intention), H must 
believe1 S wants2 H to go away. 
 
4th and 5th-order intentionality: Now factor in S’s communicative intention. That is, 
assume S utters intending his informative intention to be manifest to H. In order for 
H to grasp this, H must recognise1 that S intends2 H to believe3 that S wants4 H to go 
away. More demanding still, assume now that the speaker is motivated by the 
informative intention that H believe something. For H to grasp S’s communicative 
intention in this situation (i.e. where S has an informative intention directed at H’s 
mental states and not just her behaviour), H must recognise1 that S intends2 H to 
believe3 that S wants4 H to beleive5 (say) it’s raining.  
In all, according to this performance analysis, initiating communication 
requires at least 3rd-order intentionality on the part of speakers, and at least 4th-order 
intentionality on the part of hearers (Sperber 2000, Scott-Phillips 2015). But this is 
when communication is directed at behaviour. When the goal of communication is to 
get the hearer to believe something, for example, then communication requires at least 
4th-order intentionality on the part of speakers and 5th-order intentional on the part of 
hearers. We now turn to the issue of using communication successfully, once initiated. 
 
3.2 USING COMMUNICATION SUCCESSFULLY 
 
According to Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Tomasello (2008), recursive mindreading 
is needed to ensure that communication proceeds successfully, once initiated. More 
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specifically, it is needed so that speakers provide the right evidence for their 
informative intention, and so that receivers make the appropriate inferences to arrive 
at the speaker’s informative intention (or something close enough). This is essential to 
the notion of ‘mutual manifestness’ (Sperber & Wilson 1986) or ‘common ground’ 
(Tomasello 2008). The idea is that a speaker must represent what is mutually manifest 
or common ground between the hearer and himself. 
Turning back to our example, I must provide the right evidence for my 
informative intention, given what I believe about what information is manifest to 
Rick, along with what subset of this information will be relevant to Rick. Unless I 
know that, upon leaning back, Rick will be able to see Roger, and moreover that this 
information will be salient for Rick, I won’t know whether leaning back will be 
sufficient to fulfil my informative intention. That is, I must think1 that Rick see and 
attend2 to Roger, upon leaning back on my chair. Concomitantly, Rick must be able to 
infer my informative intention, given what he believes - about what I believe - he will 
find salient. Unless Rick knows that I think he is able and willing to attend to Roger as 
a result of my leaning back on my chair, he won’t be confident in inferring my 
informative intention. That is, Rick must believe1 that I think2 he will see and attend3 
to Roger, upon me leaning back on my chair. 
Arguably, it doesn’t stop there. It seems, further, that I must have some 
understanding that Rick has this nested awareness of what I think he will see and 
attend to, in virtue of me leaning back on my chair. Otherwise, why would I lean back 
on my chair, as opposed to provide some other kind of evidence for my informative 
intention? That is, unless I think1 Rick will believe2 I think3 he will see and attend4 to 
Roger, upon me leaning back on my chair, it won’t be rational to lean back on my 
char. If we stop here65, it appears that representing what is mutually manifest or 
common ground is not trivial, by any means. It requires at least 3 orders of 
intentionality for hearers and 4 orders of intentionality for speakers. In the next 
chapter I largely ignore the issue of using communication successfully, once initiated. I 
focus exclusively on the intentional demands of initiating communication. This issue 
has received the most attention in recent literature: probably because of the intimate 
connection between Grice’s intentional requirements for an action to count as 
meaningfulNN, presented in Section 1, and the role of the communicative intention 
(Grice’s first intentional requirement) in initiating communication, as opposed to 
allowing it to proceed successfully once initiated. This isn’t to say the issue of 
successfully using communication is not important. On the contrary, if the 
performance analysis presented here is on the right track, then proponents of the 
Post-Gricean account will need to show how the relevant intentional requirements of 
                                                          
65 No doubt there are some that would be inclined to expand this recursive dance of intentional states out 
even further.  
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successfully using communication are met by young children in the face of the 
development findings on mindreading abilities presented in Chapter 566.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
If the post-Gricean picture is correct, then the kind of meaning humans express and 
recognise is psychologically demanding. In the next chapter, we will see that it is 
arguably too demanding, given the relatively modest mindreading abilities of young 
children who are nevertheless learning to express and recognise speaker meaning. The 
focus then goes back to animal communication. If the kind of meaning humans trade 
in must be deflated, then this has clear comparative implications. The simpler human 
communication is, the more likely other species are doing it, or something close to it. 
 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 5. What of young children able to express and recognise speaker meaning in the absence of 
explicit higher-order mindreading abilities? Perhaps this mindreading is done implicitly, below the 
level of conscious awareness and explicit control? Or perhaps humans typically express and recognise a 
fundamentally simpler kind of meaning than Gricean non-natural meaning? What are the 
comparative ramifications? What kind of meaning do chimpanzees and monkeys send and receive? 
  
                                                          
66 It should be noted that I have presenting a simplified version of the Sperber & Wilson line. For 
instance, they have offered specific proposals for how speaker meaning is coded and decoded.  
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Chapter 5 
Grades of Speaker Meaning 
 
 
This chapter addresses an important objection to the post-Gricean picture (Moore 
2017). Young children are able to express and recognise speaking meaning in the 
absence of explicit higher-order mindreading abilities. In response to this objection, 
aired in Section 1, I present some options in Section 2. One option I present is to 
drop non-natural meaning, and with it, Grice’s analysis as being an accurate depiction 
of the kind of meaning humans typically traffic in. As a result, I propose kinds of 
meaning standing in-between natural meaning, on the one hand, and meaningNN, on 
the other. Inspired by Moore (2016; 2017), but also parting ways with him on some of 
the important details, I draw on the work of Csibra (2010) to first propose a kind of 
speaker meaning (‘meaningC’), in which speakers behave intending their 
communicative behaviours to effect hearers in a particular way; and where hearers 
must grasp something close enough to the speaker’s intention to accurately infer 
speaker meaning. What is not required is the recognition of communicative intent. 
Instead, the functional role of recognising communicative intent is handled by signals 
carrying natural meaning about the sender attempting to communicate, which are sent 
and received without meta-representation. I also propose a third notion of speaker 
meaning (in addition to meaningNN and meaningC), involving no proxy for the 
expression and recognition of communicative intent whatsoever. Finally, Section 3 
returns to animal communication. There, I argue that chimpanzees don’t meanNN 
things when gesturing. However, they may well express and recognise a more modest 
form of speaker meaning. I then argue that the pragmatic-inferential abilities of old-
world monkeys do not show them to expressing and recognising any kind of speaker 
meaning, despite these inferential abilities representing an important step on the road 
towards the domain-general nature of human comprehension. In short: old-world 
monkeys are ‘simply’ more sophisticated interpreters of natural meaning, while chimps 
may send and receive a form of speaker meaning: i.e. a kind of meaning requiring 
intention expression and recognition. 
 
1. Ontogenetic constrains on post-Gricean communication 
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In Chapter 4, I presented a broad sketch of a currently-influential explanatory account 
of human communication. In this account, the dual intentional structure analysed by 
Grice is put to explanatory work67. Speakers have higher-order intentions towards 
hearers, and hearers must represent these higher-order intentions. This is both so that 
communication can be initiated and so that it can unfold successfully, once initiated. 
In this section, I explore ways to deflate the intentional demands of the standard post-
Gricean picture, in response to an important objection (Moore 2017). 
To begin with, recall again the conditions for some act to have meaningNN 
(Moore 2016). A speaker (or non-verbal communicator) S non-naturally means 
something by an utterance x if and only if, for some hearer (or audience) H, S utters x 
intending: 
 
1. H to produce a particular response r, and 
2. H to recognise that S intends (1) 
 
Unless Rick recognises that I intend him to believe something, he might take my 
leaning back as just an ordinary piece of instrumental behaviour on my part. Perhaps 
I’m just adjusting my posture to relieve some discomfort. Or perhaps I’m shifting my 
posture to get a better look at someone across the room. The role of clause 2 is to 
signal signalhood, and with signalhood, relevance. By leaning back I might intend to 
produce a particular response in Rick, namely the belief that Roger is approaching 
(clause 1). But unless Rick interprets my leaning back as communicative, Rick will be 
less likely, according to the standard picture, to pragmatically infer my informative 
intention from my rather indeterminate outward behaviour. To this end, I must intend 
Rick to recognise that I intend him to believe Roger is approaching.  
One objection grants the necessary role of clause 1 but denies that of clause 
2, at least in the form presented above. In leaning back, I might plausibly [intend1 Rick 
to believe2 Roger is approaching]. But why must I intend1 that Rick recognise2 [I 
intend3 him to believe4 Roger is approaching]? The objection is that, in order to signal 
signalhood, I need not possess a communicative intention within which [the content 
of my informative intention] is embedded. Instead, my communicative intention can 
take a simpler form. Moore (2016; 2017) argues for this possibility. He does so for 
good reason. For if the performance analysis presented in Chapter 4 was correct, then 
arguably young children should be unable to begin communicating. But young 
children do begin communicating. In Chapter 4 we saw that, on the standard picture, 
initiating communication requires at least 3 orders of intentionality of the part of 
                                                          
67 As mentioned, Chapter 6 examines the status of intentional psychology in detail. 
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senders and at least 4 on the part of receivers. The presents a potential problem. The 
problem is that children seem to be pragmatically competent communicators well 
before they develop the ability to process 3 or 4 orders of intentionality. Two findings 
are in prima facie conflict: First, experiments carried out on children suggest that only 
around ages 5 to 6 do they pass (explicit) second-order false belief tests68, let alone 
tasks requiring more sophisticated meta-representation (Miller 2009). At the same 
time, however, the communicative behaviours of children as young as 12 months 
suggest that they can take into account their own past experiences with an interlocutor 
(Liebal et al. 2009) and are motivated by what appears to be something as rich as 
communicative intent (Grosse et al. 201069). 
At least one proposed solution to this prima facie conundrum is to assert that 
young children are engaging in implicit higher-order mindreading. I will address this 
proposal soon in Section 2.1. Another proposal, mentioned already, is to reduce the 
demands of post-Gricean communication. Moore (2017) takes this second route, 
arguing that communicative intentions need not be as complex as post-Griceans 
think. For instance, Scott-Phillips (2015, p. 67-68) adopts the standard account of 
Sperber & Wilson, claiming that “the content of a communicative intention is an 
informative intention”. Communicative intentions are intentions1 that hearers 
recognise2 that [speakers intend3 hearers to do/believe4 X], where the informative 
intention in brackets is part of the content of the communicative intention. In 
contrast to this, Moore argues that communicative intent can be functionally distinct 
from informative intent. This simplifies communicative intent by removing some of 
its recursiveness. We have a distinct communicative intention, on the one hand, and a 
distinct informative intention, on the other. What might be the content of 
functionally-distinct, ‘Moorean’, communicative intent? Moore (2017) suggests the 
content could be as simple as S intends1 that H respond to S’s signal. He argues that such 
an intention might give rise to ‘acts of address’ performed before signalling. Acts of 
address are behaviours like moving into H’s line of sight, making eye content with H, 
or calling H’s name. For instance, before leaning back on my chair I make eye contact 
with Rick and raise my eyebrow. This is a perfect example of an act of address. On 
Moore’s proposal, then, the following functionally-distinct intentions suffice for 
successfully initiating communication: 
 
1. I intend1 (in making eye contact and raising my eyebrow) that Rick respond to my 
impending behaviour (i.e. my leaning back on my chair) 
2. I intend1 (in leaning back on my chair) that Rick believe2 Roger is approaching 
                                                          
68 Passing a second-order false-belief tests shows that the subject can process 3rd-order intentionality: e.g. 
I represent X’s representation about Y’s (or my own) representation. 
69 Outlined in more detail in Section 2.1. 
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Intention 1 is my (Moorean) communicative intention. Intention 2 is my informative 
intention, or my intended message. We can further deflate the intentional demands of 
the example by changing things slightly, such that my informative intention is 
imperative in nature, as opposed to informative: 
 
2a. I intend1 (in leaning back on my chair) that Rick turn to the direction previously 
obstructed by my body 
 
The result is that speakers need only 1st-order intentionality to initiate simple forms of 
communication. Hearers, for their part, will need only 2nd-order intentionality to 
represent the two 1st-order intentions of the speaker. This is good, as empirical 
evidence suggests children as young as 15 months have an implicit (i.e. non-linguistic) 
understanding of others as representing the world (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005) or as 
being motivated by a goal (Gergely & Csibra 2003)70.  
There is reason to think Moorean communicative intent is too simple, however. If 
communicative intent is as simple as Moore suggests, then successful communication 
would be initiated far less frequently than it in fact is. Recall the importance of 
signalling signalhood, on the post-Gricean picture. Moorean communicative intent 
will need to motivate behaviour(s) that robustly get Rick to realise that my leaning 
back on my chair has the function of communicating something, as opposed to (say) 
relieving back strain. But the intention that Rick merely respond to my main signal will 
not suffice. If, in making eye contact and raising my eyebrow, I am motivated by 
something as simple as the intention that Rick respond (but in what way?) to my 
leaning back, then I will be satisfied if Rick thinks, by leaning back, I am merely 
stretching. Of course, my informative intention wouldn’t be satisfied in this scenario, 
but my (so-called!) communicative intention would be, despite the fact I’ve failed to 
initiate communication. Acts of address have a function within the post-Gricean 
framework, and this function is to signal signalhood to the hearer. If acts of address 
are to typically perform their function robustly, they will need to be produced with a 
more specific intention in mind than that H simply respond to S’s signal. They would 
have to be produced, typically, by S intending that H respond to S’s signal in a 
particular way. S must intend1 something like the following: that H recognise2 S is 
communicating71 (as opposed to, say, think2 that S is stretching – or doing something 
                                                          
70 Heyes (2014, 2015) asks whether what is called implicit ‘mindreading’ in such cases is not actually 
mindreading, i.e. the representation of others’ internal mental representations, but rather what she calls 
‘submentalizing’: (implicit) cognitive processing enabling social coordination without the agent 
representation others’ mental states.  
71 Here ‘communicating’ can be replaced by ‘is doing something of relevance to me’, or something 
functionally similar.   
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else). H would then need to recognise1 that S intends2 H to recognise3 S is 
communicating.  
If this criticism is fair, then we are left in the following position. The original 
motivation for splitting the communicative intention from the informative intention 
was to accommodate the lack of empirical evidence that children can represent 
something as recursive as Gricean communicative intent: i.e. my intention1 that Rick 
recognise2 I intend3 him to look in such-and-such a direction. Instead, Moore suggests 
the expression and recognition of the following functionally-distinct intentions suffice: 
 
1. I intend1 (in making eye contact and raising my eyebrow) that Rick respond to my 
impending behaviour (i.e. my leaning back on my chair) 
2. I intend1 (in leaning back on my chair) that Rick turn to the direction previously 
obstructed by my body 
 
Against this, I have just argued that the following functionally-distinct intentions are 
in fact required: 
 
3. I intend1 (in making eye contact and raising my eyebrow) that Rick recognise2 I am 
communicating with him 
4. I intend1 (in leaning back on my chair) that Rick turn to the direction previously 
obstructed by my body 
 
If communicative intention 3 is indeed required, as opposed to Moorean 
communicative intention 1, then speakers will need two orders of intentionality to 
communicate and hearers will need at least three. Hearers will need to recognise1 that 
S intends2 H to recognise3 that S is communicating. If this is true then the conundrum 
introduced in this section stands: young children seem capable of a form of 
communication requiring at least 3rd-order intentionality (to recognise communicative 
intent), yet empirical psychology shows that, at present, children must reach 5 or 6 
years of age before then can (at least explicitly) process three orders of intentionality72 
(Miller 2009). Thus, the cognitive demands have been cut down: there is no need for 
4th or 5th order intentions. However, the demands are still too much for toddlers, 
prima facie. 
 
2. Some options 
 
                                                          
72 Or what Miller calls “second-order mental-state attribution”: as already mentioned, the subject’s ability 
to represent X’s belief about Y’s (or the subject’s own) belief. 
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As I see it there are at least three possible solutions. The first is the most radical in the 
present context. It involves discarding the post-Gricean account, qua psychological 
explanation of communication. If hearers need at least 3 orders of intentionality for 
communication to be robustly initiated, and if children can understand utterances 
before they have developed the ability to recognise 3rd-order intentionality, then 
something must give. Perhaps the Gricean framework is best viewed as philosophy 
rather than science: i.e. as an account of how speakers and hearers would ideally justify 
their communicative behaviours, if pressed (Grandy & Warner 2017). 
 A more conservative second option, at least from the perspective of the 
standard picture, is to explore the possibility that the meta-representational demands 
of expressing and recognising communicative intent are managed implicitly, by System 
1 cognitive processes. This route is taken by Scott-Phillips (2015). He highlights that 
tests of higher-order mindreading in children have been restricted to tests of explicit 
higher-order mindreading. As a result it might be the case that, as with 1st-order 
mindreading skills, children possess the cognitive abilities to pass implicit testing before 
they pass explicit testing (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005).  
 There is a third option. It mirrors the second in hypothesising that the 
coordination required to initiate communication is enabled by System 1 cognitive 
processes. However, unlike the second option, here System 1 processes merely mimic 
the expression and recognition of recursive communicative intentions. They do not 
process implicitly represented recursive intentional states. This is how I interpret 
Csibra (2010). In what follows I explain options 2 and 3 in more detail. Each gives rise 
to different empirical predictions, which is hopefully a virtue of distinguishing them. 
For what it’s worth I argue that option 2 deserves to be considered ‘Gricean’/‘post-
Gricean’ in spirit, while option 3 does not.  
 
2.1 SYSTEM 1 OPTION A: IMPLICIT HIGHER-ORDER MINDREADING 
 
A strategy for those wishing to accommodate human communication within a broadly 
Gricean73 framework is to push the meta-representational demands attached to 
expressing and recognising communicative intent below the level of conscious 
awareness and executive control. The idea is that speakers need not explicitly infer 
what behaviours are likely to initiate communication. Likewise, and in response to 
                                                          
73 Unless otherwise indicated, by ‘Gricean’ I will from this point forward mean a form of communication, 
indebted to Grice, but where (unlike with both fully-Gricean and post-Gricean communication) 
communicative and informative intentions are functionally-distinct mental states, following Moore. As I 
have argued though in Section 1, and in parting ways with Moore, the former kind of communication still 
requires recursive mindreading on the part of speakers and hearers: hence the two System 1 proposals 
currently being considered. I will use the term ‘post-Gricean’ to refer to the standard account examined in 
Chapter 4, involving upwards of 3rd-order intentionality for speakers and 4th-order intentionality for 
hearers, which was then deflated (but only somewhat) in Section 1. 
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such behaviours, hearers need not explicitly infer that speakers want to communicate. 
Instead, the relevant inferential work is done implicitly. 
 The difference between explicit and implicit varieties of inference is presented 
by dual-processing theories of cognition (Evans 2008, Frankish 2010). Dual-
processing theories take there to be two fundamentally different processing ‘modes’ 
available for many cognitive tasks: one that is fast, automatic and non-conscious; 
another that is slow, controlled, and conscious. The first (implicit) mode is relatively 
effortless and runs in parallel to tasks placing demands on reflective cognition. In 
contrast, the second (explicit) mode requires significant cognitive effort and can be 
disrupted by (other) tasks placing demands on explicit cognition. The first mode is 
labelled ‘type 1’ processing; the second ‘type 2’. Dual-systems theory extends these 
findings, assigning the two different processing modes to two separate cognitive 
systems: ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’, respectively. System 2 is often taken to be uniquely 
human, and the source of our ability to think abstractly and hypothetically.    
 The hypothesis for this section is that communicative intent is processed 
implicitly, by System 1. This hypothesis is at least consistent with introspection. It 
certainly seems like acts of address, underpinned by communicative intent, are not 
performed and recognised explicitly. If you pass me in the hall and make eye contact 
with me before nodding hello, to direct my communicative attention into your nod, 
you are probably not consciously reasoning thusly: “I desire that David interpret my 
nod as communicative. I believe that, for David to interpret my nod as 
communicative, I need to direct his attention onto it by making eye contact with him 
before nodding. Therefore, I will make eye contact with him before nodding”. 
Likewise, it doesn’t seem like I need to explicitly represent your recursive intention 
that I interpret your eye contact as evidence of your intention that I recognise you are 
trying to communicate with me. Instead, the expression and recognition of 
communicative intent seems to be carried out implicitly. 
Two versions of this proposal can be distinguished, the first to be addressed 
here and the second in Section 2.2. On the first version of this proposal, I possess a 
mental representation of your communicative intention, the content of which is 
recursive. However, my mental representation of your communicative intention is not 
subject to conscious awareness nor executive control: it is processed in System 1. 
Nevertheless, the content of this representation is isomorphic to an explicit 
representation taking the following form: S intends1 me to recognise2 that S is communicating 
(or something close enough). This version of the proposal is suggested by Scott-
Phillips (2015), who is sensitive to the prima facie conflict between current empirical 
evidence on explicit false-belief tests, on the one hand, and the intentional demands of 
post-Gricean communication, on the other. Children pass explicit false-belief tests 
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only around 4 years of age, and this finding is robust (Wellman et al. 2001)74. Scott-
Phillips argues that the post-Gricean account is saved in virtue of implicit, 1st-order, 
false-belief testing (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon 2005) showing that children possess 
non-verbal mindreading skills as young as 12 months. However, the proposal places a 
significant empirical bet that might not be borne out. It requires that implicit (i.e. 
System 1) mindreading tests one day scale up to show that we possess implicit recursive 
mindreading abilities: i.e. that System 1 mindreading processes compute over meta-
representations. As Moore (2016) points out, success on implicit, 1st-order, false belief 
tasks is not good evidence for implicit higher-order mindreading skills. It doesn’t rule 
the latter out, of course. But it represents an absence of evidence nonetheless. Scott-
Phillips’ proposal also rests on findings that higher-order belief reasoning among 
linguistically competent subjects is relatively quick and effortless (O’Gradey at al. 
2015). But as Moore (2016) also points out, this is problematic because linguistic 
abilities might make higher-order mindreading possible in the first place. 
It may turn out that System 1 computes meta-representations of recursive 
communicative intent. This would depend on further empirical investigation into 
implicit higher-order mindreading among young children. One study suggesting that 
the hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously is by Grosse et al. (2010), mentioned in 
passing in Section 1. The study suggests children as young as 18 months gesture, 
intending not just that their gesture has a certain effect on another, but also that the 
hearer recognise this intention. That is, the study suggests children as young as 18 
months act with communicative intent75. Although it didn’t test the intentional 
structure of recognising (as opposed to expressing) communicative intent in young 
children, the fact that the study provides evidence that children of 18 months intend1 
H to recognise2 that they (i.e. the child) wants3 H to do X gives us reason to think that 
children this young are able to recognise1 that S intends2 they (i.e. the child) recognise3 
that S is communicating.  
The study in question required infants to request an object they wanted from 
a first experimenter (say, a ball to complete a task the infant was playing with a second 
experimenter). The first experimenter would then ‘misunderstand’ the infant’s request 
for the ball by pointing to a different object (e.g. a bit of paper) and uttering ‘Oh, you 
want the paper!’. However, at the same time as reaching for the object the infant did 
not want, the first experimenter would distractedly place the requested object (the 
ball) in easy reach of the infant, so that the infant’s informative intention was 
essentially satisfied, despite being misunderstood. This ‘misunderstanding’ condition 
was compared with a series of other conditions, the most relevant being the condition 
                                                          
74 More precisely, 3-year-olds typically fail, 4-year-olds display some success, and 5-year-olds typically 
pass. 
75 Indeed, with Gricean (i.e. non-Moorean) communicative intent: S intends1 that H recognise2 S intends3 
H to do X.  
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where the infant got the ball and was understood correctly. It was found that around 
45 per cent of 18-month-old infants attempted to ‘repair’ the communicative 
interaction in the misunderstanding condition. Attempts to ‘repair’ were defined as 
“all verbal utterances, vocalizations, points, reaches, and showing gestures that were 
directed at E1 and were not clearly affirmative in nature (as indicated by nodding 
and/or smiling)” (Grosse et al. p. 1715, my italics). Also measured was the infants’ 
latency to turn away from this communicative exchange and to re-engage with the 
game the infant was previously playing with the second experimenter. It was found 
that, when an infant got what it wanted but was misunderstood, the time taken to turn 
away from the communicative exchange was a bit more than double the length of 
time (around 9 seconds) compared to when the infant got what it wanted and was 
understood correctly (around 4 seconds). The conclusion of the study is that infants 
communicate, not just to have their (informative) intentions met, but also to be 
understood. 
This study can quite easily be interpreted as showing that the infants acted not 
only with informative intent, but also with communicative intent: i.e. that the infants 
had the goal, not just that their utterance had a certain effect on the adult, but also that 
the hearer recognise that they (the infants) had this goal. That is, it can be taken to show 
that infants (as speakers) intended1 that H believe2 they (the infant) wanted3 the ball. If 
this hypothesis is taken seriously, then certain empirical predictions follow. 
Specifically, we should expect young children to pass implicit higher-order 
mindreading tasks around the time they begin communicating. If System 1 
mindreading abilities allow young children to express recursive communicative intent, 
then these same implicit abilities should allow subjects to pass implicit mindreading 
tasks testing for the same level of intentionality.  
 
2.2 SYSTEM 1 OPTION B: IMPLICIT COORDINATION OF ATTENTION 
 
Now for the second version of an implicit solution to the conundrum presented in 
Section 1. On this version, the processing of communicative intent takes place in 
System 1. However, the relevant representation in this instance is not isomorphic with 
the explicit content (of communicative intent): S intends1 that H recognise2 S is attempting3 
to communicate. There is no higher-order mindreading going on, no meta-representation, 
even implicitly. Instead, System 1 gives rise to communicative behaviours mimicking 
those produced on the back of recursive, communicative intent. Communication is 
thus dual-layered, and hence continuous with Gricean communication, but does not 
involve the expression and/or recognition of recursive communicative intent. This is a 
more general view of communication: one which includes Gricean (and post-Gricean) 
communication within it. The view is ‘inferential’ when it comes to working out the 
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speaker’s intended message (her informative intention), but is purely code-based when 
it comes to initiating communication (and hence there is no need for the expression 
and/or recognition of communicative intent).  
The view draws from one interpretation of Csibra (2010). On it, 
communication can be initiated in one of two ways. First, in Gricean fashion: i.e. by 
the speaker providing good evidence that she is attempting to communicate, from 
which the hearer must then infer that the speaker has an impending informative 
intention. As a result of inferring the speaker’s communicative intention, inferential-
interpretive processes (something like those outlined in Sperber & Wilson 1986) are 
triggered in expectation of further actions produced by the speaker evincing her (the 
speaker’s) informative intention or message. The second way communication can be 
initiated is by the speaker providing an ostensive signal, which non-reflectively triggers 
the inferential processes in the hearer required to interpret the speaker’s informative 
intention. 
The difference between these two ways of initiating communication comes 
down to the nature of the procedure that triggers inferential-interpretive processes in 
the hearer (i.e. processes related to representing common ground and interpreting the 
actions of the speaker in line with something like the principle of relevance). In the 
first case, the hearer infers the existence of communicative intent, before engaging in 
further inferential processing of informative intent. Also, in the first case a meta-
representation must be entertained (i.e. a representation of the speaker’s 
communicative intention). In the second case, however, the speaker need only infer 
informative intent. The inferential-interpretive processes that were inferentially 
triggered in the first case are, in the second case, automatically trigged. Also, a meta-
representation of the speaker’s communication intention is not entertained.  
‘Motherse’ and eye-contact are two examples given by Csibra of ostensive 
signals: codes which automatically trigger infants to “make an effort to fill the empty 
placeholder of an informative intention” (Csbira 2010, p. 154). In response to such 
ostensive signals, infants automatically employ certain assumptions that help guide 
their inferential search for the speaker’s informative intention. These assumptions 
“constrain the search space that infants survey in the effort to attribute an informative 
intention to the communicator, or in other words, they implement biases that will 
influence the interpretation of ambiguous communicative acts” (Csibra 2010, p. 154). 
For example, one of the assumptions triggered (in an infant) by an adult making eye 
contact with the infant, before fixing on an object and uttering a word, is that this 
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word is being uttered with the intention on the part of the adult to refer to the object 
(and also to treat the object as a member of a general kind)76.  
If something like this proposal is true, then a form of communication exists 
that is neither code-based nor Gricean, contra Scott-Phillip (2015). Scott-Phillips 
argues that communication must be either code-based: i.e. involving no real-
time/intentional coordination between speakers and hearers; or else ‘ostensive-
inferential’: involving the expression and recognition of recursive intentional states. 
But on my way of interpreting the Csibra (2010) proposal, the available options are 
more nuanced than Scott-Phillips suggests. According to this System 1 hypothesis, 
communication requires the expression and recognition of informative intent, but not 
the expression and recognition of communicative intent. System 1 manages the 
coordination required to initiate communication successfully, but the relevant System 
1 computations manage this coordination without processing meta-representations, 
the contents of which are isomorphic with explicit descriptions of communicative 
intentions. The relevant coordination (allowing the search for relevance to be initiated 
in the hearer, for example) is due to historical coordination over phylogenetic or 
ontogenetic timescales, as opposed to the real-time coordination of intentional states. 
For example, Csibra (2010) can be taken to suggest that children are born with the 
hard-wired tendency to search for an informative intention lying behind an adult’s 
behaviour when this behaviour is preceded by, or accompanied by, ostensive 
behaviours: behaviours such as making eye contact or talking in motherese. But the 
child need not represent (in System 1) that an adult intends them to recognise that 
communication is taking place.  
Like the last proposal, the current one makes certain empirical predictions. 
Specifically, children should be able to begin communicating successfully before they 
show competence in controlled testing of implicit higher-order mindreading. As 
highlighted in Section 2.1, research is needed to determine whether the shift to 
implicit testing reduces the age at which children pass higher-order false-belief tests. If 
it turns out that young children display pragmatic competence before they show 
competence in implicit higher-order mindreading tests, the present System 1 proposal 
would be favoured over the first System 1 proposal presented in Section 2.1.  
Before summarising, where might Apperly & Butterfill’s (‘AB’) currently-
influential ‘minimal theory of mind’ fit with the current proposals for handling the 
initiation of communication via System 1? AB (Butterfill & Apperly 2013, Apperly & 
Butterfill 2009) propose a dual-system account of mindreading, drawing upon 
considerations from developmental, comparative and cognitive psychology. They 
                                                          
76 It must be noted that Csbira’s (2010) proposal is a live research program, and some of the supporting 
evidence has been challenged: see Gredebäck et al. (2018), Heyes (2016), Moore et al. (2013), and Moore 
et al. (2015). 
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propose that the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some belief-reasoning 
tasks might be explained by an efficient and relatively automatic system for tracking 
mental representations. This system is innate and runs in parallel to a more flexible, 
but slow and effortful system, of explicit theory-of-mind developing later in life. They 
are motivated by the very plausible idea that mindreading abilities are subject to 
competing demands for efficient and flexible processing. On the one hand, 
mindreading abilities must be fast enough to facilitate competitive and cooperative 
social activities in dynamic situations: like trying to figure out what your team mate 
with the ball will do upon seeing an opponent move out of position to cover you as 
you lead for the mark. On the other hand, mindreading abilities need to be flexible 
enough to facilitate explicit reasoning about action in ‘offline’ situations: like trying to 
figure out why your partner wrote ‘I’m not happy with the way things have been going 
recently’ in the note left on the kitchen bench.  
AB’s proposal is that humans possess two systems for mindreading: System 1 
which is fast, efficient and relatively automatic; System 2 which is slow, flexible and 
relatively effortful. Moreover, they see the representations involved in System 1 
mindreading as being very different in content and functional role from those 
involved in System 2 mindreading. The former representations are not isomorphic to 
language-based representations of mental states, while the latter are. Nor is the 
functional role of the relevant System 1 representations as rich and inter-linked as that 
of System 2 representations of mental states. The relevant System 1 representations of 
mental states are much less inferentially integrated with other such representations, 
which explains why processing over them is more efficient.   
Now, one might think AB’s System 1 mindreading capacities are a great 
candidate for the implicit processing of recursive communicative intent (in the vein of 
section 2.1), thereby making a Gricean account of communication tenable in the face 
of the relevant ontogenetic constraints presented in Section 1. However, here I cannot 
appeal to AB’s implicit system as a way of saving a Gricean account on this score. For, 
I argued in Section 1 that the (functionally-distinct) communicative intention must be 
recursive to do the work required of it, despite the informative intention not being 
embedded within it. AB’s implicit system for mindreading allows the likes of infants, 
chimpanzees, scrub-jays and humans under cognitive load to track others’ 
representations. But it doesn’t allow them to track others’ representations of others’ 
representations. This doesn’t mean AB’s proposal is irrelevant, however. On the 
contrary, AB’s proposed system for implicit mindreading is a perfect candidate for a 
mechanism handling the fast and efficient processing of informative intent when 
communication occurs ‘on the fly’. The proposal presented in Section 2.2 holds that 
initiating communication could be code-based (Csibra 2010), while the grasping of 
informative intent (i.e. speaker meaning) is inferential. But it is fairly clear that, in cases 
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of communication occurring ‘on the fly’, this inferential process must be fast and 
efficient. Unlike when trying to work out the meaning of your partner’s note left on 
the kitchen bench, grasping the meaning of ‘look out!’ yelled on the football field is 
not a complicated process placing heavy demands on executive control and requiring 
an exhausting search of background knowledge. Instead, you quickly take note of 
where the speaker is looking and the context, inferring unreflectively that an opponent 
is probably charging you from your right. This is a cognitive feat well within the 
bounds of AB’s implicit system77. 
Time to take stock. Post-Griceans face a puzzle when it comes to 
communication. I argued in Section 1 that a deflated picture of post-Gricean 
communication, involving functionally-distinct communicative and informative 
intentions, still requires young children to possess recursive mindreading abilities. This 
is in tension with studies of (explicit) recursive mindreading in children showing that it 
is only at age 5 or 6 that they possess 3rd-order intentionality (Miller 2009). One 
solution is to throw out the Gricean picture altogether. A second is to take seriously 
the idea that System 1 processes enable higher-order mindreading among young 
children. The last option is to posit a form of communication that lies in-between 
Gricean communication, on the one hand, and purely code-based communication, on 
the other. This kind of communication requires the expression and recognition of 
informative intent, but not necessarily the expression and recognition of 
communicative intent. Instead, the relevant coordination required to initiate 
communication could be managed by a code (i.e. natural meaning), while the means 
required to grasp the speaker’s intended message could be managed by inference and 
meta-representation.  
In what follows, I refer to the kind of meaning expressed and recognised in 
this novel form of communication ‘meaningC’ (after Csibra). On the one hand, 
meaningC is contrasted with meaningNN in not requiring meta-representational 
inference about communicative intent (whether functionally-distinct or not). On the 
other, meaningC is contrasted with natural meaning in requiring the expression and 
recognition of informative intent. However, meaningC involves more than just the 
expression and recognition of informative intent (what I will call ‘bi-intentional 
communication’: see Figure 1). With meaningC, but unlike bi-intentional 
communication, the expression and recognition of informative intent is constrained 
by the principle of relevance, or something functionally similar (like Grice’s maxims). 
Like with meaningNN, when it comes to meaningC the interpretation processes is 
aided by cognition taking the principle of relevance (or the maxims) as a constraint on 
                                                          
77 Heyes (2014, 2015) argues that it is an open question whether the implicit cognitive processes at work 
in cases like these are functionally dedicated to (an implicit form of) mindreading, as Apperly & Butterfill 
maintain, or whether they might be handled by (implicit) domain-general processes. 
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what the speaker intends by uttering. However, unlike with meaningNN, the 
processing constraints that contribute structure to the inferential search for the 
speaker’s meaningC need not be triggered by a meta-representation of communicative 
intent (see Figure 5.1 below).  
Having charted the options just outlined, I now consider where nonhuman 
primates fit in: specifically chimpanzees and old-world monkeys. Moore (2016) argues 
that chimpanzees communicate in the gestural modality motivated by both 
informative and communicative intent, placing them within the realm of meaningNN 
(Figure 5.1). Cheney and Seyfarth (2008) (also Seyfarth & Cheney 2017) argue that 
old-world monkeys express and recognise informative intent in the vocal modality, 
effectively placing them within the realm of bi-intentional communication (Figure 
5.1). I am sceptical of both appraisals. Explaining why I am sceptical will also help 
illuminate the options presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Fig 5.1 Grades of meaning, from least to most sophisticated (outside-in). Natural meaning needn’t be the 
product of intentional behaviour on the part of senders. Sometimes, however, natural meaning can be 
sent intentionally, as when I purposefully accentuate to you that I have spots by giving you a clear view of 
them. However, the recognition of natural meaning requires no meta-representation on the part of 
receivers. Bi-intentional communication requires the expression and recognition of informative intent. 
MeaningC also requires this, in addition to signalhood being indicated and recognised (but the latter, 
without meta-representation). MeaningNN requires, in addition to the expression and recognition of 
informative intent, the expression and recognition of communicative intent – whether functionally 
distinct or not. 
 
3. Ostension and inference in nonhuman primate communication 
 
- Nonhuman great apes and ostension – 
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Moore (2016) argues that when chimpanzees gesture, they express both informative 
and, more controversially, communicative intent. Chimp gestural communication is 
dual-layered in the Gricean sense. In Tomasello’s (2008, p. 22) comprehensive review, 
two basic types of (intentional) great ape gestures are described: intention-movements 
and attention-getters. Intention-movements are abbreviations of social actions (like 
playing or pulling mum’s back down to climb on it), where receivers have come to 
anticipate the sender’s behaviour over repeated instances of the interaction. For 
example, a young chimp approaches another wanting to play, raises his arm in 
preparation to play-hit the other, and then goes ahead and hits, which initiates playing. 
Over repeated instances of this, the receiver comes to learn to anticipate the sequence 
on the basis of the initial arm-raise, and so begins playing after perceiving just this first 
step. The sender, respectively, also come to anticipate the receiver’s behaviour, and so 
simply raises his arm expecting the receiver to initiate play.  
Attention-getters are different. They function to draw the receiver’s attention 
to something the sender thinks will cause the receiver to do what he (i.e. the sender) 
want. For example, male chimps wanting sex sometimes engage in ‘leaf-clipping’ 
behaviour: making sharp, loud noises (presumably with leaves) and attracting the 
attention to females to their erect penis. Attention-getters are presumably learned by 
individuals doing something for non-communicative reasons which naturally attracts 
the attention of others, a result which is noticed and then exploited in the future in the 
service of informative intent (Tomasello 2008). As an extension of their natural 
attention-getting gestures, chimps raised in captivity ‘point’ for humans who (unlike 
other chimps) are disposed to assist chimps in getting them what they want. Chimps 
point to out-of-reach food they want; to tools a passing human could use to retrieve 
the food for them (but not for tools the human could use for his own benefit); and to 
locked doors they want access behind. Chimps in zoos also clap their hands, or engage 
in other attention-getting behaviours, for human visitors so that they will be attended 
to and, hopefully, thrown food (Tomasello 2008).  
Attention-getting gestures like this would seem to show that chimps 
understand others have perceptions (loosely defined), and that they (i.e. chimps) need 
to manipulate these perceptions in the service of getting their informative intentions 
satisfied. Further, Leibal et al. (2004) found that chimpanzees (along with bonobos 
and gorillas) move into the line of sight of a potential human food donor before 
gesturing for food. In other words, the understanding chimps have of others’ 
perceptions is intentional, in the sense that chimps flexibly seek to gain the attention of 
conspecifics. As a result, chimps’ attention-getting gestures seem to be motivated by 
something quite like Gricean communicative intent. Recall me making eye-contact and 
raising my eyebrow to Rick before leaning back on my chair. This seems to be a 
behaviour with a very similar function to a chimp’s efforts at directing the attention of 
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a receiver by pointing, clapping, moving into their line of sight, or making loud noises 
for them with a leaf.   
The issue I want to raise concerns the attention-getting behaviours of chimps: 
more specifically, whether such behaviours are motivated by communicative intent78. 
Moore (2016, pp. 226-227; 2017, p. 316) argues that if S performs one action (say, 
moving into H’s line of sight) as a means of addressing a second action (say, a begging 
gesture) to H, then it is true to say that S intended1 H to recognise2 that S wanted3 
food (perhaps implicitly). I do not see a good reason to grant this conditional claim. 
This is because informative intent alone might have motivated the very same action 
on the part of S. It is just as plausible that S moves into H’s line of sight, not because 
S intended1 H to recognise2 S wanted3 food, but rather because S knew1 H must see2 
her begging gesture for it to elicit food from the human. There need be no (explicit 
nor implicit) representation on the part of S about the perspective taken by H towards 
her (i.e. S’s) intentions. All there need be is a representation of the part of S about the 
perspective taken by H towards the outward gesture: ‘Can H see1 my begging gesture?’79.  
S’s attention-getting behaviours might be performed because of an 
instrumental belief underlying informative intent alone, as opposed to anything like 
communicative intent (whether represented implicitly or explicitly). After all, if 
informative intentions are intentions, i.e. mental states that produce behaviour robustly 
sensitive to means-ends contingencies, then we should expect an animal with an 
informative intention (i.e. that a human produce food) to act in flexible ways to have 
this intention fulfilled. This, combined with findings that chimpanzees understand 
what others can and can’t perceive (Hare, Call & Tomasello 2001), gives us no reason 
to draw a necessary equivalence between attention-getting behaviours, on the one 
hand, and behaviours motivated by communicative intent over and above informative 
intent, on the other. Of course, sometimes attention-getting might be done with 
something like communicative intent. But there is no necessary equivalence between 
getting the attention of an intended receiver, on the one hand, and communicative 
intent, on the other.  
Does this mean chimps are restricted to naturally-meaningful communication, 
like fireflies? No. Chimps are not just coding and decoding signals. Senders act 
intentionally to bring about some effect in the hearer, and, crucially, hearers may be 
inferring something like the sender’s intention in gesturing. If this is true, then chimps 
                                                          
78 I argued earlier that the functionally independent communicative intention carries one more order of 
intentionality than Moore suggests, but this does not affect the current point. 
79 An even more deflationary hypothesis that would account just as well for chimpanzee acts of address is 
that S simply knows1 that she must be in front of H before begging. I.e. there need not even be an 
awareness of what others see. However, studies suggest that chimps represent, at least in some way 
(perhaps akin to our System 1 abilities in this domain), what conspecifics are attending to (Hare, Call & 
Tomasello 2001). So, while it is possible that chimps are not bringing this capacity to bear on 
communication, it seems unlikely. 
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are, at the very least, bi-intentional communicators (Figure 5.1). If indeed chimp 
gestural communication is bi-intentional, then this still sets it apart from most of the 
signalling systems considered in this thesis (including old world monkey vocal 
communication, as will be argued shortly).  
Might chimp gestural communication traffic in meaningC? This would 
depend on whether communication is ‘cooperative’, in the following sense. Are 
speakers choosing behaviours, to get what they want via communication, constrained 
by how hearers interpret? Are hearers making inferences about what speakers intend, 
guided by the expectation that speakers are so constrained? If not, then chimps won’t 
be communicating meaningC. They will be bi-intentional communicators, only. Even 
if chimps are not communicating meaningNN nor meaningC, however, the fact that 
chimps understand they need to address their communicative actions to conspecifics 
is plausibly significant. It might create the space within which meaningC and 
meaningNN develops phylogenetically. While chimp communication is not dual-
layered when it comes to its intentional basis, because it often manifests in two 
separate behaviours (attention-getting/directing and then a signal), there might be a 
solid basis here upon which meaningC or meaningNN developed. 
 
- Old-wold monkeys and inference - 
 
A recent paper called the origins of meaning in animal signals pushes continuity between 
primate communication in the vocal domain and human linguistic communication. In 
it, Seyfarth and Cheney (2017) seek to highlight ‘pragmatic’ competencies in the vocal 
comprehension abilities of old-world monkeys. One of their main case studies is the 
baboon. Baboons have rich and busy social lives, living in groups of 50-150 
individuals. Males emigrate to other groups as young adults, while females remain 
within their natal groups for life where they keep close social bonds with their 
matrilineal kin. Females are ranked in linear dominancy hierarchies that determine 
access priority to resources. Daughters acquire a status like that of their mothers. All 
members of one matriline (for instance line B) outrank or are outranked by all 
members of another matriline (i.e. C and A, respectively). The result is a set of 
relations like the following: A1>A2>A3>B1>B2>B3>C1>C2>C3, where letters 
denote matrilineal kin groups and numbers denote individuals within each kin group 
(Cheney & Seyfarth 2007). 
 Over the course of any single day, baboons hear a range of vocalization. 
Threat-grunts are an exemplar. Here, a higher-ranking individual grunts to a lower-
ranking individual. In response, the latter usually screams: a submissive signal given 
primarily by lower to higher-ranking individuals. Another vocalisation is the 
reconciliatory grunt, given after conflicts to minimise the disruptive effects of within-
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group tension. Reconciliation occurs after about 10% of all fights, and occurs when 
the dominant animal grunts to the subordinate. The typical result is that the victim will 
tolerate the approach of her former opponent, or alternatively approach her former 
opponent herself. Importantly, vocalisations are individually distinctive: receivers 
recognise the identity of senders from voice alone. Moreover, calls are given in 
predictable social contexts. As a result, baboon receivers can acquire quite specific 
information from combining a representation of who called with a representation 
about the social context in which they called. For instance, when a baboon hears a 
member of line C produce a threat-grunt which is followed by a scream from a 
member of line B, she displays much more interest than if she hears a member of line 
C scream in response to the threat-grunt of a line B member. This is presumably 
because, in the first case, she has inferred a between-family rank reversal taking place. 
Within-family rank reversals also elicit surprise, but baboons show more surprise in 
response to apparent between-family reversals. Most pertinent to the current 
discussion are observations, which, according to Seyfarth & Cheney (2011)80, show 
that baboons recognise “other individuals’ intentions and motivations”. If baboons do 
indeed recognise sender intent during communication, then this places them in the 
category of bi-intentional communicators.  
For example, when a female hears the threat-grunt of a recent opponent, she 
responds as though the grunt was “directed at” her. However, when she hears the 
same female’s threat-grunts soon after grooming with her, she acts as though the 
grunt was “directed at” a different baboon. Another example concerns reconciliatory 
grunts. As a proxy for direct reconciliation by a former opponent, baboon victims 
often accept the reconciliatory grunt of a close relative of the recent opponent. For 
example, when A2 grunts in the hour following a confrontation between C1 and A1, 
then the former victim (i.e. C1) is more likely to tolerate the approach of A1 or A2 
compared with: a) if C1 heard no grunt at all; or b) if C1 heard a grunt from another 
higher-ranking individual unrelated to the A matriline. From observations like these, 
Seyfarth & Cheney allege that baboons supplement the meagre information available 
from a signal81 with contextual information. As a result of this process of “pragmatic 
inference”, baboons infer whether the sender’s intention in grunting concerns them or 
another baboon. They draw the conclusion that “in the primate lineage, pragmatic 
inference seems likely to have served as a precursor to the evolution of semantics, 
syntax and language among humans” (Seyfarth & Cheney 2017, p. 8).  
This conclusion is outwardly like Scott-Phillips (2015), where ostensive-
inferential communication, or a ‘pragmatics-first’ picture of communication, is alleged 
to make the advent of syntax and thus human language possible. However, what is 
                                                          
80 See Cheney & Seyfarth (2007), where they also claim intention recognition is taking place. 
81 Close to the sense of natural meaning I defined in Chapter 1. 
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meant by the label ‘pragmatics’ differs significantly between Scott-Phillips, on the one 
hand, and Seyfarth & Cheney, on the other. For both parties, pragmatic interpretation 
involves inference on the part of receivers: that is, some kind of rational process 
operating over representations of information in order to reach a conclusion about the 
significance of a signal. However, in the pragmatics-first picture defended by Scott-
Phillips, the inferential process results in a representation of what the speaker 
intended by producing an utterance. When it comes to baboon pragmatics, on the 
other hand, the conclusion that the inferential process results in a representation of 
sender intent is questionable.  
Consider reconciliation grunts. There need be no inference, on the part of 
listeners, regarding who A2 intended to reconcile with her relative, A1. C1 only need 
infer what state of the world has been made more likely, given A2’s grunt and also 
C1’s recent conflict with A1: namely, that approaching A1 (or A2) will not be 
dangerous now. Consider also threat grunts. Recall that when a female hears the grunt 
of a recent opponent, she responds as though the grunt was ‘directed at’ her. 
However, when she hears the same female’s threat-grunts soon after grooming with 
her, she acts as though the grunt was ‘directed at’ a different baboon. Some kind of 
inferential process has obviously taken place here, but the conclusion of this process 
needn’t be a representation about sender intent. Instead, the conclusion could refer 
simply to the likely state of the world, given the grunt and the listener’s recent dealings 
with the sender. If the listener has recently fought with the sender, then behavioural 
evidence that she (i.e. the listener) has taken the threat grunt to be ‘directed at’ her 
does not imply meta-representation of sender intent. ‘Directed at’, in the mind of the 
listener, could just amount to ‘has ramifications for me as opposed to another 
baboon’.  
The issue is unlikely to be settled by playback experiments alone. The 
observed behavioural responses of listeners are compatible with either inference about 
sender intentions or merely inference about the state of the world. In order to 
establish which hypothesis is more likely, it might be helpful to turn to the 
mindreading abilities of monkeys more generally. A recent review (Meunier 2016) 
splits mindreading into 5 components and presents the state of play regarding each: 
gaze following, perspective-taking, attention reading, intention comprehension, and 
false-belief understanding. When it comes to gaze following, monkeys seem to 
resemble apes in following another’s gaze, particularly when the other individual is a 
conspecific. The evidence for (level 1) perspective taking in monkeys is slightly more 
“mixed”. As with chimps (e.g. Hare, Call & Tomasello 2001), there is some evidence 
that long-tailed macaques, ring-tailed lemurs, and rhesus macaques can represent what 
conspecifics are perceiving in competitive feeding paradigms, but only under certain 
experimental setups. When it comes to attention reading, monkeys can discriminate 
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gross cues like body and face orientation while chimps, in addition, possibly display 
more sensitivity to the state of the eyes. The most relevant component, intention 
comprehension, is characterised by contradicting results and “new data are eagerly 
awaited”. As of the time of the review, no monkey species has been shown to 
represent the false beliefs of others.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that more information is needed before 
classifying old-world monkeys like baboons as bi-intentional communicators (Figure 
1). There is currently no good reason to conclude that the following conjunction is 
require for successful communication: a) that senders act with informative intent 
towards receivers; and b) that receives need to infer the sender’s informative intention. 
The first conjunct seems likely, while the second is an open question. The sole fact 
that baboons engage in perhaps relatively sophisticated, domain-general, inference to 
determine the significance of vocal signals does not show that baboons infer 
informative intent. At most, receivers might be just representing a relatively wide 
range of factors in inferring the natural meaning of the signal. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on two main issues. First, ways of deflating the intentional 
requirements of post-Gricean communication in response to ontogenetic constraints. 
In Section 2, I argued that those wanting to hold on to meaningNN must take 
seriously the hypothesis that humans are born with the ability to meta-represent using 
System 1. I also made space for forms of intentional communication not involving the 
expression and recognition of communicative intent. Second, Section 3 argued that 
there is no good reason to infer from chimpanzees’ acts of address that they meanNN 
things when gesturing. Instead, chimps may be bi-intentional communicators. Despite 
this, the fact that chimps might well be attention-readers makes their communication 
an interesting precursor to human communication. I also argued that the pragmatic-
inferential abilities of old-world monkeys do not yet show them to be bi-intentional 
communicators, despite these abilities plausibly representing an important step in the 
road towards the domain-general nature of human comprehension. 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 6. The expression and recognition of intentional states is a crucial component in explaining 
how human beings express and recognise speaker meaning. But what is the explanatory status of 
intentional states? Can intentional states feature in genuine cognitive explanations of some capacity, 
like communication? What is the relationship between intentional explanation and cognitive 
explanation? 
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Chapter 6 
The Explanatory Status of Intentional Psychology 
 
 
The main posits in post-Gricean explanations of communication are intentional states. 
Chapters 4 and 5 referred to ‘communicative’ and ‘informative’ intentions, although 
some have different labels for these intentions. However, the main issue is the 
structure and role of these intentions in successful communication, and also the 
consequences of this structure for the meta-psychological requirements of 
communication. A range of researchers agree on one fundamental point: that Grice’s 
analysis of meaningNN revealed some of the key psychological capacities necessary 
for communication (Moore 2017; 2016, Scott-Phillips 2015, Tomasello 2008, Sperber 
& Wilson 1995; 2002). The capacities identified by Grice’s analysis explain pragmatic 
aspects of communication, and anything less than this intentional structure fails to 
produce the kind of communication humans engage in: i.e. the communication of 
meaningNN as opposed to natural meaning. What some researchers disagree on are 
the finer details of this intentional structure: whether communicative and informative 
intent must be entwined in a single intentional state, i.e. where the content of the latter 
is embedded in the former (Scott-Phillips 2015, Sperber & Wilson 2002); or whether 
communicative and informative intent can be functionally distinct (Moore 2017). This 
difference is important because of its ramifications for the meta-psychological 
demands of communicating meaningNN. If communicative intent can be functionally 
distinct from informative intent, then somewhat less recursive mindreading is required 
by interlocutors. This, in turn, is important because of its ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic implications (as outlined in the previous chapter).  
In Chapter 5, I examined the meta-psychological demands of communicating 
meaningNN, assuming communicative intent and informative intent are functionally 
distinct as suggested by Moore (2017). However, I parted ways with Moore on the 
structure of the communicative intention. I did this because of the role of the 
communicative intention in signalling signalhood, and thus relevance (or something 
functionally similar). Here, again, is the intentional structure I proposed: 
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1. Are signals produced by senders intending to elicit a particular response from a 
receiver? If so, does the receiver recognise the sender’s intention?  
➢ This criterion concerns the informative intention  
2. Do senders intend their audience to recognise that they are communicating? If so, 
does the receiver recognise that the sender intends them to recognise this? 
➢ This criterion concerns the functionally-independent communicative 
intention 
 
As discussed, if these abilities are indeed required for communicating meaningNN 
then it doesn’t sit comfortably with the idea that children can communicate 
successfully before they succeed in recursive mindreading. One option is to give up 
altogether on Grice as explaining communication. If meaningNN is so closely tethered 
to an intentional structure beyond the capabilities of young children who 
communicate, then in giving up this intentional structure we are giving up on 
meaningNN. The transition from natural meaning to meaningNN will not be the 
transition from nonhuman to human communication82. Perhaps, as suggested in 
Section 1 of Chapter 4, the post-Gricean approach took an analysis that was not 
intended to be explanatory in the wrong direction.  
In response, I explored a less pessimistic route. Even if meaningNN is strictly 
speaking outside of the capabilities of young children (and also our closest living 
ancestors), I argued that human communication, at its simplest, may involve the 
expression and recognition of informative intent alone: where this process may be 
assisted by the activation of certain communicative assumptions using ostensive 
signals (Csibra 2010). For instance, simply hearing you utter an English sentence 
might prime me to search for the relevance of your linguistic action, making it easier 
for me to infer your informative intention from your outward behaviour. But there is 
no reason to demand that my response is a product of meta-representing 
communicative intent. Likewise, a child being addressed in motherese might attempt 
to fill the placeholder of an informative intention. But this need not be the result of 
the child recognising1 that S intends2 H to recognise3 that communication is occurring. 
Instead, motherese just needs to prime H to search for informative intent, via a code 
(i.e. a naturally-meaningful signal). This represents a form of communication standing 
midway between purely coded communication, on the one hand, and Gricean non-
natural meaning, on the other. I also presented a second form of communication that 
is neither purely code-based nor meaningfulNN. It involves the expression and 
recognition of informative intent, without ostensive signals. I called it ‘bi-intentional 
communication’. On the options presented in Chapter 5, then, there are grades of 
                                                          
82 Nor will it represent the transition from code-based communication to something resembling human 
communication, if one thinks this transition occurred earlier. 
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speaker meaning. There is the kind of speaker meaning plausibly expressed and 
recognised by chimps in their bi-intentional communication. Then there are kinds of 
meaning humans express and recognise, if indeed communication is ‘cooperative’ in 
the sense that speakers and hearers are (perhaps implicitly) constrained by something 
like the principle of relevance: meaningC and meaningNN.  
 
1. Accounts of intentional mental states 
 
I now want to change tact and raise a more fundamental issue. The issue is the 
explanatory status of intentionality. This issue has major implications for the kinds of 
speaker meaning just discussed. All rely heavily on the theoretical posit of 
intentionality. However, there are mutually-inconsistent ways of understanding 
intentionality in the philosophical literature. Some philosophers hold a very permissive 
view of intentionality. Alternatively, some hold a very demanding view of 
intentionality ruling out non-linguistic organisms as having intentional states. Put 
simply: what is intentionality (or, what I take to be equivalent: what is an intentional 
mental state)? Intentional states are commonly taken to be belief-desire pairs, and 
beliefs and desires are folk states. Crucially, how folk-psychological explanations of 
behaviour involving beliefs and desires interface with cognitive explanations of 
behaviour is not straightforward. In fact, it is perhaps the most fundamental issue in 
the philosophy of psychology (Bermudez 2005).  
One kind of response to the interface problem takes folk-psychological states 
to correspond quite directly to cognitive states, such that folk states are genuinely 
explanatory of behaviour. This view posits a significant isomorphism or ‘image’ of the 
propositional attitudes in the structure of cognition. It proposes a type-type reduction 
of folk-psychological states to cognitive states (but not typically neural states). Fodor’s 
representational theory of mind (RTM) is a paradigm example of such a view. 
According to Fodor’s RTM, the states that drive thought and behaviour from the 
perspective of the cognitive sciences are structurally isomorphic, on a suitable level of 
abstraction, to the linguistic descriptions we give of beliefs and desires. This is why 
Fodor’s RTM is called the ‘language of thought’. 
On the other end of the spectrum lies Dennett’s response to the interface 
problem83. Dennett is prepared to attribute beliefs and desires to any system in which 
doing so allows us to predict its behaviour more powerfully than we could from the 
functional and physical stances alone. If we benefit from considering what it would be 
rational for the system to do given its function(s) plus its source(s) of information 
about the world, then the system in question has beliefs and desires. However, in 
                                                          
83 Davidson and McDowell’s responses to the interface problem also lie on this end. 
123 
 
classifying some system as a belief-desire/intentional system, Dennett is not 
attributing discrete states driving thought and behaviour and corresponding to 
linguistic representations of belief and desires. There is no type-type reduction of folk 
psychological states to cognitive states. Instead, the relevant beliefs and desires are 
“emergent” upon a complex conglomerate of cognitive states that might bear no 
correspondence to a belief-desire explanation of behaviour. Think of how a bird flies 
without internally representing aerodynamics. Similarly, according to Dennett, agents 
act rationally (or semi-rationally) without internally representing beliefs and desires. In 
between a Fodorian response to the interface problem on the one hand and a 
Dennettian response on the other lie various forms of functionalism. 
Somewhat congruent with these different responses to the interface problem 
are different views on the ontology of intentionality. We will start with the most 
minimal account of intentionality. Dennett holds that an organism is an intentional 
agent just in case the strategy of taking that organism to be an agent is needed to 
predict its behaviour. This is taking the intentional stance. Taking the organism to be an 
agent, or assuming the intentional stance towards the organism, involves attempting to 
predict its behaviour by attributing to it proposition attitudes (beliefs and desires). But 
by doing so one is not attributing (discrete) internal states to the system. Instead, one is 
simply attributing course-grained aptitudes for world-directed behavioural patterns 
(Dennett 1992, Matthews 2007). More precisely, one is not making a claim about 
internal cognitive states beyond committing to the idea that there is something going on 
giving rise to the relevant behavioural patterns84. What are these behavioural patterns? 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, they involve the ability to pursue the same end via 
different means, and different ends via the same means. In short: behavioural 
resilience. An intentional system can act (fairly) adaptively if the environment is 
tweaked somewhat. When a system can do this, according to Dennett, then taking the 
intentional stance over and above the physical and design stances becomes necessary. 
Essentially, attributing intentionality is a claim about a specific kind of capacity, as 
opposed to how that capacity is mechanically supported.  
Next up is the most demanding view of intentionality: what I will label The 
Higher-Order Deliberation View (HOD). According to HOD, only organisms 
meeting two criteria perform intentional actions (Arruda & Povinelli 2016). The first is 
the one outlined immediately above: the ability to pursue the same end via different 
means, and different ends via the same means. Second, the view requires higher-order 
deliberation: the ability to explicitly represent one’s goals as one’s goals to evaluate, 
                                                          
84 It is important to note that one can perfectly well be a representationalist about subpersonal cognitive 
states while taking the intentional stance to be the appropriate attitude towards folk psychological states 
like beliefs and desires: e.g. Cummins 1989. In other words, while beliefs and desires might not be 
syntactically structure mental representations, the complex behavioural patterns that warrant taking the 
intentional stance might be caused by syntactically structured presentations at the subpersonal level. 
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rank, or otherwise reason about them. An important qualification to the last 
requirement is needed, however, to make this view of intentionality credible. Much 
human behaviour occurs in the absence of higher-order deliberation about what one is 
doing. But this doesn’t mean such behaviour is on par with non-intentional behaviour 
like reflexive behaviours (Brownstein 2014). Take the highly skilled movements of a 
professional pianist’s hands over the keyboard. Such movements are intentional, even 
though, while the movements were executed, there was no higher-order deliberation 
going on. Why are the pianist’s movements intentional? Because he could probably 
give reasons for his movements, after the fact. Even if he was not explicitly reasoning 
about his movements while making them, he could explain why he made those 
movements to anyone who asked after the concert85. One plausible moral to take 
from this relates to our second criteria for intentional behaviour. Instead of requiring 
actual deliberation, it should instead require actual or counterfactual deliberation. On this 
view, a behaviour is intentional if the individual did, or could have, engaged in higher-
order deliberation about that behaviour (Brownstein 2014). 
The last account of intentionality to be considered is based on a Fodorian 
RTM: i.e. a representation theory of mind that is representational in virtue of a 
language of thought (LoT). Some versions of RTM invoke maps as their 
representational entities, as opposed to sentences of Mentalese (Braddon-Mitchell & 
Jackson 1996, Camp 2007, Rescorla 2009). This kind of RTM will not be addressed 
here, though, partially for reasons of space and partially because they are worked out 
in less detail. Thus, when I refer to RTM in what follows, I mean an RTM where the 
representational vehicles are linguistically structured.  
Intentionally, on RTM, does not require higher-order deliberation: neither 
actual nor counterfactual. It is less demanding. But it is more demanding than 
Dennett’s intentional stance. Saying a system has an intentional state (i.e. a belief or a 
desire), on RTM, is saying that it possesses an internal representation, the vehicle of 
which is structurally isomorphic with the content of an applicable propositional 
attitude report of the belief/desire86. An example of a propositional attitude report is 
the statement Smith believes Pink Floyd were better than The Beatles. Here, belief is the 
attitude reportedly taken by Smith towards the proposition that Pink Floyd were 
better than The Beatles. Another propositional attitude might be Smith wishes Pink 
Floyd were better than The Beatles. Here, desire is the relevant attitude reportedly taken by 
Smith towards the same proposition: the proposition that Pink Floyd were better than 
                                                          
85 For instance: ‘I shifted my posture after the exposition section in preparation for the rapid trill 
beginning high up the treble range in the development section’. 
86 When one appreciates the richness of human language, the idea that the isomorphism obtains between, 
say, English propositional attitudes reports and representations in LoT becomes questionable. It is 
plausible that Fodor had in mind something like Chomsky’s distinction between surface structure and 
deep structure, where the isomorphism grounding intentional mental states obtains between the deep 
structure of English (or Chinese) propositional attitude reports and representations in LoT. 
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The Beatles. This makes sense of the intuition that agents can take different attitudes 
towards the same proposition. Moreover, agents can take the same attitude towards 
different propositions, like when Smith believes the above proposition in addition to 
believing The Beatles were nevertheless a great band. Now, if Smith indeed believes 
the proposition that Pink Floyd… etc, on RTM, then he possesses an internal mental 
representation, the structure of which is isomorphic to the content Pink Floyd were 
better than The Beatles. Moreover, this mental representation must play the kind of 
functional role characteristic of belief. Alternatively, if Smith desires the same 
proposition, then he possesses an internal mental representation, the structure of 
which is isomorphic to the content Pink Floyd were better than The Beatles, where this 
representation carries out the functional role characteristic of desire. In short: when 
someone believes that Pink Floyd were better than The Beatles, the content of that 
belief is realised by an internal structure that is the vehicle of it’s content in the same 
way as the meaning of the sentence ‘Pink Floyd were better than The Beatles’ is 
realized by the structure of the inscription (Bermudez 2005). 
Crucially, the organism need not explicitly represent the content of its 
belief/desire for it to be an intentional agent. The belief or desire could be tokened 
‘implicitly’. What is meant by the ‘implicit’ tokening of a belief or desire, on RTM? 
One plausible answer is to attribute ‘implicitly’ held belief to anyone possessing a 
discrete, syntactically structured representation serving as the vehicle of the belief, but 
where the agent is not engaged in higher-order deliberation about this belief. Further, 
the representation serving as the vehicle of the belief must possess the functional role 
of belief: it can’t be a representation isolated in early visual processing, for example. A 
second plausible answer is to attribute the ‘implicitly’ held belief that p to anyone who 
hasn’t tokened an applicable, syntactically-structured, mental representation, but who 
could easily infer p from those syntactically-structured representations he or she has 
tokened. For instance, folk psychological intuition tells us that that, plausibly, Donald 
Trump believes the earth is larger than an average pickle. However, Trump probably 
doesn’t possess, at all times, a syntactically-structured representation with this content, 
playing the functional role of belief. Instead, it is relatively easy for Trump to infer 
such a belief from those syntactically-structured representations he is tokening, at any 
one time. Contrast this to the belief that Bertrand Russell but not David Lewis 
thought propositions are structured. Trump surely doesn’t implicitly believe this. On 
RTM, this is because a) Trump isn’t tokening a syntactically-structured representation 
playing the belief role with this content; and because b) Trump cannot infer this belief 
from those syntactically-structured representations that he is tokening, at any one 
time. 
Despite their differences, each of the three broad accounts of intentionality 
just mentioned endorse the following idea. The idea is that intentional behaviour 
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contrasts with the kinds of reflexive behaviours described by Tinbergen as hard-wired 
‘releasers’. It also contrasts with behaviour learned via simple forms of stimulus-
response conditioning and classical conditioning, at least on ‘non-cognitive’ accounts 
of such learning processes (Holland 2008). Hard-wired responses to stimuli acquired 
either by natural selection or via simple, non-cognitive, forms of learning are 
commonly seen as non-responsive to how the organism represents the connection 
between means and ends: i.e. rational or proto-rational representational abilities. 
This conceptual connection between intentionality on the one hand and 
rationality on the other can be seen in Heyes and Dickinson’s (1995) critique of the 
idea that cognitive maps are genuine intentional states in the psychology of an 
organism: 
 
How would we ever know whether… the “cognitive map” of a bee has intentional 
properties (for the… bee, rather than the human observer) unless it can control 
behaviour that is rational with respect to the content of these states? It is not 
sufficient to appeal to the adaptiveness of the behaviour because the rationality that 
matters with respect to intentionality is that of the psychological processes of the 
individual agent, not of the evolutionary process. 
 
From this we also get a distinction between rationality derived from evolutionary 
processes and rationality derived from the individual agent itself, in real-time (see also 
Allen & Bekoff 1997). Dennett, too, endorses this distinction and characterises it as 
one between ‘free-floating’ rationality on the one hand, and rationality for the agent 
on the other. I think it is safe to say, that for the three views of intentionality 
discussed above, the ‘rationality’ required of intentional behaviour must be rationality 
for the agent itself. The three views simply tell different stories about what gives rise 
to rationality for the agent itself. On the modest side, Dennettians who simply require 
flexible, goal-orientated behaviour are relatively non-committal on what gives rise to 
rationality for the agent. The kind of representations could be highly distributed, or 
they could be discrete and syntactic. On the least modest side are those who require 
higher-order deliberation. Occupying the middle ground is a broadly Fodorian 
position: agent-level rationality derives from discrete beliefs and desires guiding 
behaviour appropriately, even if implicitly. 
In what follows, I consider the explanatory status of notions of speaker 
meaning assuming RTM, on the one hand, and then the intentional stance, on the 
other. I leave behind the HOD view of intentionality. This is because, if intentionality 
requires higher-order deliberation, then the intentional demands of communication 
are automatically increased. If, in order to harbour the informative intention that Rick 
look over there, I must be able to meta-represent my goal, then I must not only intend 
that Rick look over there: I must also consider (or be able to consider) that I desire 
Rick to look over there. Basically, any problems about the intentional requirements of 
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broadly Gricean accounts of communication will be multiplied: by one order of 
intentionality, to be precise.  
Another potential issue with the HOD view is that it seems to require 
intentional agents to possess concepts about representations: concepts like desire. If 
this is the case, then individuals without such concepts will not harbour genuine 
intentional states, and hence won’t be genuine communicators, on broadly Gricean 
views. Perhaps it might be suggested that individuals represent their own mental states 
in the absence of concepts of these mental states. Apperly & Butterfill’s ‘minimal 
theory of mind’ (mToM) comes to mind, here. However, mToM is explicitly not a 
cognitive system that represents mental states as such. Rather, it represents proxy 
states that track, in the right circumstances, mental states like believing, perceiving and so 
on. The states it represents are labelled ‘registrations’ and ‘encounterings’ and are not 
mental states as such. Moreover, Apperly & Butterfill nowhere suggest that mToM 
tracks the subject’s own mental states. There are no representations of one’s own 
registrations or encounterings, generated in mToM. You register, but you do not 
register that you register. Rather, mToM is a system for the circumscribed tracking of 
others’ mental states based on cues like gaze direction. Even if mToM could represent 
proxies for one’s own mental states, though, it is questionable whether this would 
enable the kind of higher-order deliberation about one’s own goals required by a 
HOD view of intentionality. It is one thing to represent a proxy state that tracks a 
mental state in certain bounded circumstances. It is another to deliberate about this 
proxy state for the purpose of evaluation, raking, or otherwise reasoning about it. 
Arguably, the latter requires concepts of mental states as such. Registrations and 
encounterings are not propositional attitudes, because (among other things) they do 
not possess the rich inferential and causal connections with inputs, other mental 
states, and outputs characteristic of beliefs and desires (Apperly & Butterfill 2009). It 
is because registrations and encounterings are not represented as having such rich 
causal relations that processing over them is fast and efficient. Thus, because these 
proxy states don’t connect rationally with inputs, other mental states, and outputs, it is 
hard to conceive of a process of deliberation over such states that is in the spirit of a 
higher-order deliberation view of intentionality. 
A yet further issue with HOD is that it may require intentional agents to 
possess language. There is some debate about whether higher-order thought requires 
language (see, for instance, Botterill & Carruthers 1999). One of the reasons for 
thinking that it does includes the above-mentioned consideration. That is, it is difficult 
to conceive of what higher-order thought might be in the absence of concepts of 
mental states as such. And one natural position to take is that concepts of mental 
states as such come to us through language. Before we are enculturated into language, 
we might have representations of proxies for mental states, but such representations 
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will not be of states that get deliberated about. There are other reasons that have led 
philosophers of psychology (e.g. Dennett 1991) to propose that higher-order thought 
requires language. They will lead me too far afield here. Suffice it to say that if HOD 
requires language, then it will not be applicable to theories of communication evoking 
intentional states in explaining communication.    
 
2. Trying out RTM 
 
Psychological notions of speaker meaning are hostage to the interface problem. How 
do they fair under RTM? There is a straightforward sense in which these kinds of 
meaning will be genuinely explanatory if the relation between folk-psychological 
explanation and cognitive explanation is one of type-type reduction. Assume, 
plausibly, that a model of some target system is explanatory to the degree it 
decomposes a system-level function into component functions. If, as RTM states, 
intentional states correspond nicely to internal components of a cognitive system, 
then accounts of communication leaning heavily on intentional states will be 
explanatory. Of course, the issue of abstraction looms large here. Obviously, beliefs 
and desires are not found at the neural level on RTM. Even still, on RTM the 
propositional attitudes are not mere patterns of behaviour, as they are on the 
intentional stance. Rather, they are discrete states internal to the cognitive system at a 
suitable level of abstraction, in the same way data structures are internal states of a 
computer at a suitable level of abstraction.  
However, there is a potential worry one might have here, given the view of 
RTM held by Fodor. For Fodor, RTM is a view about central cognition. RTM finds a 
home for folk psychology in the scientific image of the mind by positing a type-type 
reduction of propositional attitudes to states of central cognition. Input systems, like 
vision or language, might themselves operate over linguistically structured 
representations (modular LoTs), but propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires 
find their ‘image’ in the LoT of central cognition, as opposed to the LoTs of modular 
input systems (Fodor 1983, Bermudez 2005). This makes sense from the perspective 
of folk psychology. From this perspective, beliefs and desires are states bearing 
rational relations with each other and with a range of other intentional states. When 
Jones learns of the first time that his father was, in fact, a spy, this new belief has 
ramifications for a wide range of his beliefs and desires. Compare this new belief to 
Jones’s mental representation of an edge located in his early visual system. Unlike the 
new belief about his father which sends shock waves throughout his whole mental 
life, a representation of an edge in the visual system has very little, if any, cognitive 
ramifications.  
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Now, If the propositional attitudes are restricted to central cognition, then we 
are obliged to posit that much of the work of speaker meaning expression and 
recognition takes place in central cognition. This presents a potential problem. If, as 
dual-system theorists commonly conceive of things, all central processing is identified 
with System 2, then the expression and recognition of intentions will inherit the 
properties commonly ascribed to System 2 processing. It will be conscious, controlled, 
effortful, slow, reflective, and demanding of cognitive capacity (Evans 2008, Stanovich 
2004). However, it is unlikely that everyday episodes of communication involve the 
expression and recognition of informative and communicative intent in a way that is 
conscious, effortful, and reflective (etc.). Likewise, the communication of young 
children. What about intermediary forms of meaning: those lying in between code-
based and Gricean communication, requiring the expression and recognition of 
informative intent, but not communicative intent? It is plausibly less of a stretch to 
posit that the expression and recognition of informative intent, alone, always takes 
place consciously, with effort, and reflectively. Yet even this is problematic. 
Introspection coheres with the idea that a great deal of communication occurs swiftly, 
effortlessly, and during other activity placing demands on reflective/executive 
cognitive processes: in other words, that it is a paradigmatic System 1 ability.  
Imagine I am driving home from work and accidently cut off one of my 
fellow drivers while changing lanes. He leans out the window and utters an imperative 
sentence which, in line to the post-Gricean picture, causes me to infer his informative 
intention: that I procreate with myself87. However, him inferring the best action to 
produce so I accurately infer his informative intent is not slow, effortful, and under 
executive control. Likewise, my inference about his informative intention from his 
utterance and the context. This is not slow, effortful, and under executive control. The 
speaker’s message seems entirely ‘transparent’ to me: as transparent as Gibsonians 
think perception is.  
The analogy with perception might be useful here. Just like perception, 
communication might be ‘inferential’ without the relevant inferences taking place in 
central cognition. But if S’s inference regarding the best action to produce so I 
correctly infer his message is not a central process, then in what sense is S expressing 
an informative intention? For intentions are belief-desires pairs, and beliefs and desires 
are states of central cognition on a Fodorian RTM: 
 
 Belief: ‘if I utter X then H will infer my desire that he procreates with himself’  
 Desire: ‘I want H to think that he should procreate with himself’ 
 Intention: Utter X! 
 
                                                          
87 Or perhaps, via implicature, that I feel insulted. 
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Likewise, if I am not making inferences about central cognitive states of the speaker, 
then in what sense am I inferring S’s informative intention? It seems coherent to posit 
that the recognition of informative intent might occur outside of central cognition. 
Domain-specific processes in hearers might be equipped to represent domain-general 
states of speakers. However, it is less coherent to posit that the expression of 
informative intent (in speakers) takes place outside of central cognition. This is not to 
say that every kind of internal motivational state is necessarily domain-general and 
inferentially connected to a suite of other mental states. But if such motivational states 
are not domain general, then they can’t be belief-desire pairs, at least on a Fodorian 
RTM. In other words they can’t be intentional states. This means that speakers aren’t 
always expressing intentions. Concomitantly, it means that hearers aren’t always 
recognising intentions. This is problematic for the post-Griceans and others wishing 
to explain human communication by appealing to intentions. If a model of 
communication purports to explain communication by referring to the expression and 
recognition of intentions, then there is a problem if communication does not always 
involve the expression and recognition of actual intentions. 
The worry is premature, however, as not all central cognition need be System 
2-like. Fodor himself (1983, p. 104) thought the bulk of central processing, looking, as 
it does, “at what the input systems deliver… [looking] at what is in memory, and 
[using] this information to constrain the computation of ‘best hypotheses’ about what 
the world is like”, is “largely unconscious”. Exposition aside, there is no independent 
reason to think that all central processing must possess System 2 properties, as related 
by dual-systems theory. Thus, the expression and recognition of intentions relevant to 
quotidian communication (and communication among young children) might well 
take place in central cognition, on RTM.  
It would be nice to finish off Section 2 here, concluding that post-Gricean 
and other accounts of communication employing a psychological notion of speaker 
meaning, are explanatory on RTM. However, we must address a further, important, 
issue. The issue relates closely to the preceding discussion. Some prominent post-
Griceans don’t think there is a central cognitive system (Sperber & Wilson 2002; 
Scott-Phillips 2015). The mental architecture envisaged by these theorists is massively 
modular in nature (e.g. Carruthers 2006). Thus, intention expression and recognition 
must be the work of domain-specific modules, according to these theorists. But, as we 
have just seen, the mental states that comprise intentions (namely, beliefs and desires) 
are not domain-specific mental states, at least paradigmatically. Rather, they are 
domain-general states possessing inferential relations with each of the subject’s other 
beliefs and desires. This raises at least two questions. First, how can the idea of 
modular beliefs and desires be made good? Second, how might the expression and 
recognition of intentions be realised in a wholly modular cognitive system? Answering 
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the first question is relatively simple, resting on the functional role of certain mental 
representations within a massively-modular architecture. The answer to the second is 
not as simple. Drawing on Carruthers (2006), I will offer a crude how-possibly model 
of intention expression and recognition within a massively-modular RTM. The model 
is intended to show simply that post-Gricean and related forms of speaker meaning 
are explanatory within a massively-modular RTM. There is no in-principle conflict 
between being committed to massive modularity, on the one hand, and being a post-
Gricean (or one who deflates Gricean speaker-meaning), on the other. 
 
~ Massively modular RTM, intentional psychology, and the expression and recognition of speaker 
meaning ~ 
 
What kind of mental state is a belief within a massively-modular architecture? A belief 
will be any syntactically-structured mental representation with the right kind of 
causal/functional role. What is the ‘right kind’ of causal/functional role, for belief, 
within a massively-modular architecture? A modular representation will be a belief if it 
can potentially interact with motivational states in the process of action planning88. On 
Carruthers’ (2006, p. 66) preliminary model of a plausible massively-modular 
architecture of cognition, desires are syntactically-structured representations 
competing for entry into action-planning modules (of which there are many). When a 
desire gains entry into an action planning module, the latter queries a restricted range 
of information-storage modules to devise an action schema to be passed onto the 
motor control system and drive behaviour. Beliefs are representations in these 
information-storage modules, used by the action planning system to devise an action 
schema that might result in the fulfilment of the initial desire. Desires, for their part, 
are representations triggering action planning systems to query information-storage 
modules so that the former systems devise action schemas relevant the satisfaction of 
the initial desires. It is vital to note that, just as there are many action-planning 
modules, there are many belief-generating and desire-generating modules, with 
individual action-planning modules connected to one or a limited number of belief-
generating modules and desire-generating modules. If there was simply one belief-
generating system and one-desire generating system, then the overall architecture 
would not be very modular-like. 
 
 
                                                          
88 So, what separates beliefs from representations of the world more generally is that the former are 
available to action planning while phonetic representations (say), or representations of edges in the visual 
scene (say), are not. 
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Fig 6.1 A first-pass model of a massively-modular mind without language, from Carruthers (2006). 
 
We can think of intentional states, such as the informative intention that Rick believe 
the proposition it’s raining, as a representation in the action planning module that 
results from an initial desire [for Rick to believe it’s raining] triggering the module into 
operation, causing it to query available belief-generating modules in the process of 
generating an instrumentally-appropriate action schema (e.g. pointing at the rainy sky 
for Rick). This action schema is then passed onto the motor control system. Relevant 
beliefs drawn upon by the initial action-planning module might be memories of how 
getting people to think that it’s raining worked in the past. In addition to 
representations contained in memory, beliefs can be representations in any conceptual 
module (such as a mind reading module) that are drawn upon in the production of 
action schemas by action-planning modules. For instance, the action planning module 
activated by the desire [that Rick think that it’s raining] might query a mindreading 
module to generate a representation of what Rick will likely infer upon his attention 
being directed towards the sky. 
Of course, when communication involves language, our model will need to be 
enriched to include modules dedicated to linguistic production and comprehension. 
Carruthers’ (2006, p. 233) more expansive model of the massively-modular mind is 
presented below in Figure 6.2. Not only are language modules now present, action 
planning has been expanded to include a practical reasoning module in addition to a 
module producing action schemas. Moreover, a feedback loop allowing for the mental 
rehearsal of action schema is included. This will become relevant (later) as a model of 
how the expression and recognition of intentions might operate reflectively, slowly, 
and under executive control (i.e. System 2). For now the feedback loop can be 
ignored. 
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Fig 6.2 A massively-modular model of a mind with language, from Carruthers (2006). 
 
When producing linguistic utterances in the pursuit of one’s communicative goals, the 
core of the process is much the same as outlined previously. One’s desire [for Rick to 
believe that it’s raining] triggers a module (this time depicted as a practical reasoning 
module) querying a restricted range of belief-generating modules to devise a first-pass 
action schema so that Rick will believe it is raining. What is new, this time around, is 
that linguistic knowledge is used, in addition to memories and mindreading 
information (i.e. information in belief-generating modules). The flow of information 
beginning with the practical reasoning module and ending in action schema generation 
goes through the language production module. As a result, the action schema 
produced is linguistic in nature (the utterance ‘Look! It’s raining!’).  
This is how informative intentions might be produced, causing 
communicative behaviours in speakers in a way which is fast automatic and relatively 
effortless (i.e. System 1). But how might the recognition of informative intentions go, 
in hearers? And, additionally, how might informative intentions be expressed and 
recognised in System 2 fashion? For, despite most communication being relatively 
unreflective and automatic, there are instances where speakers devote great care and 
cognitive effort to expressing their meaning, and where hearers devote great care and 
effort in inferring speaker meaning. First, the recognition of informative intent in 
hearers. 
The process starts with the hearer’s perceptual modules encountering visual 
or verbal stimuli of the speaker’s pointing gesture and/or utterance. Take the non-
verbal signal first. As with all perceptual information, visual information about the 
speaker’s pointing gesture is globally broadcast to the whole suite of conceptual (belief 
and desire) modules. If this perceptual information falls within the input domain of a 
conceptual module, the latter will be activated. One module(s) kicked into gear will be 
the hearer’s mindreading modules(s). Mind reading modules will be activated upon the 
perception of any kind action carried out by another agent, whether communicative or 
not, in order to determine the agent’s goal. However, if the speaker has produced 
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signals indicative of communication (Csibra 2010), then one of the conceptual 
modules kicked into gear might be the hearer’s relevance submodule (Sperber & 
Wilson 20002), which, if the speaker acted in line with the principle of relevance, 
enables the hearer to infer the speaker’s informative intention/meaning. The hearer’s 
representation of the speaker’s informative intention is then stored as a belief (in the 
massively-modular sense) in memory. When the speaker’s communicative action is 
linguistic, the process will, in addition, involve language modules. Perceptual 
information about the speaker’s verbal behaviour is passed to the language 
comprehension module, which then queries linguistic knowledge, in addition to the 
mindreading module(s) and relevance sub-module, before issuing a belief representing 
the speaker’s meaning (or something close enough). 
As noted just above, some episodes of communication are not System 1 
processes. Sometimes, speakers devote great care and cognitive effort in expressing 
their meaning, such as when my partner writes a breakup letter she leaves on the 
kitchen bench. Likewise, hearers sometimes devote great care and effort in inferring 
speaker meaning, like when I pour over each sentence in the breakup letter. How 
might a massively-modular architecture enable reflective, System 2, forms of 
communication? This is where the feedback loop in our model of the massively-
modular mind enters in picture. According to Carruthers (2006), System 2 reasoning is 
not the product of a single, domain-general, cognitive mechanism, like Fodor’s central 
system. Instead, System 2 processing is realised by cycles of domain-specific modular 
cognition: the creation and mental rehearsal of action schema, where many of these 
actions are linguistic: i.e. episodes of ‘inner speech’89.  
Action schema rehearsal takes place when practical reasoning issues 
intentions to one of the individual’s action schema modules, but where this action 
schema is then fed back to perceptual modules instead of forward to motor control 
modules. Since perceptual modules broadcast their information to the whole suite of 
conceptual modules, rehearsed action schemas can trigger conceptual modules not 
responsible for initially creating the action schema. Sometimes, the language 
production system is queried in the creation of offline action schemas. This results in 
episodes of inner speech. Inner speech is a particularly powerful form of action 
schema rehearsal, on Carruthers’ model. This is because language production can 
conjoin representations generated in a range of different conceptual modules. What 
results is a verbal action schema that cuts across domains, and which is then fed back 
into the entire cognitive system to be processed by the various domain-specific 
modules.  
                                                          
89 Although not exclusively: the mental rehearsal of visual imagery plausibly plays a role in System 2 
thinking.   
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How might the System 2 expression of informative intentions work? Take the 
utterance “your eyes are like sapphire”, spoken to your date. Imagine your utterance is 
the result of explicit reflection aimed at influencing your date to kiss you. That is, your 
informative intention is not to instil the belief in your date that her eyes are literally 
like sapphire. Instead, your informative intention is the initiation of a kiss. We can 
model the process as follows. First, an initial verbal action schema is created off the 
back of a desire to kiss. This involves the desire to kiss triggering your practical 
reasoning module to consult a limited range of conceptual, belief-generating, modules 
as well as your language production module. A verbal action schema might then be 
chosen, for instance, “can I kiss you?”. However, instead of being passed to motor 
modules, and being uttered out loud, the (verbal) action schema of this utterance is 
taken offline and fed back to your perceptual modules. As a result, it is globally 
broadcast to all your conceptual modules, a process that is experienced as an episode 
of inner speech. 
The offline rehearsal of verbal action schemas, or inner speech, provides a 
plausible mechanism for how you could predict the likely consequences of saying “can 
I kiss you?”. Conceptual modules, such as mindreading, receive a representation of 
this utterance, and generate, for instance, the prediction that you would find this too 
direct. This then sets off a whole new cycle of action planning. This process might be 
repeated n number of times before the verbal action schema “your eyes are like 
sapphire” is sent to your motor modules to be uttered out loud. What the offline 
rehearsal of verbal action schemas contributes to cognitive processing is not only 
multiple cycles of modular processing, and thus planning refinement, but also the 
recruitment of conceptual modules not involved in the initial cycle of action planning 
(the one responsible for the verbal action scheme asking directly for a kiss). 
What about the System 2 recognition of informative intentions? On 
Carruthers’ model, your date perceives your utterance and this information is fed to 
her language comprehension module. After a semantic representation of the literal 
meaning of your utterance is generated there, it is fed to the conceptual modules, 
including mindreading and the relevance sub-module within mindreading. Now, 
assume that, for some reason, mindreading and relevance cannot deliver a clear 
verdict. System 1 inference of your meaning is not able to infer a clear informative 
intention with just one cycle of modular processing. Is it your intention just to 
complement, or something more? As a result, a verbal action schema is generated: 
“What on earth does ‘your eyes are like sapphire’ mean?!”. This is fed back to the 
perceptual modules and globally broadcast to the whole suite of conceptual modules 
after being decoded by the linguistic comprehension module. This time, long term 
memory is queried for information. Perhaps a memory of a movie depicting a very 
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similar situation is recalled. As a result, a belief is generated in your date that, in fact, 
you desire a kiss.    
It has been my goal to provide but the barest sketch of how the expression 
and recognition of informative intentions might explain communicative behaviour, 
according to RTM. I have used Carruthers’ model of the massively-modular mind, 
because it has been worked out in some detail, and because prominent post-Griceans 
seeking to explain how speakers and hearers express and recognise meaning via 
intentional psychology favour a massively-modular mental architecture. There might 
be many problems with massive-modularity, as a hypothesis about how the mind 
works; or with Carruthers’ particular model; or with my application of it. However, 
the point has been simply to show that the expression and recognition of intentions is, 
at least in-principle, explanatory of some crucial aspects of communication: namely, 
the expression and recognition of speaker meaning. Having done this, I now consider 
the explanatory status of speaker meaning assuming the relationship between 
intentional psychology and cognitive science is more nuanced than depicted on RTM. 
 
3. Assuming the intentional stance 
 
I argued that the substance of post-Gricean accounts of communication depend on 
the explanatory status of intentional states. I explored some different accounts of the 
explanatory status of intentional states: i.e. ways in which folk psychological 
explanation, invoking intentional states, interfaces with explanation in the cognitive 
sciences. One account drew from the RTM and took intentionality to be grounded in 
syntactically-structured beliefs and desires, these being type-type reducible to cognitive 
states. On this view, post-Gricean accounts of communication are explanatory. They 
are explanatory because the kinds of folk states central to post-Gricean accounts of 
communication neatly ‘hook onto’ kinds of states that are explanatory from the 
perspective of cognitive science.  
The other relevant account of the ontology of intentionality to be explored is 
the intentional stance (Dennett 1987). It takes intentionality to be grounded in the 
right kinds of behavioural patterns, as opposed to internal mental states (Dennett 
1992). Note that the understanding of ‘explanation’ employed above was 
decompositional: appealing to how sub-functions give rise to system-level functions. 
From this, it seems natural to conclude that a Dennettian view of the interface 
problem is not an option for post-Griceans. This is because, on the intentional stance, 
the beliefs and desires constituting intentionality are not discrete states of the 
cognitive system. Why is this relevant? Well, according to one attractive view, there 
are two requirements of person-level psychological explanation (PPE) (Bermudez 
2005). First, PPE depends on the existence of regularities governing the inter-relations 
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between person-level states and between these states, perceptual representations, and 
behaviour. Second, PPE depends on causally efficacious internal items corresponding 
to the person-level states cited in PPEs. From this second requirement, one might 
infer that the intentional stance is not an option for post-Griceans who wish to 
cognitively explain how meaning is expressed and recognised in human 
communication.  
Consider also one of Dennett’s motivations for advocating the intentional 
stance. The goal is to insulate person-level explanation from developments in 
cognitive science. Whether the subpersonal basis for cognition turns out to consist in 
representations bearing a structural correspondence with linguistic representations of 
the propositional attitudes, or whether what’s under the hood instead consists in 
distributed neural networks (or whatever), bearing no neat correspondence with 
person-level states, PPEs will nevertheless be truth-apt90 explanations of behaviour. 
They will be truth-apt explanations of behaviour because they potentially correspond, 
not to internal, causally-interacting physical structures, but rather to genuinely existing 
patterns in the outward behaviour of agents. The truth of the claim ‘x believes that p’ 
depends, not on states internal to x, but rather to x’s behaviour – either actual or 
counterfactual. The structural correspondence between PPE and the world goes from 
being an internal correspondence (on RTM) to an external one. Thus, one could easily 
conclude that the intentional stance is not explanatory in a decompositional sense.  
If the intentional stance is not a way of decomposing an intelligent system 
into its sub-systems, then what is it? How does it explain? It explains by positing a 
network of relations between inputs, mental states, and behaviours; where intervening 
on any one of these variables makes a difference to the others. According to Dennett 
(1992, p. 43), “if one finds a predictive pattern of the sort just described one has ipso 
facto discovered a causal power – a difference in the world that makes a subsequent 
difference testable by the standard empirical methods of variable manipulation”. The 
idea is that, taking the intentional stance, PPE is explanatory because whether ‘x 
believes that p’ is true depends on what x would do, say, or think in various 
circumstances: “what it means to say that someone believes that p, is that that person 
is disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions” (Dennett 1987, p. 50). 
And these counterfactuals can be tested, either via observation in the wild or 
experimentally.  
Take the two sentences below. They both explain, from the perspective of the 
intentional stance. Each are made true or false, depending on counterfactual 
behaviours, utterances, and thoughts.  
 
                                                          
90 I.e. not just useful. Dennett arguably became less of an instrumentalist by the time of Real Patterns 
(Dennett 1992). 
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1. S intends that H recognise S intends H to go away (i.e. S harbours communicative intent) 
2. S intends that H go away (i.e. S harbours informative intent) 
 
Consider the first sentence. In the last chapter I discussed a study probing the truth of 
relevant counterfactuals to determine whether sentence 1 is true or false (Grosse et al. 
2010). To briefly recap, the study required infants to request a desired object from a 
first experimenter (say, a ball to complete a task the infant was playing with a second 
experimenter). The first experimenter would then ‘misunderstand’ the infant’s request 
for the ball by pointing to a different object (e.g. a bit of paper), uttering ‘Oh, you 
want the paper!’. However, at the same time as reaching for the undesired object, the 
first experimenter would distractedly place the requested object (the ball) in easy reach 
of the infant, so that the infant’s informative intention was essentially satisfied despite 
being misunderstood. This ‘misunderstanding’ condition was compared with a series 
of other conditions: most notably where the infant got the ball and was understood 
correctly. It was found that around 45 per cent of 18 month-old infants attempted to 
‘repair’ the communicative interaction in the misunderstanding condition. It was also 
found that, when an infant got what it wanted but was misunderstood, the time taken 
to turn away from the communicative exchange was a bit more than double the length 
of time (around 9 seconds) compared to when the infant got what it wanted and was 
understood correctly (around 4 seconds). The conclusion of the study is that infants 
communicate with communicative intent over and above informative intent.  
 Considering this, the difference between RTM and the intentional stance isn’t 
that the former is explanatory while the latter is not. Rather, the difference comes 
down to the kind of ‘explanation’ given by invoking person-level states. On RTM, (at 
least many) person-level states are type-type reducible to cognitive states. For instance, 
my intention to lean back for Rick is type-type reducible to a state in one of my 
practical reasoning modules, after this module has consulted belief-generating 
modules in response to being activated by my desire that Rick believe Roger is 
approaching. Looking back at Figures 6.1 and 6.2, it is easy to come away with the 
impression that a mechanism is being described, where intentional states are 
components in this mechanism. Indeed, proponents of mechanistic explanation argue 
that cognitive models like these explain only to the degree they depict mechanistic 
structure (Kaplan & Craver 2011, Piccinini & Craver & 2011). Others have objected, 
arguing that many cognitive models represent, not mechanistic structure, but rather 
functional organisation (Weiskopf 2011, Barrett 2014, Shapiro 2016). Unless 
mechanistic explanation is trivialised into a vague, catch-all, physicalism, a cognitive 
model is not mechanistic. While all cognitive scientists expect their models to 
ultimately bottom-out in physical structures, many test their hypotheses about 
cognitive organisation without considering the brain at all. What these cognitive 
139 
 
scientists include in their models are components described functionally, as opposed 
to mechanistically. Functional decomposition investigates how sub-functions (i.e. a 
practical reasoning module) contribute to some system-level function (i.e. expressing 
meaning); mechanistic decomposition investigates how physical structure (shape, 
position, timing, force, charge) produces the activities the functionalist identifies 
(Shapiro 2016). Taking this line, person-level states, on RTM, are states of a system 
that is functionally decomposed. Functional decomposition is similar to mechanistic 
decomposition in that both decompose a system into smaller units which, when 
combined, give rise to a higher-level function. However, functional decomposition is 
concerned less (if at all) with how physical structure realises function.  
The idea I want to take forward is not the difference between mechanistic 
explanation and functional decomposition, per say. Instead, it is the idea that much 
cognitive science explains behaviour via decomposition. This contrasts with the 
intentional stance. The intentional stance explains behaviour by highlighting 
counterfactual dependencies at the level of the whole system. Having pointed out that 
the intentional stance doesn’t decompose intelligent systems to understand them, 
though, what are we to make of Dennett’s (1987) suggestion that his intentional 
stance is like Marr’s (1982) top level in the latter’s famous hierarchy of cognitive 
theorising? Marr calls his top level the computational level, distinguishing it from both 
the (middle) algorithmic level and the (bottom) implementation level. A computational 
description of some thinking/behaving system is the most abstract. It involves 
characterising the system’s inputs and outputs, and the relation between these inputs 
and outputs. The latter relation constitutes the function (in the mathematical sense of 
the term) the system can be said to compute, which it is then the job of the 
algorithmic level of analysis to specify computational processes that can realise the 
function defined at the computational level. The implementation level involves 
physical realisation of the processes, formulated at the algorithmic level, in neural 
hardware (or silicon chips). For Marr at least, a good computational (i.e. top-level) 
analysis of some system is key to further investigation down the hierarchy. If, as Marr 
took to be the case in then-contemporary vision science, the computational 
description of some capacity is mistaken, then work at lower levels will be misguided.  
Now, if taking the intentional stance towards a system is akin to analysing the 
system at Marr’s computational level, then perhaps the former will count as the 
beginnings of a decompositional explanation of behaviour. The job of the intentional 
stance will be to get clear on the capacities of some system, before programmers or 
network engineers get to work designing computational implementations of these 
capacities. This sounds tantalising. However, despite comparing the intentional stance 
with Marr’s computational level, Dennett himself holds-out little hope in finding a 
“strong resemblance” between an intentional depiction of some system (what he also 
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calls a ‘competence model’) and a depiction of the same system at levels 
corresponding to Marr’s algorithmic and implementation analyses.   
 
The fact about competence models that provokes my “instrumentalism” is that the 
decomposition of one’s competence model into parts, phases, states, steps, or 
whatever need shed no light at all on the decomposition of the actual mechanical parts, 
phases, states or steps of the system being modelled-even when the model is, as a 
competence model, excellent (Dennett 1987, pp. 75-76). 
 
If indeed there is a resemblance between an intentional description of some system, 
on the one hand, and a description of the system from what Dennett calls “sub-
personal cognitive psychology”, this resemblance will be more or less accidental. 
Moreover, it won’t be indicative of a ‘good’ intentional description. What is indicative 
of a good intentional description is, instead, whether the attributed person-level states: 
a) make sense of the system’s behaviour, or b) accurately predict, again constrained by 
considerations of rationality, what the system will do.  
 There are at least two conclusions stemming from the forgoing 
considerations. The first privileges explanation via decomposition and, as a result, 
disprivileges the explanatory status of the intentional stance. Because the latter doesn’t 
decompose an intelligent system into its lower-level sub-functions, it doesn’t give us 
much understanding of the system’s intelligence. I favour a second conclusion. 
Intentional psychology (PPE from the perspective of the intentional stance) is 
obviously a powerful way of intervening on an intelligent system for the purposes of 
manipulation and control. As a result, it would be an exercise in extreme parochialism 
to dismiss intentional psychology simply because it doesn’t capture regularities at the 
level of internal cognitive structure. Forms of empirical clinical psychology, like 
cognitive behavioural therapy and acceptance and avoidance therapy, are saturated in 
person-level states: for example, identifying and then working through one’s (possibly 
irrational) beliefs surrounding perceived negative problems. From the perspective of 
the intentional stance, the relationship between inputs, mental states, and behaviours 
is a systematic one, such that intervening on, say, one’s un-analysed and perhaps 
irrational belief about the expectations of partners within marital relationships, has 
(possibly positive) consequences for other mental states (including emotions) and for 
behaviour. Consider also any empirical study in psychology/cognitive science based 
on the violations-of-expectations paradigm. For instance, in response to a child’s 
surprise at where Sally looks for her marble after returning from her ‘walk’, it is 
concluded the child lacks certain beliefs: in this case, veridical beliefs about Sally’s 
(false) mental states. This conclusion is made assuming a systematic relationship 
between behaviours (e.g. surprise and gaze direction) and mental states (beliefs about 
Sally’s mental states). The conclusion that the child lacks certain beliefs (or the 
capacity to form certain beliefs) is also projectable to future behaviours. This is, in 
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effect, what is being done when the child is diagnosed with some form of mind-
blindness as a result of failing the false-belief test.     
Now, one objection to this is Fodorian. Something like the RTM must be true, 
not only because of the success of PPE in allowing us to navigate our peers every day, 
but also because successful science in psychology takes place on the level of PPE. 
This isn’t the only available conclusion, though, and begs the question against the 
intentional stance. The intentional stance claims a system of regularities holding at the 
level of PPE, without being committed to regularities internal to intentional systems 
resembling those holding at the level of PPE. My point is that, if there is indeed a lack 
of resemblance between PPE and internal cognitive structure, then it is foolish to 
demote PPE because it doesn’t capture internal structure in the process of successfully 
exploiting structure at the level of PPE. Psychological explanation is many and varied. 
Sometimes, i.e. when working out how to build an artificial system that mirrors 
human intelligence, it may be necessary to engage in functional and mechanistic 
decomposition. At other times it won’t be, when manipulating thought and behaviour 
at an abstract level.   
When, then, of models of communication invoking intentional states? If the 
intentional stance is the proper response to the interface problem, then such models 
won’t be explanatory in a decompositional sense. However, they will be explanatory in 
an interventionist sense. In leaning back on my chair, the claim that I behave 
motivated by the informative intention that Rick believe Roger approaches will be 
literally true or false. Whether it is true or false depends, for instance, on what I would 
do/think/say in response to Rick exclaiming ‘Yay!’, after Rick has looked over his 
right shoulder. Assume that I believe Rick loathes Roger, and that Rick desires not to 
interact with Roger. Then, if I genuinely intend Rick to believe Roger is approaching, I 
should be surprised at a gleeful response from Rick. Additionally, if the intentional 
stance is the proper response to the interface problem, then positing that speaker 
meaning is expressed and recognised via the expression and recognition of certain 
intentions might be a true explanation of communication. It might literally be the case 
that, in order to work out what you mean, I infer your intention(s) in gesticulating 
towards me. If PPE is the kind of intentional ‘calculus’ Dennett suggests, then even if 
personal-level states don’t neatly correspond to states of subpersonal cognition, it 
nevertheless obtains that, by (correctly) inferring that you want me to go away, I will 
have a good chance at successfully coordinating my behaviour with yours: at least, a 
much better chance than if I (incorrectly) infer you want me to come closer.  
 
4. Conclusion 
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Post-Gricean accounts of communication are hostage to how descriptions of the 
mind at the person-level (invoking intentional states) interface with descriptions of 
mind at lower levels. I presented some ways of conceiving of this relationship among 
levels of description, and explored the ramifications for post-Gricean accounts. I 
concluded as follows. First, if RTM accurately depicts the relationship between 
person-level states and cognitive states, then post-Gricean accounts of communication 
come out as explanatory in a decompositional sense. Second, if this relationship is as 
Dennett theorised, then post-Gricean models still explain how expressing and 
recognising meaning in communication works: this time at the level of whole persons.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Against the background of the information vs influence debate (Owren, Rendall & 
Ryan 2010, Stegmann 2013), this thesis defended a broadly informational approach to 
animal communication. However, it sought to get clear on exactly what cognitive 
commitments arise from attributing meaning to signals, as well as whether animal 
communication can be defined in terms of such meaning. I drew a line between a 
working notion of ‘natural meaning’, requiring very little cognitive sophistication; and 
a notion of ‘speaker meaning’, requiring intentional behaviour on the part of speakers 
and mindreading on the part of hearers. 
Chapter 1 argued that the natural meaning of signals should be grounded by 
both correlation and by teleology. Only if so grounded can the content of signals do 
the following: (1) make sense of why receivers currently respond to signals, (2) explain 
historical success non-vacuously, and (3) assign the appropriate contents in non-
cooperative cases. Chapter 2 argued that, despite the explanatory upshot of attributing 
natural meaning to signals, signalhood cannot be defined in terms of phenotypes that 
uniquely carry natural meaning. This conclusion was not an artefact of the particular 
notion of natural meaning I defended in Chapter 1. It would be the result, also, of a 
purely correlational notion or a purely teleological one. Chapter 3 then looked more 
closely at the role of natural meaning when it comes to explaining receiver responses. 
What do (or should) ethologists mean by saying that a creature behaved thus-and-so 
because it derived natural meaning q from a signal? Typically, this explains a receiver’s 
(relatively fixed) response from a historical and population-level perspective only. 
Sometimes, though, it is part of explaining a receiver’s (relatively flexible) response in 
real time.  
Chapter 4 switched focus from natural meaning to speaker meaning.  This 
was done because non-natural meaning is sometimes attributed to the signals of a 
limited number of nonhuman species, such as chimpanzees. I tried to make clear 
sense of non-natural meaning while outlining its psychological commitments. Chapter 
5 argued that these commitments might well place non-natural meaning outside of the 
capabilities of nonhuman species, if not also young human beings learning how to 
communicate for the first time. I suggested that the latter point rests on whether or 
not children possess System 1 recursive mindreading skills from birth: a question in 
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need of further empirical investigation. Drawing from Csibra (2010), I also suggested 
there are grades of speaker meaning standing in-between natural meaning, on the one 
hand, and non-natural meaning, on the other. Both intermediary forms of speaker 
meaning involve receivers inferring informative intent, but not communicative intent. 
On the lower end, there might be no proxy yet of communicative intent (i.e. 
chimpanzee communication). On the upper end, however, there might be a proxy for 
the expression and/or recognition of communicative intent: codes that trigger 
interpretive processes in hearers in virtue of proper function as opposed to meta-
representation. 
Finally, Chapter 6 explored the relationship between intentional psychology 
and cognitive science. I did this because notions of speaker meaning (whether fully 
Gricean or not) are grounded by intentional states. I considered the ramifications of 
two different ways intentional psychology might interface with cognitive science. I 
concluded that the ramifications are different depending on one’s solution to the 
interface problem. On neither solution to the interface problem, however, should 
speaker meaning be rejected as non-explanatory.  
Before finishing, I offer some brief concluding remarks about the project and 
its underlying assumptions. These would have taken up too much space in the 
introduction. Furthermore, they might not have made sense there, without the context 
of the thesis behind them.  
 
- More on terms - 
 
Those who are familiar with the philosophy of information/representation may take 
issue with the way I used the notion of ‘natural meaning’. Some philosophers, 
particularly Millikan (2004) and Neander (2017), use this term differently. According 
to them, ‘natural meaning’ is incapable of being false. This is because it is carried 
solely in virtue of a sign being physically linked to its referent. M number of rings on a 
tree naturally means the tree is n years old, because of the physical link between tree 
rings and tree age. Unless the tree is n number of years old, you will not see m number 
of tree rings. This means signs carrying natural meaning can’t misrepresent. 
Philosophers taking this line have contrasted natural meaning with a kind of meaning 
that, they allege, can misrepresent.  
Somewhat confusing, in my opinion, Piccinini & Scarantino (2010) contrast 
the kind of (natural) meaning carried by tree rings, which they also allege can’t be 
false, with Gricean non-natural meaning, which allegedly can. They then state the 
latter kind of meaning is “often used interchangeably with the notion of 
representation” (Piccinini & Scarantino 2010, p. 242). Now, it is true that Millikan and 
Neander (and others) contrast natural meaning with representational content, because 
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the latter can be false while, allegedly, the former cannot. However, the latter 
philosophers do not equate non-natural meaning with representational content. And 
they are right not to. Non-natural meaning is sent by individuals behaving with higher-
order intentions towards hearers, and it is received by individuals able to meta-
represent the higher-order intentions of senders. Representational content, on the 
other hand, does not require anything like this. Take a subpersonal mental 
representation in the early visual system. This carries representational content without 
being sent by something that is even capable of behaving motivated by intentions; and 
this content can be ‘received’ without the consumer having the capacity to recognise 
intentions. 
Although I stand with Millikan and Neander on keeping Gricean non-natural 
meaning separate from representational content, I part ways with them in attributing, 
as I do, natural meaning to signals. As I have been using the notion of ‘natural 
meaning’, signals carrying it can misrepresent. Take our female Photuris firefly offering 
sex but instead delivering death. I have understood her signals to be misrepresenting 
that she is a Photinus female looking for a mate. But for Millikan and Neander, natural 
meaning can’t misrepresent. This is because, for them, natural meaning (as opposed to 
representational content) rests on causation/correlation alone. The transition from 
natural meaning to representational content, for them, requires the introduction of 
biological proper function. Only after we add proper function can a sign that 
correlates with its referent possibly be false (and only then can it become a genuine 
sign). On the other hand, I have used the term ‘natural meaning’ to refer to signals that 
can misrepresent, because of biological proper function.  
I did this, firstly, because I wanted a neat way of contrasting Gricean non-
natural meaning with a simpler kind(s) of meaning not requiring the expressing and 
recognition of intentions. Contrasting non-natural meaning with, say, ‘content’ or 
‘information’, as opposed to ‘natural meaning’, is not as symmetrical. Secondly, I used 
the term ‘natural meaning’ to refer to a kind of meaning that can misrepresent 
because, at least from my perspective, the latter is much closer to ‘orthodox’ natural 
meaning - as Millikan and Neander use the term - than non-natural meaning. 
Combining correlation with proper function, in order to turn a concept of natural 
meaning that (allegedly) cannot misrepresent into one than can misrepresent, is a 
relatively minor adjustment to the concept of ‘natural meaning’. A third reason for my 
use of ‘natural meaning’ is that ‘orthodox’ Gricean natural meaning can misrepresent, 
if we allow the latter to be carried by entities that correlate with their referents, as 
opposed to demanding causation (e.g. Skyrms 2010). This is because the correlation 
grounding content exists at the level of types. As a result, tokens of a type R that 
correlates with C can be tokened when C does not obtain (Shea 2007). Thus, the 
146 
 
reason for splitting natural meaning from representational content may not be a good 
reason to start with.  
But does my use of terminology have the following, awkward, consequence? 
Am I forced to say that the information in cues, for instance, isn’t natural 
information? One might think I am, because my notion of natural meaning requires 
biological proper function (on the part of consumers of this meaning). The particular 
natural meaning carried by a signal refers to the world-state that rationalises the 
evolved/learnt response of the receiver, in addition to referring to the world-state 
which the signal correlates with. However, because the theory of content chosen in 
Chapter 1 doesn’t require co-adapted producers and consumers, but only adapted 
consumers, cues also carry natural meaning, as I have been using that term. If a cue is 
used by an organism to adjust behaviour to the world, the organism’s response must 
be a product of evolution or learning. Thus, there will be a world-state that 
rationalised the response of an organism to a cue when, historically, things went well 
for that organism and the response was re-enforced. This world-state is the natural 
meaning carried by the cue. Of course, cues that have not yet been utilised by an 
organism won’t carry natural meaning. However, they will still correlate with their 
potential referents. A beam of light reflected by a predator correlates with the 
predator, even if this cue has not yet been utilised, and this correlation explains why 
receivers that eventually came to respond appropriately to the cue benefitted.   
 
- Is all meaning natural meaning? – 
 
Finally, I respond to Skyrms’ (2010, p. 1) provocative claim that all meaning is natural 
meaning. In his book, Skyrms presents a how-possibly account of the emergence of 
meaning conventions from the spontaneous actions of individuals in a population. 
Lewis (1969) first proposed something along these lines. He did so in response to the 
following conundrum. How do words get their semantic contents? It can’t be from 
some episode where everyone sits down to decide upon the semantic contents of 
words, because this episode would itself depend on everyone possessing contentful 
language. Instead, Lewis proposed that semantic content arises through the 
spontaneous coordination of senders and receivers. However, the coordination of 
senders and receivers envisaged by Lewis depends on them possessing a raft of 
(contentful/meaningful) mental states. Only by me believing that others in my language 
community use words in a certain way (and that, additionally, these other people 
believe that I believe this) do I respect semantic conventions.  
Skryms (2010) took the idea of spontaneous coordination giving rise to 
meaning conventions a step further than Lewis, proposing that this coordination can 
be achieved on basis of trial and error (either evolutionary or ontogenetic) as well as 
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via the rational coordination of agents. With the right kind of feedback, the 
spontaneous behaviours of ‘mindless’ individuals (like fireflies) can be coordinated 
such that meaning conventions arise: senders will produce behaviours in certain 
world-states, such that this behaviour influences receivers, causing the latter to 
produce their own behaviours that are adaptive (enough). The resulting ‘meaning’ that 
emerges from this ‘mindless’ coordination is correlational. Signals carry natural 
meaning about particular world-states in virtue of raising the probability of such 
world-states. Thus, we have meaning conventions grounded by facts, none of which 
are facts about meaningful entities prior to the emergence of meaning conventions. 
Meaning conventions can arise on the back of non-mentalistic coordination. As a 
result, “all meaning is natural meaning” (Skryms 2010, p. 1). 
This might be well and good for communication in many, relatively simple, 
species. But what about primate (including human) communication? Chimpanzee 
communication arguably involves senders behaving with informative intentions and 
receivers recognising these intentions. Quotidian human communication involves the 
same, perhaps with the aid of assumptions constraining the process of inferring intent 
that are triggered by ostensive signals (Csibra 2010). If this is true, then the idea that 
all meaning is natural meaning is not as straight forward as Skyrms makes out. For, the 
kind of (speaker) meaning humans, and potentially other great apes, exchange depends 
on the intentional states of interlocutors; where these states possess intentionality, or 
‘aboutness’, independent of external semantic conventions.  
If Skyrms’s claim is to be born out, it would have to be shown that the 
intentional states grounding speaker meaning themselves carry merely natural 
meaning. This brings us back to the interface problem, discussed in Chapter 6. If, for 
example, the intentional states grounding the expression and recognition of speaker 
meaning are discrete mental representations in the vein of a representational theory of 
mind, then Skyrms’s claim that all meaning is natural meaning depends on the success 
of the long-running project to ‘naturalise’ the content of internal mental 
representations91. If discrete mental representation indeed underpin propositional 
attitude ascriptions, and if the intentional content of these representations (at least at 
the base level) can be grounded by appeal to the information carried by such 
representations (Dretske 1981) or by teleological theories (Millikan 2004), then the 
following picture of communication is suggested: linguistic utterances carry natural 
meaning about the intentions of speakers, where these intentions themselves carry 
natural meaning qua mental representations, in the sense outlined by Dretske, Millikan 
or someone similar. Alternatively, if the interface problem is solved by taking the 
intentional stance, then linguistic utterances carry natural meaning about the 
                                                          
91  See Stich & Warfield (1994) for an overview of this literature. 
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intentions of speakers, where these intentions are simply mental/behavioural 
dispositions of speakers, as opposed to internal mental representations corresponding 
to propositional attitude ascriptions. In either case, all meaning (external and internal) 
would indeed be natural meaning, but in a way that is somewhat more nuanced than 
the Skyrmsian proclamation. Of course, such a picture would need to be filled out in 
much more detail than I have done. As such, I end merely with the aforementioned 
suggestion for how natural meaning and speaker meaning might combine to form a 
unified account of communication in which a) natural meaning is primary, but where 
b) speaker meaning is taken seriously.  
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